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Abstract
The thesis focuses on a few fundamental problems in multi-player dynamic sequential decision problems
– games and teams – with asymmetric information. It is divided into two parts and addresses six broad
theoretical problems. In the first part of the thesis, the focus is on dynamic games, in which the decision
makers do not observe the same set of random variables at every time step of the play. In the second part
of the thesis, the focus is on static and dynamic teams in which the decision makers may or may not share
their observations with each other. This part of the thesis partially resolves a long-standing open question
in stochastic control theory, which is to establish the existence of team-optimal solutions in teams with non-
classical information structures. To solve all problems, a two-step solution approach is adopted; the first step
involves identifying an equivalent decision problem with expanded state, observation, and action spaces of
the decision makers, and the second step consists of solving this equivalent problem and then projecting the
solution back to the original problem.
Information asymmetry among decision makers naturally arises in numerous social, economic, and
engineering settings. An auction is an example of a game of asymmetric information. The value of the
object to a bidder is known only to that bidder, but not known to other bidders. However, the decisions of
all the bidders affect the outcome of the auction. A communication system comprising an encoder and a
decoder is a team with asymmetric information. The encoder wants to communicate a randomly generated
message to the decoder via a noisy channel. The decision makers here are the encoder and the decoder, who
decide, respectively, on the encoding and decoding strategies to minimize the expected distortion between
the original and the decoded messages subject to certain communication or energy constraints. Despite
ubiquity of scenarios in which information asymmetry appears, very few results exist on the existence of
suitable solutions in such problems. The purpose of this thesis is to identify sufficiently general conditions
under which suitable solutions exist in dynamic stochastic games and teams with asymmetric information.
The first part of the thesis studies three problems pertinent to games with asymmetric information.
In the first problem, a refinement concept for Nash equilibrium is presented, called common information
based Markov perfect equilibrium (CIMPE), for a class of two-player dynamic linear-Gaussian (LG) games
of asymmetric information satisfying two general conditions. The most appealing property of CIMPE is that
it can be computed using a backward induction algorithm. Further, if the cost functions of the decision
makers are quadratic in their arguments (called LQG games) and satisfy certain conditions, then the game
is proven to admit a unique CIMPE, which can be computed by solving for the unknowns in a succession
of linear equations. A two-step solution approach is adopted to prove the results and devise the algorithm.
In the first step, a two-player virtual game of symmetric and perfect information is constructed. It is shown
that every Nash equilibrium of the original LQG game can be mapped to a Nash equilibrium of the virtual
game and vice-versa. Thereafter, in the second step, a Markov perfect equilibrium of the virtual game is
used to construct a Nash equilibrium of the original LQG game. The algorithm to compute a Markov perfect
equilibrium of the virtual game is used to devise an algorithm to compute a CIMPE for the original game. An
example game, which admits a unique CIMPE but multiple Nash equilibria, is also presented to illustrate that
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there may be several other Nash equilibria in a game of asymmetric information, that cannot be computed
using the proposed scheme.
The second problem pertains to a finite-horizon dynamic incentive design problem, in which the deci-
sion makers have asymmetric information at every stage of the game. A central agency designs incentives
dynamically, so that decision makers behave in a desired manner at every stage of the game. The goal of
the central agency is to optimize its own utility function, which may depend on the utility functions of all
the decision makers. We introduce a new equilibrium concept for dynamic incentive design games, which
we call common information based incentive scheme. We show that under certain assumptions, the central
agency is able to design a common information based incentive scheme which forces decision makers to
behave according to the desired strategies at all time steps.
In the third problem, the refinement concept (CIMPE) is extended to a multi-player dynamic game in
which decision makers have resource constraints across time. A similar two-step approach is used as in the
first problem to show the existence of a Nash equilibrium under certain assumptions on the game. A key
step in the proof is to show that the amount of resource used by decision makers up to a time step into the
game forms a set of states of the game, which is then augmented with other states of the game to compute
a Nash equilibrium.
The second part of the thesis resolves three issues pertaining to teams with asymmetric information.
The first problem of this second part, and also the fourth problem of the thesis, considers a static team of
asymmetric information, in which the decision makers do not share their observations with each other. Such
an information pattern is referred to as the no-observation sharing information structure. Under certain
assumptions on the observation channels of the decision makers, existence of a team-optimal solution is
established. First, the strategy spaces of the decision makers are expanded to behavioral (randomized)
strategy spaces. A challenge is to ensure that the limiting strategy of a convergent sequence of behavioral
strategies of a decision maker under a certain topology does not depend on the random variables that are not
acquired by the decision maker. Appropriate assumptions on the joint measures over state and observations
of the decision makers are made to overcome the challenge. Thereafter, tools from probability theory and
general topology are used to establish the existence result.
In the fifth problem of the thesis, dynamic teams with no-observation sharing information structures
are considered. The proof techniques developed for static teams are used sequentially in a specific manner
to prove the existence of optimal solutions in a large class of dynamic teams with no-observation sharing
information structures. Consequently, a large class of dynamic linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) teams with
no-observation sharing information structures and cost functions with a specific structure is proven to admit
optimal solutions.
In the sixth and final problem of the thesis, the results for teams with no-observation sharing information
structure are used to establish the existence of team-optimal solutions in a class of teams with observation
sharing information structures. Consequently, several teams, with or without observation sharing informa-
tion structures, are shown to admit optimal solutions, for which proofs of existence did not exist previously.
Furthermore, optimal encoding-decoding policies are shown to exist in a large class of multivariate Gaus-
sian channels, where existence of optimal policies were known only for a few cases and under stringent
assumptions, and the proof relied on certain information-theoretic techniques.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The scenario in which one or more decision maker(s) (DM(s)) act is called a decision problem. In any
decision problem, the DMs are assumed to have certain preferences: Each DM has a preference ordering
among his possible actions given the actions of all other DMs. The preference ordering and the interactions
with other DMs’ actions are generally captured by utility functions1. One can also view the problem in
another way: Each DM has a utility function which determines the orderings among its preferences. In
certain classes of decision problems, the utility function of each DM depends on not only self actions, but
also the actions of the other DMs. The dependence of the utility function of each DM on the actions of all
(or a subset of) other DMs makes decision problems interesting, rich, and applicable to many real situations.
This dissertation studies a variety of such decision problems, establishes existence of appropriate solutions,
and devises algorithms for their computation.
Our common sense suggests that information and beliefs are the fundamental bases for decision making
in most real scenarios. For example, consider a high-school student. His or her decision about which
university to choose for undergraduate education depends on many factors - proximity to native place, cost
of education, reputation of the university, reputation of the department in the university that the student
is interested in, and so on. In such a scenario, the student knows certain variables required for decision
making (for example, proximity to native place and the cost of education) but not all, and those others
he/she has certain beliefs based on reviews by various people, news agencies, etc. (for example, reputation
of the department and the university). The student will surely take into account all these factors before he
or she decides on the university to enroll in. Hence, information and beliefs are important in constructing
decisions in a decision problem, which we now make precise. Information of a DM is a collection of random
variables that the DM observes or whose realizations are acquired by the DM before making a decision. On
the other hand, belief of a DM is the conditional probability measure over the information of other DMs and
some other random variables given its own information.
The dependence of decision making on information and beliefs has been underscored by several re-
searchers in the past. However, early work on decision problems did not introduce information explicitly
as a variable in the decision making process because of primarily two reasons: (i) Simple decision making
problems with multiple DMs had just started receiving attention at the time, and (ii) adding information of
DMs explicitly as another variable of the problem introduced significant complications, which deterred re-
searchers from looking into these problems. Due to the foundations of probability theory and its applications
to the fields related to optimization laid by the work of Kolmogorov and Stratonovich in the early twenti-
eth century, researchers were able to introduce information explicitly as a part of the problem formulations
1In the problems considered in this thesis, we assume that each DM has a cost function, and the DMs decide on strategies that
minimize their expected cost functions.
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in various decision problems. Most of these problems arose primarily in economics and control-theoretic
setups.
Prior to 1940, a majority of decision problems were studied under deterministic settings2, that is, all
variables of the decision problems, except the actions of the DMs, were known to all the DMs at the outset.
The solutions to these problems computed the actions the DMs would take in those settings. An uncertainty
may arise if DMs act according to certain probability distributions3. Such problems, though not necessarily
easy to analyze, were not able to model real decision making scenarios in which DMs’ information is asym-
metric. Absence of such a framework led to the study of decision problems with information-constrained
DMs.
In a deterministic decision problem, the underlying optimization (or game) is formulated on the product
of all action spaces of the DMs. There are two ways of analyzing a decision problem in which DMs do not
share all the information: one using the ex-post method and the other using the ex-ante method. In the
ex-post method, each DM takes the conditional expectation of its cost, with the conditioning being on the
realization of its information, and then decides on a control action that optimizes its (conditionally) expected
utility. In the ex-ante method, on the other hand, each DM decides on a strategy, and the original decision
problem has to be lifted to a decision problem over the product of strategy spaces of the DMs – the so-
called strategic form. The distinction between actions and strategies of a DM is subtle: A strategy of a DM
is a collection of functions that map his/her (dynamic) information to his/her action set at all time steps.
In other words, strategy of a DM specifies what action the DM should take given a particular realization
of his/her information. Thus, in a decision problem with information, strategies are determined at the
beginning of the activity, and the action of each DM is generated by the strategy given the realization of
his/her information at every time4.
In order to develop a better insight into the intricacies one faces in analyzing decision problems, we need
to introduce a few definitions. A decision problem is dynamic, if the action of a DM affects the observation of
some DM (possibly itself), otherwise it is static. A decision problem is sequential, if the ordering of “who acts
when” is decided a priori, even before the decision horizon starts. On the other hand, in a non-sequential
decision problem, DMs may act at random times, which may also depend on the actions of the other DMs. A
decision problem is said to be stochastic, if there are random parameters in the setting that are not controlled
by any DM. Such random parameters are called environment variables or the states of the nature. Thus, in
a stochastic decision problem, the world is divided into decision variables and environment variables.
In a dynamic decision problem, at each instant of time each DM acquires some information about the
state, past actions, and past and current observations of all the DMs. The specification of the information
acquired by each DM at every time step in a dynamic problem is called the information structure of that DM,
and the collection of information structures of all the DMs in the problem is called the information structure
of the decision problem. If all the DMs acquire the same information at every time step of the decision hori-
zon, then the problem is said to be of symmetric information. Otherwise, it is called a decision problem with
asymmetric information. The primary subject of this dissertation is dynamic stochastic sequential decision
problems with asymmetric information, in which, at every step, the DMs do not necessarily acquire the same
information.
2Wald studied Markov decision problems in the late 1940s, which is a stochastic decision problem.
3This is the case, for example, in games, where Nash equilibrium may not exist in pure strategies.
4Note that after the activity starts, the DMs do not have to change or revise their strategies due to the new information that arrives
(or is acquired). This is due to the fact that a strategy of a DM at a time (which has been fixed before the activity started) already takes
into account all the information that will be acquired by all the DMs throughout the decision horizon (from the beginning of the activity
until the end of the activity).
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Decision problems can be classified into two broad categories – games and teams. In a game problem,
the DMs do not have the same utility function, whereas in a team problem, on the other hand, they do and
agree to cooperate with each other. A game could be cooperative or non-cooperative. As the name suggests,
in a cooperative game, the DMs are able to enforce binding agreements (in other words, DMs may enforce
cooperative behavior). In a non-cooperative game, besides the rules of the game, no binding agreements can
be made, and all DMs are free to act according to their own will. All games considered in this dissertation
are non-cooperative in nature. For brevity, we simply use the wording “game” with the understanding that
it is a non-cooperative game.
If the utility of a DM is a cost, then the DM decides on a strategy to reduce its cost. If the utility of a DM
is a payoff, then the DM decides on a strategy to increase its payoff.
There are several key issues associated with a dynamic stochastic game or team with asymmetric infor-
mation, which have to be paid attention to in the analysis:
1. Interdependence of information of DMs: In most cases of interest, the information that a DM acquires
in a decision problem is correlated with the state of the nature, and the information acquired by other
DMs. This interdependence or correlation of information of DMs has to be considered while looking
for a solution to the problem.
2. Common knowledge among DMs: In a multi-DM setup, common knowledge is defined as the piece of
information that is available to all DMs, all DMs know that all DMs know that piece of information, and
ad infinitum. Merely the fact that all DMs have observed the same event does not necessarily mean that
the event is common knowledge. To illustrate this point, consider the following thought experiment.
Suppose that you and your friend live in adjacent apartments. There is a bus that passes by the
apartments sometime between 8 AM and 9 AM everyday, and both of you can see the bus passing
by through your respective windows. One morning, you and your friend saw the bus pass by your
apartment. Can you be certain that your friend also saw the same event that morning and vice-versa?
No! Now, assume that you were talking to your friend in front of your apartment, and you both saw
the bus passing by. In this case, both of you claim that the bus passed by your apartments, but each of
you can also claim that the other knows that the bus passed by, and ad infinitum. Thus, in this case,
the passing of bus is a common knowledge between you and your friend.
In typical scenarios, the model of the decision problem, the cost functions of the DMs, state and
observation equations, beliefs on the primitive random variables are all assumed to be common knowl-
edge among all DMs5. There is scant, but insightful literature on the importance and implications
of common knowledge in decision problems6. If any of the components of the decision problem is
not common knowledge among the DMs, then this has to be explicitly stated as part of the problem
formulation, and the solution must be approached with some care.
3. Higher order beliefs: In a decision problem, the behavior of a DM does not only depend on what his
5In games, contrary to the popular belief, common knowledge of rationality is not required for DMs to act according to Nash
equilibrium (Nash equilibrium is the key solution concept in games). Consider, for example, a finite non-zero sum game that has no
dominant strategy and admits a Nash equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies. DMs act according to Nash equilibrium, if each DM
knows its utility function and is rational (utility maximizing), and each DM believes that the other DMs act according to their respective
Nash equilibrium strategies (there are more technical conditions, which we will not go into here). Minimum knowledge that should be
available to DMs so that they act according to Nash equilibrium in a game is called epistemic conditions. See some related discussions
in [16, 17, 18] and the references therein.
6See, for example, [19, 20, 21].
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belief7 is about the state of the world and the information of other DMs, but it also depends on the
beliefs of other DMs about the state of the world and the information of all the DMs including itself and
other higher order beliefs8. It is not difficult to see that modeling such infinite hierarchies of beliefs of
all the DMs in a decision problem seems formidable. Of course, there are ways to simplify the problem
significantly by making certain consistency assumptions, which will be introduced later.
4. Agreement on the distribution of state of nature: This point is in similar spirit as above. In a multi-
DM setup, it is also possible that the DMs have different beliefs on the probability measure over the
state of nature. However, to propose a suitable solution concept for such problems and establish their
existence, the higher order beliefs of the DMs should satisfy certain consistency conditions. A static
decision problem of this kind has been investigated earlier in [22].
5. Unlimited computational resources with DMs: To be able to optimize their utility functions, each DM
needs unlimited computational resources. However, there is significant literature on “bounded ratio-
nality”, which limits the amount of computational resource the DMs may have. Thus, in a decision
problem where DMs have bounded rationality, they may not act optimally (or the definition of op-
timality needs a revisit). For the purpose of this dissertation, we assume that DMs have unlimited
computational resources, and leave problems with boundedly rational DMs as a topic for further re-
search.
6. Signaling: Signaling is a term widely used in the literature to refer to the fact that in stochastic dynamic
decision problems, a DM uses its action to encode part of its information as a “signal” to the DMs who
act at a later time and who do not necessarily acquire the information of that DM. More precisely,
consider a two-DM dynamic decision problem in which DM 1 acts first and DM 1’s action affects DM
2’s observation. Assume that DM 2 does not acquire the observation of DM 1. In such a case, the
action chosen by DM 1 is a function of its observation. Then, DM 2’s observation reveals part of the
information that was observed by DM 1 in the past. This event is called signaling, which is integral to
decision problems with non-nested information structures (defined later).
It should be noted that in the above example, the information may not be encoded consciously
by DM 1. Assume that both DMs know the distributions of the primitive random variables and DM
2 knows the strategy that DM 1 is using. Since DM 1’s action affects DM 2’s observation, DM 2,
based on its observation, can update its belief on DM 1’s observation. This phenomenon is signaling
(implicitly). In communication systems, on the other hand, DMs consciously encode, decode, and relay
information, which are different forms of explicit signaling, to transmit the information reliably over
noisy communication channels.
In games, where the strategies that DMs use may not be publicly known, the signals perceived by a
DM may not provide a good estimate of the observations of DMs who acted in the past. This is the case,
for example, in a game with multiple Nash equilibria where DMs act in order to deceive each-other.
7. Cooperative vs. non-cooperative DMs: In a team problem, the DMs agree to cooperate with each other.
One of the outcomes of this cooperation is that all DMs agree on their strategies prior to the beginning
7For the purpose of this discussion, the belief of a DM is defined to be the conditional probability measure on the state space of the
world and information spaces of other DMs given a realization of the information of that DM.
8To illustrate this by an example, let us consider a two-DM scenario, where the state of the world is denoted by x and the ob-
servation of DM i is denoted by yi. Further, assume that x and yi lie in finite sets X and Yi, respectively, for i ∈ {1, 2}. Let
y1 ∈ Y1 be a realization of the observation of DM 1. Then, the behavior of DM 1 depends on y1, P {X,Y2|y1}, P {P {X,Y1|Y2} |y1},
P {P {P {X,Y2|Y1} |Y2} |y1} , and so on.
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of the activity. This agreement goes a long way during the decision making process, since the DMs
have accurate beliefs on the random variables of interest. In a game scenario, non-cooperative DMs
need not agree on any particular set of strategies prior to the beginning of the activity. In a dynamic
setting with multiple possible solutions, this may be harmful for DMs, because they may not be able to
form the correct beliefs on the random variables of interest. Such scenarios also lead to deception in
games. We will revisit this issue and discuss it in greater detail in Section 6.2.
In the light of the discussions above, it should now be clear that analyzing asymmetric information
decision problems is quite challenging. This calls for a structured study of decision problems with asymmetric
information to develop certain conceptual tools to understand and prescribe “optimal” behavior of DMs in
such settings. This dissertation is an attempt in that direction. We should emphasize that the existence
of solutions in games and teams with asymmetric information is not obvious. Due to several technical
challenges one encounters in very simple games and teams with asymmetric information, this is an important
problem that needs to be addressed.
Having brought forth the intricacies of various decision problems, we now present some examples of
games and teams with asymmetric information in the next section.
1.1 Examples of Decision Problems with Asymmetric Information
In this section, we present some examples of dynamic decision problems in which the DMs have asymmetric
information. Once again, we would like to remind the reader that when we talk about games in this and the
subsequent sections, we are referring to non-cooperative games.
1.1.1 Teams with Asymmetric Information
Optimization with Limited Memory
Figure 1.1: A Soyuz spacecraft. In any spacecraft, the amount of on-board storage is limited. Hence, a large
amount of data that is generated or gathered during the operation is deleted. The deleted information may
be useful for controlling the spacecraft optimally. Image courtesy: http://en.wikipedia.org.
Consider an optimization problem in which the controller has limited memory, that is, it cannot store
more than N real numbers, where N ∈ N. Suppose that during the course of time, the controller uses this
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memory for storing past observations and actions. In this case, after a sufficiently long time, the controller
will be forced to expunge part of the past observations and actions from its memory in order to store the
latest observations and control actions. At every time step, the controller can be viewed as an agent with
certain information, and the controller at different time steps is assumed to be different agents with different
information. Thus, this is an example of a team with asymmetric information.
A Communication System
Relay
Encoder
Relay Relay
Decoder
Figure 1.2: A communication system comprising an encoder, a decoder, and multiple relays, which can be
construed as decision makers.
Consider any modern communication system that comprises an encoder and a decoder, and several
relays. The purpose of the encoder is to observe a random variable, called source symbol, and encode it into
a message that can be transmitted over a communication medium. The encoded message passes through
several relays before reaching its destination, the decoder. The decoder then decides on an estimate of the
source symbol, called decoded symbol, based on its observation. The encoder, the relays, and the decoder
all strive to minimize the distortion between the source symbol and the decoded symbol.
Most communication media have inherent random noise and random fading, which introduce errors in
the messages that are transmitted over the media. Thus, every relay and the decoder in the aforementioned
setup receives a noise-corrupted message. This is another example of a team with asymmetric information.
A Decentralized Control System
Decentralization of control systems has been an area of active study. In such a setup, several controllers,
separated spatially due to physical constraints, act together to run a system. At any given time, each con-
troller observes certain state of the system, recalls certain past observations and actions, and acquires some
information about the observations and actions of the other controllers via a communication link (which
itself may be unreliable). Thereafter, each controller takes an action based on its information at that time
step. All controllers act in order to minimize a certain cost function that depends on the system processes
and actions taken by all the controllers. Thus, this is an example of a team with asymmetric information.
1.1.2 Games with Asymmetric Information
Several real world systems are comprised of a group of strategic DMs, called players, who act in order to
optimize their own utility, but do not necessarily share the same information. Such problems fall under the
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purview of games with asymmetric information. We present some such scenarios in the following subsec-
tions.
A Traffic Network
Figure 1.3: A city with several commuters. Image courtesy: http://en.wikipedia.org.
On a busy highway, several commuters travel from their source to destination. Each commuter knows
its source and destination, but has no knowledge of sources and destinations of other commuters. The travel
time of each commuter depends on the traffic density on the highway, that is, the number of vehicles that are
driving on the highway. Each commuter wants to minimize its travel time and/or fuel cost, but the amount
of time required to reach its destination depends on the sources and destinations of other commuters. Thus,
it is an example of a game of asymmetric information.
There is significant interest in developing smart cities for the future. It should be noted that such intel-
ligent traffic system in smart cities must be designed keeping in mind the strategic nature of the commuters
with limited information. One could also design incentives for the commuters using various means (taxes,
rush hour prices, etc.) in order to avoid traffic jams.
Signaling and Screening Games
Consider a setup in which there is a set of at least two informed players, each with some private information,
and a set of at least two uninformed players. The action sets of all informed players are the same. The action
sets of all uninformed players are also the same, and it is usually assumed to be the real line9. Each player
has to take an action based on certain information, which depends on ‘who acts first’ in this setup. Two types
of scenarios may appear: a signaling game and a screening game10.
Signaling Game: In this game, informed players act first; each informed player, based on its private
information, takes an action. The actions taken by the informed players are observed by both uninformed
players. Each uninformed player then decides on a function that maps the action set of informed players
9The action of uninformed player usually is a monetary amount that it is willing to transfer to one of the informed players.
10See [23] for a definition of signaling games and [24] for a definition of screening games. See also [25] for differences between the
two models.
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to its own action set11. Each informed player chooses to work with the uninformed player who would give
him/her a higher payoff.
Screening Game: In this game, uninformed players act first; each uninformed player decides on a func-
tion, called its strategy, that maps the action set of informed players to the real line (the action set of
uninformed player). The informed players gain information about the strategies of the uninformed players.
Based on this information and their private information, each informed player takes an action and receives
a payoff.
In both games described above, all players incur certain payoffs on the basis of actions chosen by all
(informed and uninformed) players. Both scenarios listed above are examples of dynamic sequential games
with asymmetric information. They are dynamic because the action of one player affects the observation of
another, and sequential because “who acts when” is decided a priori.
As an example of a signaling game, consider a job interview in which an interviewee (informed player) is
being interviewed by an interviewer (uninformed player). In this setup, the interviewee knows his abilities
and wants to ‘signal’ its abilities to the interviewer. The interviewer wants to hire a good employee for
an open position in his/her company. The interviewer’s objective is to increase the profit to the company,
whereas the interviewee’s objective is to get the position with the best possible renumeration package given
his/her abilities. A similar setup arises when a salesman (informed player) wants to sell a product to a
customer (uninformed player).
As an example of a screening game, consider several firms (uninformed players) who offer compensation
packages for different positions, and several workers (informed players), each of who knows their abilities,
but may not know the abilities of other workers. The workers, knowing their abilities and the compensation
packages offered, then decide on the credentials they will acquire (perhaps in the form of education or skills)
to get one of the positions. Thus, the firms first announce their positions, then they screen the workers for
their credentials, and then offer them positions and the associated compensation packages. Each worker
then chooses to work for the firm offering him/her the best compensation package.
A Cyberphysical Attack Problem
PlantController
Communication
Channel
Jammer
uk
yk = xk
αk ∈ {0, 1}
αkuk
Figure 1.4: An attack on a networked control system, in which the jammer is launching a denial-of-service
jamming attack in the feed-forward channel. This setup has been modeled as a game of symmetric
information and is a subject of study in [10, 26].
Consider a physical system in which various components communicate via a communication network.
An example of such a system is a large industrial plant, where various controllers communicate over a wire-
less network to pass on critical observations and important information to other controllers. The controllers
11The function chosen by an uninformed player essentially provides information to each informed player about the amount the
uninformed player is willing to transfer to the informed player.
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Tx
J
Rx
U ∈ {0, 1}
J ∈ {B, 1}
X JUX Xˆ
Figure 1.5: An attack on a transmitter-receiver system, in which the jammer is launching a denial-of-service
jamming attack in the communication channel. This setup has been modeled as a game of asymmetric
information and studied in [11].
act in order to ensure that the normal operations of the system run smoothly. Assume further that such a
system is under attack from a strategic jammer, who wants to cause harm to the system or disrupt the pro-
cesses in the system. The jammer may not know the observations of the controllers or have any information
about the processes of the system. Thus, this is an example of a game of asymmetric information.
DMs with Differences of Opinion
Consider a two-DM static problem in which the cost functions of both DMs are the same. Assume that each
DM observes a private random variable that is not observed by the other DM. Each DM has a different belief
on the probability distributions of the primitive random variables, and their beliefs are common knowledge.
This happens in real scenarios when two DMs have different opinions on certain events. Although this looks
like a team problem, mathematically speaking, this is a game of asymmetric information. This problem has
been addressed in [22] in the past.
1.2 A General Model for Games and Teams
In this section, we present a sufficiently general model for dynamic sequential decision problems. A large
class of finite-horizon dynamic sequential decision problems, which includes dynamic games and dynamic
teams, can be reduced to the following general model.
Consider a dynamic decision problem with N decision makers and N time steps, in which DM i takes an
action at time i, where i ∈ [N ]. Let (Ωi,Fi, µi) be standard measure spaces for i ∈ {0, . . . , N}, in which Ωi
denotes a state space of the nature, Fi denotes its Borel sigma-algebra, and µi denotes a probability measure
over Ωi. DM i ∈ [N ] observes a random variable Yi, which lies in the set Yi, and then takes an action
denoted by Ui, which lies in the set Ui. The sets Yi and Ui are assumed to be measurable spaces with the
Borel sigma-algebras denoted by Yi and Ui, respectively, for each i ∈ [N ]. The observation of DM i, Yi, is
given by
Yi = hi(ω0:i,U1:i−1), (1.1)
where hi : Ω0:i × U1:i−1 → Yi is a Borel measurable map. The above model allows each decision maker
to share its information and control actions with decision makers acting in the future. Let Ii denote the
sigma-algebra generated by the observation Yi, that is,
Ii := σ{Yi} ⊂
(⊗Nj=0Fj)⊗ (⊗Nj=1Uj) .
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Each decision maker is assumed to incur a cost that depends on state ω0 ∈ Ω0 and the actions taken by
all decision makers. However, for the time being, we will not worry much about the cost functions of the
decision makers and they will be introduced in subsequent chapters depending on the problem considered
in that chapter. In the next section, we state some of the information structures that have been considered
in the literature.
1.3 Information Structures in Dynamic Decision Problems
In dynamic sequential team and game problems, several types of information structures of the decision
makers have been considered in the literature. We define a few of them in the sequel. Before we introduce
different information structures of the decision makers, let us first provide the following definition.
Definition 1.1. Consider i, j ∈ [N ] with i < j. We say that the action of DM i, Ui, does not affect the
information of DM j, Yj , if for every Borel set Yj ∈ Yj , we have
h−1j (Yj) ∈
(
⊗jk=0Fk
)
⊗
(
⊗jk=1,k 6=iUk
)
⊗ {∅,Ui}.
In other words, Ui does not affect Yj if the observation function hj does not require the argument Ui in
order to compute Yj . If the above condition does not hold, then we say that Ui affects Yj . Furthermore,
we say that Yj contains Yi if Ii ⊂ Ij , and Yj contains Ui if Ui ⊂ Ij . 
A decision problem is said to be of complete information if Yj contains Yi and Ui for all i such that
1 ≤ i < j. The following two information structures are widely used in this dissertation.
Definition 1.2 (Partially Nested Information Structure (PNIS)). A group of decision makers have partially
nested information structure if for every i, j ∈ [N ] satisfying i < j, if Ui affects Yj , then Yj contains Yi.
Definition 1.3 (Non-Nested Information Structure (NNIS)). A group of decision makers have non-nested
information structure if the information structure is not partially nested.
Analyzing a dynamic decision problem with NNIS is very challenging. One of the main problems asso-
ciated with analyzing problems with NNIS is the presence of “signaling”, that is, the DMs use their actions
to encode parts of their information. In other words, the DM acting at a certain time step uses its informa-
tion/observation to estimate (or decode) what the realizations of the observations of the DMs whose actions
affect its information/observation are. In dynamic decision problems with NNIS, there is a tension between
signaling and optimization12. In a game with NNIS, the technical challenge is exacerbated by the fact that a
DM can take advantage of non-nestedness of information by deceiving the other DMs in the game who act
at a later time. More discussion on this issue appears in Section 1.5 later.
In the context of games, we now introduce a slight variant of PNIS:
Definition 1.4 (PNIS with Access to Actions). A group of decision makers have PNIS with access to actions
if for every i, j ∈ [N ] satisfying i < j, if Ui affects Yj , then Yj contains Yi and Ui.
We call the information structure satisfying the above definition as PNIS with access to actions, with the
understanding that if DM j has access to DM i’s observation, then DM j has access13 to DM i’s action.
12Note that signaling games, as defined earlier, constitute a dynamic decision problem with NNIS.
13We will not use the term DM i shares its control action with DM j, since sharing information in a game may incentivize DMs to
resort to deception, that is, to misrepresent their true information. Using the word access here seems more appropriate.
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Given a dynamic sequential decision problem, the first question that needs to be addressed is the nature of
the solution concept to be adopted. Thereafter, the two primary natural questions are (i) does a solution
exist, and (ii) if a solution exists, then how to compute it? For games, the widely accepted solution concept
is that of Nash equilibrium14. A set of strategies of the DMs is said to be in Nash equilibrium if there is no
unilateral deviation by a DM from its strategy the would decrease the total expected cost to that DM. For
teams, the natural solution concept is that of (global) optimality, or equivalently team-optimality. A set of
strategies of the DMs is said to be team-optimal if there is no other set of strategies that would decrease the
total expected cost to the team.
1.4.1 Typical Solution Approaches in Dynamic Decision Problems
In this subsection, we study five important and widely used solution approaches to establishing the exis-
tence of solutions in dynamic decision problems. These approaches can also be employed to compute the
appropriate solutions (in terms of strategies) to the decision problems.
Dynamic programming has been widely used for deriving the team-optimal solutions in teams or Nash
equilibria in games with complete information. It is also the most convenient tool to use for dynamic decision
problems because it decomposes the original dynamic problem into a sequence of static ones. The static
decision problems are relatively easier to solve. Thus, using dynamic programming to obtain a solution to the
dynamic decision problem with complete information is somewhat standard in the literature now. One of the
major problems associated with dynamic decision problems with asymmetric information, however, is that
dynamic programming fails for them. Dynamic programming should be used cautiously in dynamic games
with complete information; in such games, one can obtain a Nash equilibrium via a dynamic programming
argument; there could, however, be other Nash equilibria that cannot be obtained via the backward induction
approach. As a rule of thumb, one can use dynamic programming for dynamic decision roblems with PNIS
(see Definition 1.2 for a definition of PNIS).
If dynamic programming cannot be applied to a decision problem, then there is another technique that
may come to rescue. Under this technique, the information of the DMs are expanded to include certain
other variables, and then a solution is computed, mostly by employing dynamic programming. If there exists
a solution that does not use the extra information provided to the DMs, then that is also a solution to the
original problem15. This technique is employed, for example, in a single-agent LQG optimal control problem,
say P1, where the DM only remembers the past observations, but not the past actions. We first expand the
information structure of the DM to include past actions, and obtain a new LQG problem, say P2. The LQG
problem P2 admits an optimal solution, as is well-known. Now, obtain a control law of the DM at time t in
P1 by substituting the past optimal control laws of the DM in P2 in the optimal control law at time t in P2
in a recursive fashion. The control strategy thus obtained is also the optimal control strategy for the LQG
problem P1 (the verification of this claim is immediate).
Another technique that can sometimes guarantee a solution to a decision problem, particularly in a
game, is to expand the strategy spaces of the DMs to include behavioral and/or randomized strategies. The
14For zero-sum games, the solution concept was proposed by John von Neumann in 1928, and he called it a saddle-point equilibrium.
John Nash, in his seminal paper [27], introduced the concept of an equilibrium for non-zero sum games, which we now call Nash
equilibrium. He also established the existence of Nash equilibrium in finite non-zero sum games. Nash equilibrium coincides with
saddle-point equilibrium for a zero-sum game.
15This approach should be used in games cautiously; see, for example, [28, 29] where this technique has been used in the context of
zero-sum differential games.
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existence of saddle-point equilibrium and Nash equilibrium in finite zero-sum and non-zero sum games,
respectively, rely on this technique. Using this technique to establish existence result may require some
topological arguments related to weak* (or some other) topology over measure spaces.
If the three aforementioned techniques fail to establish the existence of a solution, then there are two
more general, but somewhat tedious, approaches to analyze and solve dynamic decision problems16:
1. One can develop a clever decomposition technique to convert the dynamic problem into a sequence of
static ones, albeit over expanded state or action spaces.
2. Alternatively, one has to reformulate the original decision problem over the strategy spaces of DMs as a
static decision problem, in which each DM decides on its complete strategy (from beginning of decision
horizon until the end) before the activity begins. In other words, the dynamic nature of decision
problem is lost, and it instead is converted into a static decision problem. Also, the reformulated
problem may become non-convex over the strategy spaces of the DMs, which makes it very difficult
to analyze. Further, even if the original cost functions of the DMs were continuous in action variables
of the DMs, the cost functions of the DMs of the reformulated static decision problem may no longer
be continuous over strategy spaces. This technique should be used as a last resort, because one can
quickly land up into many technical issues with this approach.
There are, of course, other proof techniques that have been employed for establishing the existence
of a solution to some dynamic decision problems, but they are not general enough like the ones stated
above. These approaches exploit the nature of underlying spaces, properties of the cost functions or the
distributions of the primitive random variables to arrive at the conclusions. Some references along this
direction are [30, 31, 32, 33], among several others.
In the next two subsections, we provide some concrete examples of games and teams with asymmetric
information and exhibit the technical difficulties in determining the existence and computation of their
solutions. First, we state the setup for the two examples. Consider a two-DM setting in which X denotes
the state of the nature, and Yi and Ui denote, respectively, the private observation and action of DM i. Let
ci : X × U1 × U2 → R+ denotes the cost function of DM i.
Since this is a decision problem with (possibly) asymmetric information, it is convenient to transform
the original problem into a decision problem over strategy spaces of the DMs. To do this, let us first introduce
admissible strategy spaces of both DMs. The admissible strategy space of DM i is denoted by Gi, which is
assumed to be the space of all Borel measurable functions γi : Yi → U i17. For a fixed strategy tuple (γ1, γ2)
of the DMs, the expected cost to DM i is denoted by J i(γ1, γ2), which is given by
J i(γ1, γ2) := E
[
ci(X, γ1(Y1), γ2(Y2))
]
.
We now consider a game problem in the next subsection.
16We employ both approaches to obtain solutions to the decision problems considered in this thesis. The dynamic game considered
in the first part of the thesis uses the first approach, and the dynamic team considered the second part of the thesis uses the second
approach. In the team problem, we also expand the strategy spaces of the DMs to include behavioral strategies.
17One could further restrict the strategy spaces of the DMs in this setting, but for the time being, we do not worry about such issues.
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1.4.2 Static Bayesian Games
Assume that (X,Y1,Y2) are primitive18, but correlated, random variables. A Nash equilibrium of the game
is denoted by a tuple (γ1?, γ2?) ∈ G1 × G2, such that
J i(γ1?, γ2?) ≤ J i(γi, γ−i?) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Every Nash equilibrium for a game satisfies a fixed point equation: For every fixed γ−i ∈ G−i, DM i finds its
best response by computing19
BRi(γ−i) := arg min
γi∈Gi
J i(γi, γ−i).
The map BRi : G−i → Gi is called the reaction curve of DM i.
A Nash equilibrium (γ1?, γ2?) is defined as the tuple satisfying BRi(γ−i?) = γi? for both i ∈ {1, 2}.
Thus, a Nash equilibrium is a fixed point for the pair of maps (BR1, BR2) in the space of strategies G1 ×G2.
Depending on the cost functions ci and the distribution of primitive random variables (X,Y1,Y2), a fixed
point may or may not exist. See the figure below for a pictorial representation of the reaction curves and its
fixed point.
G1
G2
BR2(γ1)
BR1(γ2)
BR2(γ1)
G1
G2
BR1(γ2)
γ?1
γ?2
Figure 1.6: Reaction curves and Nash equilibrium. In the left side of the figure above, the reaction curves
intersect at a point, and the strategies corresponding to that fixed point is the Nash equilibrium of the
game. In the right side of the figure above, the reaction curves do not intersect, and thus no Nash
equilibrium exists in the game in the product of strategy spaces G1 × G2.
Now, consider a dynamic game of asymmetric information, in which the state and information of the
DMs at any time step depend on the past actions and strategies of the DMs. In this case, the probability
measure on the state and information of the DMs at any time are dependent on the past control laws of
the DMs. This introduces technical challenges in determining the reaction curves (or reaction sets) of the
DMs, let alone finding a fixed point of those reaction curves (thereby establishing the existence of a Nash
equilibrium for the dynamic game). It is helpful to identify a few sufficient conditions under which a Nash
equilibrium exists (or in other words, the reaction curves intersect at a point in the strategy spaces).
18By primitive random variables, we mean that the random variables are controlled only by nature. Any primitive random variable
does not depend on the strategies of the DMs.
19Here, we are assuming that the best response exists and is unique. Nash equilibrium may exist even if BRi(γ−i) may not exist for
all γ−i ∈ G−i or in not unique (that is, it is a set and not a curve).
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1.4.3 Two Teams with Asymmetric Information
In this subsection, we consider two celebrated team problems – Witsenhausen’s counterexample and the
Gaussian test channel. In this setting depicted in Figure 1.7 below, the random variables X and Y2 are given
by X = [X1,W2]T and Y2 := U1 +W2. Note that Y2 is no more a primitive random variable as was the case
in the previous subsection on Bayesian games. It should be noted that both teams feature NNIS (non-nested
information structure).
y2
w2
γ1 γ2
x1 u1 u2
Figure 1.7: A unified setup depicting Witsenhausen’s counterexample and the Gaussian test channel from
[34].
The cost function of the team for Witsenhausen’s counterexample20 is given by
c1(x,u1,u2) = c2(x,u1,u2) := (u1 − x1)2 + (u2 − u1)2.
For the Gaussian test channel, the cost function of the team is given by
c1(x,u1,u2) = c2(x,u1,u2) := (u1)2 + (u2 − x1)2.
For both teams, the dynamic programming approach to computing optimal solutions fails. One has to view
these teams as optimization problems over product strategy spaces G1 × G2 of the DMs.
We now show that the reformulated optimization problems are non-convex problems over strategy
spaces. Let JWC and JGTC denote, respectively, the expected cost functionals of Witsenhausen’s counterex-
ample and the Gaussian test channel. Let us write the expressions for JWC and JGTC as
JWC(γ1, γ2) = E
[
(γ1(X1)−X1)2 + (γ2(γ1(X1) +W2)− γ1(X1))2] ,
JGTC(γ1, γ2) = E
[
(γ1(X1))2 + (γ2(γ1(X1) +W2)−X1)2] .
Note that in both expressions above, we have a term γ2(γ1(X1) + W2). This term makes JWC and JGTC
non-convex functionals over the space G1, since we do not know a priori the structure of γ2; it could be
any measurable function in the space G2. In fact, due to the same reason, we cannot ascertain continuity of
functionals JWC and JGTC over the space G1, if we endow the space G1 with some appropriate topology21.
Remark 1.1. Observe that if G2 is restricted to be the space of affine or linear maps, then the expected cost
functionals of both teams become convex functions over the space of strategies. Indeed, with such a restric-
tion in place, the optimal strategies of the DMs are affine in their information. However, the restriction does
not alleviate the trouble caused by NNIS; dynamic programming is still inapplicable under this restriction on
the strategy space of DM 2. 
20Note here that the action of the second controller, U2, is an estimate of U1, where the second controller observes an additive
Gaussian noise corrupted version of U1.
21It appears that since W2 is a Gaussian random variable, which has a smooth distribution function with full support over R, the
expected cost functional may be continuous (though we do not have a proof at the moment) or lower semicontinuous. If the noise
W2 is uniformly distributed over say [−1, 1], then we do not know whether the expected cost functional is continuous (or lower
semicontinuous) or not.
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We know from [30] and [34] that both of the aforementioned problems admit optimal solutions if all
random variables are scalar andX1 andW2 are mutually independent Gaussian random variables. However,
until now, the existence of team-optimal solutions was unknown for (i) appropriate vector versions of the
two teams, and (ii) the scalar version of the teams but with quartic cost functions, and several other teams
with asymmetric information. Also, even in the scalar cases of both team problems, there was no unified
result to establish the existence of team-optimal solutions. Further, in a discrete version of Witsenhausen’s
counterexample that is reproduced from [4] below, we know that an optimal solution does not exist.
Discrete Witsenhausen’s Counterexample
Consider the same setup as in Witsenhausen’s counterexample, but with different spaces: X 1 := {−1, 1},
U1 = R, andW2 := {−1, 1}. Assume that X1 and W2 have uniform distributions. Let us call this problem as
discrete Witsenhausen’s counterexample.
It is shown in [4, p. 90] that this problem does not admit an optimal solution. We reproduce the proof
below for the convenience of the reader. Consider a sequence of strategies {γ1n, γ2n}n∈N of the DMs in discrete
Witsenhausen’s counterexample, given by
γ1n(x1) := x1 +
1
n
sgn(x1),
γ2n(y2) :=
{
1 + 1n if sgn(y2) = 1
−1− 1n if sgn(y2) = −1
One can readily check that JWC(γ1n, γ2n) = 1n2 . However, there is no strategy of the DMs which can achieve
an expected cost equal to 0. Thus, in this problem, one can achieve an expected cost infinitesimally close to
zero, but cannot achieve optimality [4, p. 91]22 23.
In the light of the discussion above, it is useful to know conditions under which team-optimal solutions
to such teams can be ascertained.
1.4.4 Numerical Methods: Benefits of Studying Existence
This subsection discloses some of the reasons why we care about existence results for dynamic decision
problems.
History of mathematics suggests that in vast number of the cases, existence of a solution to some (en-
gineering, economics or mathematical) problem precedes a search for a numerical method or an algorithm
to compute the solution to that problem. The personal view of this author is also aligned with this thought.
Why? The answer lies in the fact that while establishing the existence of a solution, one has to look at the
problem with a “suitable lens, with the right aperture, angle, and depth”. A vast literature is now available
on special cases of dynamic decision problems with asymmetric information and associated numerical meth-
ods to compute their solutions. An existence result for a sufficiently wide class of decision problems with
asymmetric information will pave way for fundamentally new numerical methods to compute their solutions,
22The non-existence of an optimal solution in discrete Witsenhausen’s counterexample is due to the fact that the two points in the
spaceW2 are spaced with a positive distance between them (which will always happen becauseW2 is a two point space). Even ifW2
is countable with discrete metric, then non-existence of an optimal solution will still hold in the above problem. It should be noted that
the above problem admits an optimal solution if we takeW2 = R and let W2 be a mean-zero unit-variance Gaussian random variable,
the proof of which follows from the main result of [30].
23We use the static reduction technique developed by Witsenhausen in [35] to study dynamic team problems. It is worth mentioning
here that discrete Witsenhausen’s counterexample does not admit a static reduction. More on this technique appears in Chapter 8 and
[4].
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thereby advancing the state of the art. Furthermore, since such problems are commonplace in day-to-day
engineering and economic activities, a general, but efficient, numerical method will help us build efficient
systems in the future.
Needless to mention, from a theoretical standpoint, the pursuit of developing a “suitable lens” for de-
cision problems with asymmetric information is a focused intellectual exercise and an absolute pleasure in
itself.
The above reasons, in the author’s personal opinion, has been a strong incentive to work on establishing
existence of solutions to dynamic decision problems with asymmetric information.
1.5 Role of Control in Dynamic Decision Problems
In this section, we would like to digress a bit and review certain philosophical discussions related to the role
control actions of DMs play in dynamic (stochastic) decision problems. Although such discussions do not
affect the result or solution approach for the problems, they are nevertheless illuminating from a theoretical
standpoint. A better understanding and a novel viewpoint provided by such discussions can, perhaps, provide
a new approach to attack the problems in the future.
So, the question we would like to ask ourselves in this section is “what is the role of actions in dynamic
decision problems”. We focus our attention on dynamic stochastic sequential decision problems here.
Two roles that actions play in stochastic control problems (with complete as well as asymmetric infor-
mation) are well known in the literature: caution and probing [36, 37, 38]. Consider a dynamic stochastic
optimal control problem. Since randomness in the system degrades the performance of the system, the opti-
mal controller needs to be “cautious” (as compared to a controller acting in a deterministic control system).
On the other hand, the controller uses its action to “probe” (in other words, actively gather information
about the past), and uses its control to reduce future estimation errors of the state of the system24. Thus,
control action at a time step helps a controller to probe in the future.
In later years, Witsenhausen wrote one of his seminal papers [30], in which he showed that simple
non-linear strategies outperform the best linear ones in the now called Witsenhausen’s counterexample. We
realized that actions play another role, termed “signaling”, in stochastic control problems, particularly those
with NNIS. In such a problem, a controller uses its action to signal its information to another controller25.
In spirit, signaling is similar to probing. The difference between the two is that probing is active gathering
of a controller’s own past information for better estimation of the state of the system, signaling is “implicit
communication” between various controllers within a system for transferring their information. Signaling
may or may not help in better estimation of the state of the system.
Remark 1.2. A side remark to our main discussion on signaling is in order here. Recall the discussion on
discrete Witsenhausen’s counterexample presented in the previous section. In that problem, DM 1 is able to
signal its information exactly to DM 2 with some loss of performance. This became possible in this setting
becauseW2 is a finite set. To attain a zero expected cost in this problem, DM 1 has to signal its information
exactly to DM 2, but in doing so, DM 1 cannot use any energy – an impossible feat for DM 1. Thus, discrete
Witsenhausen’s counterexample does not admit an optimal solution. 
24Probing can be understood clearly in the context of Witsenhausen’s counterexample. Recall from the previous subsection that the
second controller just estimates U1. If the first controller uses quantization such that U1 takes only a few values that are sparsely
located on the real line, then it is easier for the second controller to minimize the estimation error. The action of first controller reduces
the estimation error of the second controller.
25Once again, this point is best exemplified by the setting considered in Witsenhausen’s counterexample, in which the first controller
uses its action to signal some amount of its information to the second controller.
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1.5.1 Signaling and Optimal Strategies
Several informal debates have sparked on whether or not the functional forms of the optimal strategies of the
DMs in a team, if they exist, have anything to do with signaling. This dichotomy can be best understood
in the case of Witsenhausen’s counterexample and the Gaussian test channel – the optimal strategies of the
DMs are non-linear in Witsenhausen’s counterexample, whereas they are linear in the Gaussian test channel.
The attractive property of linear optimal strategies in the Gaussian test channel, perhaps, have provoked
such debates. Some opine that the controllers do not signal in the Gaussian test channel.
It is this author’s personal opinion that signaling, the way it is understood in the literature and talked
about in the research community, is inherent in any dynamic decision problem (game or team) with NNIS.
Thus, the first controller in the Gaussian test channel is also signaling its observation via its action; its optimal
strategy, due to the form of the cost function, happens to be linear. A minor tweak in the cost function, say
quartic cost instead of quadratic, for the team may lead to non-linear strategies of the controllers26. Vector
version of the Gaussian test channel also appears to admit non-linear optimal strategies.
Also note that in a decision problem, linearity and non-linearity of optimal control strategies of the DMs
should not be labeled as “nothing is being signaled” and “there is signaling”, respectively. There is only
a handful of cases, like LQG with PNIS and the scalar Gaussian test channel, when the optimal strategies
are linear. What if the primitive random variables are not mutually independent Gaussian or the underly-
ing spaces are finite or countable? In such cases, optimal strategies are likely to be non-linear27, or one
cannot define linearity of strategies (for example, when observation and action spaces are finite). Using
non-nestedness of information structure in a decision problem to conclude that a DM signals in that problem
sounds more appealing.
In the next subsection, we would like to present an alternative viewpoint, partly based on the solution
approach adopted in [33] and this thesis, that takes into account all the aspects – caution, probing and
signaling – of actions in stochastic decision problems.
1.5.2 Strategies as Means of Transporting the Measure
Let us reconsider Witsenhausen’s counterexample, and ask the question as to what it means for control strate-
gies of the DMs to be optimal. In [33], the proof of existence of optimal solution to scalar Witsenhausen’s
counterexample is transformed into an optimal transportation problem. Since the second controller is com-
puting an estimate of first controller’s action, the expected cost E
[
(U2 −U1)2] to the second controller is
a function only of the measure of the random variable U1 (given that W2 is a Gaussian random variable).
Note that the probability measure on U1 is dependent on the strategy of the first controller and the distribu-
tion of X1. The expected cost to the first controller is a function of the distributions of X1 and U1 (note here
that the joint measure is precisely the strategy of the first controller). The problem of the first controller is to
determine the optimal measure of U1 so that the total expected cost to the team is minimized. The problem
of the first controller is to transport the input measure (that is, the distribution of X1) optimally for the given
cost function.
Now, getting back to the original question we asked in the previous subsection, what is the role of
actions in dynamic decision problems? It appears, from the discussion above, that the role of strategies in
26The functional form of optimal strategies of the controllers for quartic cost in Gaussian test channel is unknown, and perhaps, never
been looked into. However, Part II of the thesis establishes the existence of optimal strategies for this problem.
27As an aside, the fact that in LQG systems, there is some hope of obtaining optimal strategies that are linear or affine has something
to do with the fact that linear or affine transformations of Gaussian random vectors are also Gaussian.
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such problems are to transport the measure in an optimal fashion for the given cost function. Consider the
following two cost functions for (scalar) Witsenhausen’s counterexample:
c(x,u1,u2) := (u1 − x1)4 + (u2 − u1)4,
c(x,u1,u2) := (u1 − x1)4 + exp
(
(u2 − u1)4
)
.
In the cost functions above, the second controller is no longer estimating the value of U1 in the mean-
square sense. However, one can still view the optimization problems faced by the controllers as one of
transporting the measure. Furthermore, all the elements of caution, probing and signaling is captured by
viewing strategies as means of transporting the measures for the aforementioned problems. This viewpoint
is prevalent in the second part of the thesis, where we establish the existence of team-optimal solutions for
a large class of teams with asymmetric information.
1.5.3 Fourth Role of Control in Games
In stochastic games, control plays a fourth role, which is different from those in a stochastic teams.
Recall that in decision problem with NNIS, DMs signal their information to other DMs via their actions.
In games, the role of these signals is not obvious. In a team problem, a “good” signal by a DM reduces the
total expected cost to the team (see also discrete Witsenhausen’s counterexample in the previous section). To
understand the role signaling plays in games (besides the obvious one mentioned in the previous subsection),
let us consider a two-DM single stage game in which DM 2 observes DM 1’s action, but not its information.
Clearly, in this game, DM 1’s action signals its information to DM 2 (the obvious role). However, depending
on the cost functions of the DMs, DM 1 may benefit from this signal, in terms of a lower expected cost, or DM
1 may do worse due to this signal. In [39], the authors studied two non-zero sum games and illustrated that
“increase” in a DM’s information could actually hurt that DM at equilibrium. Thus, signals are not always
benign for DMs in games.
As an example that exhibits this behavior, consider the setup in Figure 1.5 depicting a game between a
transmitter and a strategic jammer. In this setting, the transmitter observes a message, which is a random
variable taking values on the real line. The transmitter then decides on whether or not to transmit the
message across the channel. The channel is attacked by the jammer, which can only observe whether or
not the channel is in use for transmission, and then decides on whether or not to jam the channel. Using
the channel for transmission is costly to the transmitter; jamming the channel is costly to the jammer. We
modeled this adversarial setting as a zero-sum game in [11]. In this setting, the transmitter’s action of
transmitting the message across the channel gives the jammer some information on the range of message
(for example, the message lies in certain interval). The jammer can use this information to update its belief
on the realization of the message (a random variable) , and then decide whether or not to jam the channel.
Thus, transmitter’s signal worsens its performance in this example. There is no way for transmitter to not
signal its information to the jammer, and simultaneously achieve a lower expected cost. This behavior has
also been observed in certain classes of resource allocation games [40, 41].
In the same two-DM single stage game as described in the second paragraph of this section, DM 2 can
employ a strategy in which it takes a drastic action based on the realization of the action of DM 1. The drastic
action of DM 2 may result in a higher expected cost to DM 1, which will deter DM 1 to take certain actions.
This can be construed as a threat from DM 2 to DM 1. Thus, DMs can use their actions to threaten other
DMs in dynamic games with hierarchical information structures. This is true even in games with PNIS or in
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complete information dynamic games. The refinement of subgame-perfection for Nash equilibrium in a finite
game with perfect state information was introduced by Selten [42, 43] to ensure that Nash equilibria with
non-credible and empty threats28 can be ruled out from the set of plausible Nash equilibria in that game29
(see also [3] for more details on this issue). For infinite dynamic and differential games, this issue has been
studied and some refinements of Nash equilibrium introduced in [44, 45, 46].
1.6 Previous Work
In this section, we review some of the previous work in decision theory. The list of work mentioned here is
not exhaustive; only those references that are pertinent to the topic of this dissertation are listed. First, we
provide a brief overview of decision theory, and its early history. Thereafter, we will present some references
in the area of games and teams with asymmetric information.
1.6.1 Foundations of Decision Theory
In this subsection, we present a brief history and an overview of some of the foundational works in decision
theory. As mentioned previously, game and team theory are only (though, prevalent) subclasses in the
general area of decision theory.
Decision theory attempts to understand how humans make decisions, and use this knowledge to explain
economic activities and help individual decision makers pursue their goals. The primary basis of decision
making has been rationality, that is, DMs make their decisions rationally (and do not always toss a coin
and take an action30). Thus, the primary attempt of the researchers working in decision theory has been to
propose decision making scenarios, and identify rational decisions or strategies for DMs in those scenarios.
Decision theory took form as an abstraction of certain economic activities in the early 1930s in the hu-
manities literature. Simultaneously, and perhaps, independent of the development in humanities, engineers
were actively working toward devising algorithms for better (or should we say, optimal) decision making for
various applications31. Different fields gave different names to mathematically similar concepts and devel-
oped specialized tools to analyze various problems. Thus started the exciting field of decision theory, and
many of its branches started appearing in various forms.
The mathematical foundation for decision theory was laid by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgen-
stern in [47] in 1944. They proved that a DM, whose preferences satisfy four axioms, has a utility function
(also recall the first paragraph of this chapter), and the DM acts to maximize its expected utility. However,
the utility function of a DM does not capture the subjective beliefs of that DM. The beliefs form an important
component of decision making when DMs are faced with uncertainty about the states of the nature. This
problem was addressed by de Finetti in 1930 (before the concept of utility function was proposed). He
28An empty threat or a non-credible threat is a strategy which a DM may take at some point of time. However, after reaching that
time, it may no longer be in the best interest of that DM to employ that strategy. Thus, such a strategy can be ruled out to be a “credible”
strategy, since there is a possibility that such a strategy will not be employed during the game. In a dynamic game, there could also be
a strategy which a DM may take at a certain time and at a certain information state, but the DMs acting before that time do not take
the actions that will lead the game to that information state at that time. Thus, this strategy will never be employed during the course
of the game, and can be ruled out from the set of plausible Nash equilibria.
29The refinement of Nash equilibrium proposed in Chapter 2, called common information based Markov perfect equilibrium, for
linear-Gaussian games of asymmetric information also rules out non-credible and empty threats in games with asymmetric information.
30In some cases, it may be necessary to toss a coin and take actions; as an example, consider a game in which no equilibrium exists
in pure strategies. In such cases, the reason for tossing a coin and taking an action is not well-understood, and is an area for further
research. See [16]
31Part of the reason for the development of control and estimation theory was to develop better and smart weaponry and better
processing of information during the cold war era post World War II and the emerging space race in the 1950s.
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considered monetary bets on the states of nature. Each DM has a certain preference ordering over such bets.
If the preference ordering of a DM over such monetary bets satisfies five axioms, then de Finetti proved that
there exists a unique subjective belief of that DM over the states of nature.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern assumed that there is a probability distribution over states of nature,
and this distribution is known to the DM. They further assumed that DMs maximize expected utility. Where
does this probability distribution comes from? This was answered by de Finetti’s theorem. A conceptually
elegant derivation of the subjective probability, as well as the utility function of a DM in tandem, via an
axiomatic approach, was done by Savage in 1954 in his well-known book [48].
Savage started with an abstract model of states of nature and outcomes. He proved that if the prefer-
ences of a DM satisfies seven axioms, then there exist both a utility function and a unique subjective belief
over the states of nature. Since then, many researchers have assumed an underlying distribution over the
states of nature and a utility function of the DM in a large class of decision problems. We also follow the
same line of approach in this thesis. It should also be noted that a large class of researchers believe that a
rational DM must be maximizing its expected utility.
Savage’s model and result have their own following and critiques. Some of his axioms did not appear
to have a natural basis for rationality or of decision making. In 1963, Anscombe and Aumann presented
yet another set of five axioms in [49]. If the preferences of a DM satisfies those five axioms, then the
authors proved that there exists a unique subjective belief and utility function of that DM. Kahneman and
Tversky, two experimental psychologists studying decision making in humans, proposed a new theory for
decision making, called prospect theory, in their celebrated paper [50]. Prospect theory was further refined
in their later paper [51]. A key feature of prospect theory is that the expected utility was computed using
the subjective probability in an unusual way – certain weights are assigned to probabilities of the events in a
specific manner and the expected utility is computed using these weights. Schmeidler, in [52], came up with
yet another set of axioms and established the existence of a weighting function for subjective probabilities
and a utility in a decision problem, which further provided an axiomatic and mathematical justification for
computation of weights and expected utility in prospect theory.
Given the plethora of literature and foundational work on decision theory, it can be argued that a
specific theory of decision making rests on certain axioms, and the results of that theory should be applied
to scenarios where there is a hope of satisfying those axioms. Human decision making differs from decision
making in machines32. Having a skepticism towards a specific theory, and open mindedness for exploring
other theories of decision making will, hopefully, provide new tools for decision making and help us develop
better engineering systems.
We also refer the readers to several excellent books on decision theory – [53], [54] and [55]. Reference
[54] is on prospect theory, and it presents several case studies to substantiate the claim that prospect theory
captures the essence of decision making in humans. Reference [55] constitutes a good, somewhat non-
technical introduction to decision theory, and provides key ideas and some proofs for most of the prevalent
theories in the literature.
In the next three subsections, we will review some references in game theory, incentive design theory
and team theory literature, respectively. All the references cited below are founded on expected utility theory
(of the kind proposed by Savage and Anscombe-Aumann). However, we note here that an extension of the
results in game and team theory to non expected-utility frameworks (for example, prospect theory) is a
promising avenue for further investigation.
32Is there a reason why manned space missions are treated differently than unmanned space missions?
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1.6.2 Games with Asymmetric Information
One of the first papers on game theory was written by Borel in [56]. John von Neumann established the
existence of saddle-point equilibrium in finite zero-sum games in 1928 [57]. The key equilibrium concept,
Nash equilibrium, that is widely used in non-cooperative game theory was proposed by John Nash in his
seminal paper [27] in 1951. Cooperative game theory was first studied in the book [47] by von Neumann
and Morgenstern. Most of the settings considered in the papers were that of complete information, that is,
the players knew all parameters of the game at the outset, and there was no uncertainty. Stochastic complete
information games were first introduced in [58].
For a long time, dealing with information asymmetry in (stochastic) games remained a challenge due
to the following reason. Consider a two-player static game of asymmetric information. Fix i, j ∈ {1, 2} such
that i 6= j. The behavior of Player i in this game depends on (i) Player i’s observation, (ii) Player i’s belief
about Player j’s observation, (iii) Player j’s belief about Player i’s observation, (iv) Player i’s belief on Player
j’s belief on Player i’s observation, and so on. This infinite hierarchy of beliefs affects the behavior of both
players, and modeling it in a game setting has remained a challenge until 1967.
Harsanyi, in a series of three seminal papers [59], overcame this technical challenge. He assumed
that the conditional distributions on other players’ types given one player’s type satisfy certain consistency
conditions. Under this assumption, he showed that Nash equilibrium exists in any finite game of incomplete
information. Later, [60, 61] showed that such hierarchies of beliefs can be modeled within a mathematical
framework.
Games with symmetric and/or perfect information have been well studied in the literature; see, for
example, [58, 62, 2, 1, 63]. In these games, the players have the same beliefs on the states of the game,
future observations and future expected costs or payoffs. However, in games with asymmetric information,
the players need not have the same beliefs on the current state and future evolution of the game. General
frameworks to compute or refine Nash equilibria in stochastic games of symmetric or perfect information
have received attention from several researchers, see for example, [64, 3, 2] among many others. However,
by comparison, such general frameworks for games of asymmetric information are scant (see [65, 66, 67]).
In 1970s, there was increasing interest in discrete-time non-zero sum games of asymmetric information
in extensive form in economics community [23, 68, 24, 43]. The key solution concept, perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (PBE), was proposed in [43] by Selten, where he viewed PBE as an extension of subgame-
perfect equilibrium for extensive form games with asymmetric information. Kreps and Wilson proposed
sequential equilibrium for a dynamic game with asymmetric information in [69], which is a refinement
of PBE. Later, Fudenberg and Tirole studied in [70] PBE in greater detail and identified conditions when
sequential equilibrium is equivalent to PBE in an extensive form game. See also the book [71] on the role of
information in games.
In controls literature, various authors [72, 73, 74] have studied two-player zero-sum differential games
with linear state dynamics and quadratic payoffs, where the players do not make the same measurements
about the state. A zero sum differential game where one player’s observation is nested in the other player’s
observation was considered in [75]. A zero-sum differential game where one player makes a noisy observa-
tion of the state while the other one does not make any measurement was considered in [76].
Discrete-time non-zero sum LQG games with one-step delayed sharing of observations were studied in
[66] and [67]. A game with one-step delayed observation and action sharing among the players was consid-
ered in [77]. A two-player finite game in which the players do not have access to each other’s observations
and control actions was considered in [78], where a necessary and sufficient condition for existence of a
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Nash equilibrium in terms of two coupled dynamic programs was obtained.
Obtaining equilibrium solutions for stochastic games when players make independent noisy observations
of the state and do not share all of their information (or even when they have access to the same noisy
observation as in [28]) has remained a challenge for general classes of games. There are several review
articles that focus on game theory and its impact in economics; see, for example, [79, 80, 81, 82, 83].
1.6.3 Incentive Design Problems
A mechanism design game is a Bayesian game [2], in which a principal (also called designer) designs a
mechanism so that all players act in a desired manner33. There are different types of mechanism design
games. In a classical mechanism design game [2, Chapter 7], the principal transfers (receives taxes of)
a certain amount to (from) each player so as to incentivize players to act in a particular manner. In a
principal-agent game (also called, a Bayesian game with communication) [84, 85], the principal deduces
the private information of the players confidentially and indirectly, and then recommends certain actions to
each player confidentially. In an incentive-design game [86, 87, 88], there is a non-trivial coupling between
the principal’s action and the actions of the players via their cost or utility functions and the information
structure of the principal is hierarchical; the principal announces its strategy which depends on the actions
of other players. In all cases, if an appropriate mechanism exists for the principal and he/she acts according
to the corresponding strategy, then it is in the best interest of the players to act according to the desired
action or strategies chosen by the principal.
Dynamic versions of mechanism design problems have also received a lot of attention, primarily in the
economics literature; see, for example, [2, Subsection 7.6.4], [89], a survey paper [90], and references
therein. Closed-loop dynamic Stackelberg games, such as in [91, 92], could also be viewed as falling in
that class. Recently, implementation and computational issues of designing mechanisms in certain games
have also been studied in [93, 94, 95], among several others. Mechanism design theory has also found
numerous applications. Certain classes of mechanism design games have been applied to determine pricing
mechanisms in networks [96, 97], mobile sensing application [98], machine scheduling [99], among several
others. We also refer the reader to Chapter 10 of a recent book [100] for some more interesting applications.
1.6.4 Teams with Asymmetric Information
We next provide a brief overview of the early developments in the area of teams with asymmetric informa-
tion, as is relevant to this thesis. In 1962, Radner published a seminal paper on team decision problems
[101] where he showed that a class of static stochastic teams with continuously differentiable and strictly
convex cost functions admit globally optimal (minimizing) solutions which are also the unique person-by-
person-optimal solutions; this result was later extended by Krainak et al [102] to settings with exponential
cost functions. A byproduct of Radner’s result is that in static linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) team prob-
lems, linear strategies of the agents that are person-by-person optimal are also team-optimal. Furthermore,
partially nested LQG teams also admit linear optimal solutions, as was observed by Ho and Chu [103, 104].
Bagchi and Bas¸ar extended it to continuous time stochastic teams in [105]. When the information structure
is non- classical, however, Witsenhausen showed that even seemingly simple LQG settings can be very diffi-
cult to solve [30]: as discussed earlier in this chapter, he devised a scalar LQG team problem which admits
an optimal solution, which, however, is not linear.
33Mechanism design may be viewed as reverse Stackelberg game (or a dynamic Stackelberg game [1]), in which the principal alters
the dominant behavior of the players to a desired one by shaping their utility functions through its action or strategy.
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Obtaining solutions of classical dynamic team problems is quite well understood, with dynamic pro-
gramming being the most convenient approach. For dynamic teams not of the classical type, however, there
is no systematic approach which is universally applicable; see [106], [4], [107] for a detailed coverage and
analysis of the various solution approaches, which also depend on the underlying information structure.
Some of the earliest and most fundamental works on understanding the role of information in general
dynamic stochastic teams were carried out by Witsenhausen in [108, 30, 109, 110, 35]. Among these
fundamental contributions, in [35] Witsenhausen showed that all sequential team problems satisfying an
absolute continuity condition of certain conditional measures can be transformed into an equivalent static
team problem with a different cost function and with the agents observing mutually independent random
variables. This transformation of a dynamic team problem into a static team problem with independent
observations is called “static reduction” of the dynamic team problem (see p. 114 of [4] both for a discussion
on this reduction as well as an overview of Witsenhausen’s contributions). In Chapter 8 of this thesis, we
make use of this equivalence between dynamic and static team problems to establish the existence of optimal
strategies in a class of dynamic team problems.
The existence of optimal strategies for Witsenhausen’s counterexample was proved in Witsenhausen’s
original paper [30], where his proof relied on the structure of the cost function of the team. In that problem,
the unique optimal strategy of the second agent involves the conditional mean of the control action of the
first agent using an observation that is an additive noise corrupted version of the control action of the first
agent, where the noise is a zero-mean unit variance Gaussian random variable. When substituted back, this
makes the cost functional of the team a non-convex functional on the space of strategies of the first agent.
Witsenhausen used several techniques from real analysis to show that an optimal strategy of the first agent
exists when the initial state of the system is an arbitrary second-order random variable. A shorter proof of
existence for this problem was later presented by Wu and Verdu´ [33] using tools from optimal transport
theory. One variant of this problem is the Gaussian test channel; there are other variants as well, all with
non-classical information [111]. For the Gaussian test channel, proof of existence of optimal strategies (and
their derivations) is an indirect one. First, the cost function is lower bounded using the data processing
inequality [112], and then explicit linear strategies are constructed which make the cost achieve the lower
bound. Proofs of existence of optimal strategies in some other teams with non-classical information using
this method can be found in [34].
The main difference between the formulations of Witsenhausen’s counterexample and the Gaussian test
channel is in the cost functions (even though they are both quadratic) [34, 111]. In the case of Witsen-
hausen’s counterexample, the explicit forms of optimal strategies are not known, whereas in the case of the
Gaussian test channel, linear strategies are optimal; more importantly, in both problems (where all random
variables are jointly Gaussian), optimal solutions exist. If, however, the distributions of the primitive random
variables are discrete with finite support, there is no optimal solution even in the class of behavioral strate-
gies of the agents as illustrated in [4, p. 90]. Thus, the question of sufficient conditions for a team problem
to admit an optimal solution is an important one, and this is addressed in Chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis.
Several authors have proven the existence of optimal solutions to stochastic optimization problems
through “lifting”. Specifically, the problem of optimizing a cost functional on the space of Borel measurable
functions is lifted to an equivalent optimization problem in which the cost functional is defined on the space
of probability measures. This technique is heavily used in proving the existence of optimal strategies in
Markov decision processes; see for example, [113, 114, 115], among several others. This is also the central
concept for studying optimal transport problems [116, 117], where the cost function is a measurable function
of two random variables with given distributions, and the optimization is performed on the space of joint
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measures of the random variables given the marginal distributions. In Chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis, we
use a similar lifting technique to establish the existence of optimal strategies in a class of static and dynamic
teams.
A variant of the problem of existence of optimal strategies in stochastic dynamic teams is that of the
existence of optimal observation channels in such systems. The relevant question there is how to design
observation channels (for example, quantizers) in a team problem so that the overall expected cost is mini-
mized. This problem was studied in [118], where some sufficient conditions were obtained on teams and sets
of observation channels to ensure the existence of optimal quantizers. There again, the problem of designing
quantizers was lifted to one of designing joint probability measures over the state and the observation of an
agent satisfying certain constraints. In [118], a topology on information channels was introduced based on a
fixed input distribution. Related approaches can be found in [119, 120]. In this thesis, we further generalize
these approaches.
1.7 Contributions of the Dissertation
Coming back to the discussions in the Subsection 1.6.1, we know now that there are alternatives to the
prevalent expected-utility approach to determining solutions to decision problems. However, we stick to
the expected-utility approach in this dissertation, partly due to the vast literature that is available and well
understood on this approach, and partly due to the fact that new mathematical tools are required to study
simple games for non expected-utility approaches to decision making.
We further focus our attention on dynamic games and teams with asymmetric information in this dis-
sertation. Given a dynamic game or a team problem with asymmetric information, the two natural questions
to ask are:
1. Does a Nash equilibrium or a team-optimal solution exist?
2. If the answer to Question 1 is in affirmative, then what does the solution look like?
The dissertation studies the aforementioned two natural, and seemingly important, questions for a class of
dynamic games and teams with asymmetric information. For a class of dynamic LQG games, we satisfactorily
answer both questions above. For a class of teams, we have been able to prove only the existence of team-
optimal solutions. We leave the second question as part of our future research.
The first part of this dissertation focuses on games with asymmetric information and comprises four
chapters. Before we state the main contribution of the first part of the thesis, we first would like to define
a refinement for Nash equilibrium in a game. A game may have multiple Nash equilibria. However, some of
those equilibria may satisfy some desirable properties, and we call them a refinement of Nash equilibrium.
To put it more concretely, a set of strategies of the DMs in a game is a refinement of Nash equilibrium if the
following two conditions hold34:
1. The refinement is a Nash equilibrium of the game.
2. If the game admits a Nash equilibrium, then it also admits a refinement.
In our recent work [12], we proposed a refinement for Nash equilibrium, called common information
based Markov perfect equilibrium (CIMPE), in finite dynamic games with asymmetric information. In this
34This definition is taken from [121, Definition 2.3, p. 28].
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dissertation, we extend the analysis to dynamic linear-Gaussian games of asymmetric information. The
extension is non-trivial, since we are now dealing with uncountable state, observation and action spaces.
Furthermore, we show that if the costs of the controllers are quadratic, then, under certain conditions,
a unique common information based Markov perfect equilibrium exists. Thus, for a class of LQG games,
common information based Markov perfect equilibrium is indeed a refinement of Nash equilibrium.
We extend the refinement concept of Nash equilibrium to dynamic games with resource constraints. We
also consider dynamic incentive design problems, and obtain sufficient conditions under which, the central
agency (also called principal) can design an appropriate incentive scheme so that it is in the best interest of
the players to act according to strategies that deliver the minimum total expected cost to the central agency.
The second part of the dissertation focuses on teams with asymmetric information, particularly those
in which the information structures are NNIS (also called non-classical). We prove the existence of team-
optimal solutions in a large class of static and dynamic teams. We first expand the strategy spaces of the
DMs in the team to include behavioral strategies. Thereafter, we employ several tools from probability theory
and general topology, in a very specific and sequential fashion, to conclude the existence of team-optimal
solution in the Borel-measurable strategies of the DMs. Note that we start by looking for an optimal solution
over expanded strategy spaces of the DMs, but conclude the existence in much smaller strategy spaces of the
DMs.
Although we start with no-observation sharing information structures, we also derive existence results
under some stringent assumptions for teams with observation sharing information structures. Consequently,
we show that several dynamic LQG teams admit optimal solutions, which include vector Witsenhausen’s
counterexample, vector Gaussian test channel, and the Gaussian relay channel, among several others. A
result of this generality on the existence of team-optimal solutions had not been established prior to this
work.
A major contribution of the dissertation is that it develops quite general frameworks for analyzing and
solving both dynamic games and dynamic teams with asymmetric information. There is, however, some
room for improvement on the results and weakening of the assumptions. A few immediate extensions
are discussed in the following chapters. However, the author believes that significant improvement on the
frameworks cannot be made, unless fundamentally new mathematical tools are used (for example, free
probability theory). We bring more light to this issue in the subsequent chapters.
1.8 Outline of the Dissertation
The dissertation is organized into two parts. The first and second parts deal, respectively, with dynamic
games and teams, both with asymmetric information.
Outlines of these parts and associated chapters are as follows, starting with Part I. In Chapter 2, we
consider linear-Gaussian games of asymmetric information that satisfy two assumptions on the information
structure of the controllers. In the next chapter, Chapter 3, we specialize the results of Chapter 2 to LQG
games with asymmetric information. In particular, we show that, a large class of LQG games with asymmetric
information admit unique CIMPE. Furthermore, we also produce an example of an LQG game of asymmetric
information that admits a unique CIMPE, but outside that class admits a continuum of Nash equilibria. In
Chapter 4, we develop a theory for dynamic incentive design games with asymmetric information, which
is motivated by Chapter 2. We define a new notion of incentive design in dynamic games, called common
information based dynamic incentive scheme, which is defined along similar lines as CIMPE. In Chapter 5, we
consider a dynamic finite stochastic game of asymmetric information in which the controllers have certain
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total resource constraints for the entire horizon of the game, and extend the CIMPE concept to such games.
Chapter 6 discusses certain implications of the assumptions made in the preceding three chapters, and
provides some intuition on how the results can be extended.
The second part of the dissertation comprises four chapters. Chapter 7 considers static team decision
problems over infinite dimensional state, observation and action spaces, and proves the existence of optimal
strategies under certain assumptions on observation channels of the agents and the cost function of the team.
In Chapter 8, we consider a class of dynamic team problems over infinite dimensional state, observation and
action spaces and establish the existence of optimal strategies of the agents in each team problem under
certain assumptions on the cost function and structure of the dynamic team. Chapter 9 studies teams with
observation sharing information structures, and establishes the existence of team-optimal solutions in a
class of such teams. It also discusses several mathematical challenges in extending the existence result to
more general teams with observation sharing information structures. In Chapter 10, we apply the existence
results obtained in the previous three chapters to certain well-known teams with non-classical information
structures, and show that they admit team-optimal solutions. We also provide some thoughts on further
generalizations in this chapter.
Finally, we provide some concluding discussions and directions for future research in Chapter 11.
26
Part I
Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information
27
Chapter 2
Linear-Gaussian Games
In this chapter, we consider two-player linear-Gaussian games of asymmetric information that satisfy two
assumptions on information structures of the controllers. The main goal of this chapter is twofold: (i) To
devise a structured way of determining if Nash equilibria exist in such games, and (ii) To obtain an algorithm
to compute them. In the process, we define a refinement for Nash equilibrium in games with asymmetric
information. We adopt a two-step solution approach to achieve the goals of this chapter. In the first step,
we define a new virtual game of symmetric and perfect information over enlarged state, observation and
action spaces of the virtual players. We show that there is a bijection between the sets of Nash equilibria in
the original game of asymmetric information and the virtual game of symmetric information. Then, we use
Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of the virtual game to obtain a Nash equilibrium of the original game,
which we call common information based Markov perfect equilibrium (CIMPE). Note that CIMPE exists in a
game of asymmetric information if MPE exists in the corresponding virtual game of symmetric information.
The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.1, we formulate the two-player non-zero sum game
problem with linear dynamics, linear observation equations, and asymmetric information among the play-
ers. We make two assumptions on the information structures of the controllers and an assumption on the
admissible strategies of the agents. We also discuss consequences of the assumptions we make on the infor-
mation structures. In Section 2.2, we define the virtual game of symmetric information and state the main
result of the chapter. In Section 2.3, we develop a backward induction algorithm that computes the common
information based Markov perfect equilibrium of the game formulated in Section 2.1, provided that it exists.
This chapter is based on our recent paper [8].
2.1 Problem Formulation
Let Xt be the state of a linear system which is controlled by two controllers (players)1. At each time step t,
Controller i, i = 1, 2, observes the state through a noisy sensor; this observation is denoted by Yit. Controller
i’s action at time step t is denoted by Uit. For each Controller i ∈ {1, 2} at time t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, the state,
action and observation spaces are denoted by Xt, U it and Yit , respectively, and they are assumed to be finite
dimensional Euclidean spaces. The dynamics and observation equations are given as
Xt+1 = AtXt +B1tU1t +B2tU2t +W0t , (2.1)
Yit = HitXt +Wit, i = 1, 2, (2.2)
1In this section, we use the term “controller” instead of “player”, because we introduce another set of players in the symmetric
information game introduced in the next section.
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where for t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, Wit is a random vector taking values in a finite dimensional Euclidean space
Wit , i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, and At, Bit, Hit , i ∈ {1, 2}, are matrices of appropriate dimensions. X1,W0:21:T−1 are primi-
tive random variables, and they are assumed to be mutually independent and zero-mean Gaussian random
vectors.
2.1.1 Information Structures of the Controllers
The information available to each controller at time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T} is a subset of all information gener-
ated in the past, that is, {Y1:21:t ,U1:21:t−1}. Let E it and F it , respectively, be defined as
E it := {(j, s) ∈ {1, 2} × {1, . . . , T} : Controller i at time t knows Yjs},
F it := {(j, s) ∈ {1, 2} × {1, . . . , T} : Controller i at time t knows Ujs}.
Define Iit , Ct and Pit for i = 1, 2 and t ∈ {1, . . . , T} as
Iit =
∏
(j,s)∈Eit
Yjs ×
∏
(j,s)∈Fit
U js ,
Ct =
∏
(j,s)∈E1t ∩E2t
Yjs ×
∏
(j,s)∈F1t ∩F2t
U js ,
Pit =
∏
(j,s)∈Eit\(E1t ∩E2t )
Yjs ×
∏
(j,s)∈Fit\(F1t ∩F2t )
U js .
Note that Iit , Ct and Pit for i = 1, 2 and t ∈ {1, . . . , T} are finite dimensional Euclidean spaces.
We let Iit ∈ Iit denote the information available to Controller i at time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, which is a
vector comprising the measurements and control actions that are observed by the controller. The common
information of the controllers at a time step is defined as the vector of all observation and control actions
that are available to both controllers at that time step. The private information of a controller at a time step
is the vector of observation and control actions that are not available to the other controller at that time step.
The common information is denoted by Ct ∈ Ct, and the private information of Controller i is denoted by
Pit ∈ Pit at time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T}.
A dynamic game is said to be one of symmetric information if Ct = I1t = I2t at all time steps. We are
interested in games where the controllers may have asymmetry in information, that is, I1t 6= I2t . An extreme
example of a game of asymmetric information is the case when P1t 6= ∅ while P2t = ∅ for all time steps t.
Another example of a game of asymmetric information is when the controllers recall their past information
and share their observations after a delay of one time step, that is, Ct = Y1:21:t−1 and Pit = Yit for all time steps
t.
2.1.2 Admissible Strategies of Controllers
At time step t, Controller i uses a control law git : Pit × Ct → U it to map its information to its action. We
assume that the control law git is a Borel measurable function, and denote the space of all such control laws
by Git .
A strategy of Controller i, which we define as the collection of its control laws over time, is denoted by
gi = (gi1, . . . , giT−1) and the space of strategies of Controller i is denoted by Gi1:T−1. A pair of strategies of
both controllers, (g1,g2) ∈ G11:T−1 × G21:T−1, is called a strategy profile of the controllers.
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The total cost to Controller i, as a function of the strategy profile of the controllers, is
J i(g1,g2) := E
[
ciT (XT ) +
T−1∑
t=1
cit(Xt,U1t ,U2t )
]
,
where cit is a non-negative continuous function of its arguments for i ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, and
the expectation is taken with respect to the probability measure on the state and action processes induced
by the choice of strategy profile (g1,g2).
A strategy profile (g1,g2) is said to be a Nash equilibrium of the game if it satisfies the following two
inequalities
J1(g1,g2) ≤ J1(g˜1,g2) and J2(g1,g2) ≤ J2(g1, g˜2),
for all admissible strategies g˜1 ∈ G11:T−1 and g˜2 ∈ G21:T−1.
We assume that the state evolution equations, observation equations, the noise statistics, cost functions
of the controllers and the information structures of the controllers are part of common knowledge among
the controllers. The game thus defined is referred to as game G1.
2.1.3 Assumption on Evolution of Information
As noted above, each controller’s information consists of common information and private information. We
place the following condition on the evolution of common and private information of the controllers in game
G1.
Assumption 2.1. The common and private information evolve over time as follows:
1. The common information increases with time, that is, (E1t ∩ E2t ) ⊂ (E1t+1 ∩ E2t+1) and (F1t ∩ F2t ) ⊂
(F1t+1 ∩ F2t+1) for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}. Let D1,t+1 := (E1t+1 ∩ E2t+1) \ (E1t ∩ E2t ) and D2,t+1 :=
(F1t+1 ∩ F2t+1) \ (F1t ∩ F2t ). Define
Zt+1 =
∏
(j,s)∈D1,t+1
Yjs ×
∏
(j,s)∈D2,t+1
U js . (2.3)
Then, Zt+1 ∈ Zt+1 denotes the increment in common information from time t to t+ 1 and we have
Zt+1 = ζt+1([P1Tt ,P2Tt ,U1Tt ,U2Tt ,Y1Tt+1,Y2Tt+1]T), (2.4)
where ζt+1 is an appropriate projection function.
2. The private information evolves according to the equation
Pit+1 = ξit+1([PiTt ,UiTt ,YiTt+1]T). (2.5)
where ξit+1 is an appropriate projection function.
We now introduce a few notations in order to prove an important result. Let St := Xt × P1t × P2t for
t ∈ {1, . . . , T} and use St := [XTt ,P1Tt ,P2Tt ]T to denote the random vector taking values in St. Fix the
strategy profile of the controllers as (g1,g2). Let Πt be the conditional measure on the space of state and
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private informations, St, given the common information Ct at time step t. Thus,
Πt(dst) = Pg
1:2
1:t−1
{
dst
∣∣∣Ct} ,
where the superscript denotes the fact that the probability measure depends on the choice of control laws.
The conditional probability measure Πt is a Ct-measurable random variable, whose realization, denoted by
pit, depends on the realization ct of the common information. We now have the following result, which is a
consequence of Assumption 2.1.
Let Γit be a random measurable function from Pit to U it defined as Γit(·) := git(·,Ct) for i = 1, 2 and
t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, where the realization of Γit is denoted by γit and it depends on the realization of the
random variable Ct. Thus, git(Pit, ct) = γit(Pit). We now have the following result about the evolution of
conditional measure Πt.
Lemma 2.1. Fix the strategy profile (g1,g2) ∈ G11:T−1 × G21:T−1. If Assumption 2.1 holds, then
Πt+1 = Ft(Πt,Γ1t ,Γ2t ,Zt+1),
where Ft is a fixed transformation which does not depend on the choice of control laws.
Proof: See Subsection 2.5.1.
2.1.4 Strategy Independence of Beliefs
A crucial assumption, which forms the basis of the analysis in this chapter, is the following.
Assumption 2.2 (Strategy Independence of Beliefs). At any time t and for any realization of common in-
formation ct, the conditional probability measure pit on the state Xt and the private information (P1t ,P2t )
given the common information does not depend on the choice of control laws. In particular, if Zt+1 is the
increment in the common information at time step t+ 1, then Πt+1 evolves according to the equation
Πt+1 = Ft(Πt,Zt+1), (2.6)
where Ft is a fixed transformation that does not depend on the control laws.
Assumption 2.2 allows us to define the conditional belief pit without specifying the control laws used.
Another important consequence of Assumption 2.2 is that these conditional beliefs on the state and private
information admit Gaussian density functions. We make this precise in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.2. For any time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T} and any realization of common information ct, the common
information based conditional measure pit admits a Gaussian density function.
Proof: See Subsection 2.5.2.
We henceforth call pit as common information based conditional belief. In the next subsection, we prove
a result on the evolution of the mean and variance of the common information based conditional beliefs.
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2.1.5 Evolution of Conditional Beliefs
Since the common information based conditional belief pit admits a Gaussian density at any time step t, pit is
completely characterized by its mean mt and the covariance matrix Σt. Assumption 2.2 allows us to derive
the following result for game G1.
Lemma 2.3. The evolution of the conditional mean
Mt := (M0t ,M1t ,M2t ) = (E[Xt|Ct],E[P1t |Ct],E[P2t |Ct]), t ∈ {1, . . . , T}
of the density function of common information based conditional belief is given as
Mt+1 = F 1t (Mt,Zt+1), t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} (2.7)
where F 1t is a fixed affine transformation that does not depend on the strategies of the controllers. The evolution
of conditional covariance matrix Σt is given as
Σt+1 = F 2t (Σt), (2.8)
where F 2t is a fixed transformation that does not depend on the strategies of the controllers.
Proof: See Subsection 2.5.3.
Examples of several classes of games that satisfy Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 are given in [12]. For example,
if each controller acquires the realizations of the observations and the actions of the other controller with
zero or one-step delay, then the corresponding game satisfies Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2.
2.2 Main Results
Following the approach introduced in [12], we now construct a new game G2 with two virtual players,
where at every time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, each virtual player observes the common informationCt, but not the
private information of the controllers. Since the common information is nested (by Assumption 2.1), game
G2 is a game of perfect recall. This game is intimately related to game G1, and we exploit the symmetric
information structure of game G2 to devise a computational scheme to compute a Nash equilibrium of game
G1. The steps taken to devise the scheme are as follows:
1. We formulate game G2 in the next three subsections. Further, we show that the common information
based conditional mean Mt is a Markov state of game G2 at time t.
2. In Subsection 2.2.4, we show that any Nash equilibrium of game G2 can be used to obtain a Nash
equilibrium of game G1, and vice-versa.
3. We focus on Markov perfect equilibria of game G2 and provide a backward induction characterization
of such equilibria. An equilibrium of game G1 obtained from a Markov perfect equilibrium of game G2
is called common information based Markov perfect equilibrium of game G1.
4. We interpret the backward induction characterization of common information based Markov perfect
equilibrium in terms of a sequence of one-stage Bayesian games.
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We now turn our attention to formulating game G2. At time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} and for each
realization ct of the common information, virtual player i selects a measurable function γit : Pit → U it . The
action space of virtual player i at time t is denoted by Ait, and it is defined as
Ait := {γit : Pit → U it such that γit is a Borel measurable map}. (2.9)
We call the actions taken by virtual players as “prescriptions” due to the following reason: After observ-
ing the common information ct at time step t, virtual player i ∈ {1, 2} computes the equilibrium prescription
γit ∈ Ait, and prescribes it to Controller i. The controllers evaluate the prescriptions based on the realizations
of their private informations, to compute their actions at that time step.
2.2.1 Admissible Strategies of Virtual Players in Game G2
A map χit : Ct → Ait denotes the control law of virtual player i ∈ {1, 2} at time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}. The
control law χit maps common information at time t to a prescription, that is, Γit := χit(Ct). Recall that the
prescription Γit maps private information of Controller i at time t to the action of the controller at that time.
Thus, a choice of χit induces a map from Ct×Pit to U it , which we denote by χit(·)(·). We say χit is admissible2
if
χit(·)(·) is a Borel measurable function from Ct × Pit to U it .
The set of all such admissible control laws is denoted by Hit, i ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}. The collection
of control laws at all time steps of virtual player i is called the strategy of that virtual player, and it is denoted
by χi := {χi1, . . . , χiT−1}. The space of all strategies of the virtual player i, denoted by Hi1:T−1, is called the
strategy space of that virtual player. A strategy tuple (χ1, χ2) is called the strategy profile of virtual players.
Definition 2.1. For i ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, let %it : Hit → Git be an operator that takes a function
χit : Ct → Ait as its input and returns a measurable function git : Pit × Ct → U it as its output, that is
git = %it(χit), such that git(pit, ct) := χit(ct)(pit) for all ct ∈ Ct and pit ∈ Pit . For a collection of functions
χi := {χi1, . . . , χiT−1}, let %i(χi) be defined as the set {%i1(χi1), . . . , %iT−1(χiT−1)}.
Similarly, we let ςit : Git → Hit be the operator such that ςit ◦%it = idHit and %it◦ςit = idGit . Thus, for git ∈ Git ,
if χit = ςit(git), then χit(ct)(pit) := git(pit, ct) for all ct ∈ Ct and pit ∈ Pit . Similar to the expression above, for a
collection of functions gi := {gi1, . . . , giT−1}, let ςi(gi) be defined as the set {ςi1(gi1), . . . , ςiT−1(giT−1)}. 
2.2.2 Cost Functions for Virtual Players
The cost functions of the virtual players are defined as follows: Fix a time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T} and a virtual
player i. Let pi denote a normal distribution on the space St = Xt × P1t × P2t with mean m and variance Σt,
pi is thus N(m; Σt), where Σt is given by the result in Lemma 2.3. Let (γ1, γ2) be a prescription pair chosen
by the virtual players. Define the cost function c˜it : St × A1t × A2t → R+ of virtual player i at that time step
t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} to be
c˜it(m, γ1, γ2) =
∫
St
cit(xt, γ1(p1t ), γ2(p2t ))pi(dst),
2In [122], Aumann outlines the reason why this is a natural definition for a decision problem of this type. See also related discussions
in Section 3 of [123].
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where one can view xt,p1t and p2t as appropriate projections of the variable st. At the final time step, the
cost function of virtual player i is c˜iT (m) =
∫
XT c
i
T (xT )pi(dxT ). The total expected cost for virtual player i is
given by
J˜ i(χ1, χ2) = E
[
c˜iT (MT ) +
T−1∑
t=1
c˜it(Mt,Γ1t ,Γ2t )
]
.
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4. Let (g1,g2) ∈ G11:T−1 × G21:T−1, and let (χ1, χ2) be defined as χi := ςi(gi), i = 1, 2. Then,
J i(g1,g2) = J˜ i(χ1, χ2) for i = 1, 2.
Conversely, let (χ1, χ2) ∈ H11:T−1 × H21:T−1, and let (g1,g2) be defined as gi := %i(χi), i = 1, 2. Then,
J˜ i(χ1, χ2) = J i(g1,g2) for i = 1, 2.
Proof: See Subsection 2.5.4.
2.2.3 A Markov State of Game G2
Recall from Lemma 2.3 that given a realization ct of common information, the common information based
conditional belief P{dst|ct} admits a Gaussian density function with mean mt and variance Σt. Our next
result is that the mean Mt is a controlled Markov chain, and it is controlled by the actions taken (that is, the
prescriptions chosen) by the virtual players.
Lemma 2.5. The process {Mt}t∈{1,...,T} is a controlled Markov process with the virtual players’ prescriptions
as the controlling actions. In particular, conditioned on the realization mt of Mt and the prescriptions (γ1t , γ2t )
of the virtual players, the conditional mean Mt+1 at the next time step is independent of the current common
information, the past conditional means and past prescriptions. Equivalently, this fact is expressed as
P{Mt+1 ∈Mt+1|ct,m1:t, γ1:21:t } = P{Mt+1 ∈Mt+1|mt, γ1:2t }
for all Borel sets Mt+1 ⊂ St+1.
Proof: See Subsection 2.5.5.
It should be noted that the update equation of the Markov process Mt is induced by the state dynam-
ics, observation equations, and information structure of the controllers of game G1. The main differences
between the structures of the two games G1 and G2 are summarized in the table below.
At time step t ∈ [T − 1] Game G1 Game G2
State of the game Xt ∈ Xt Mt ∈ St
Action of Player i Uit ∈ U it γit ∈ Ait
Information of Player i Iit ∈ Iit Ct ∈ Ct
Cost function of Player i cit c˜
i
t
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Since both virtual players observe the same information (the common information between the con-
trollers) and the common information always increases by Assumption 2.1, game G2 between virtual players
is a game of symmetric information with perfect recall.
2.2.4 Relation between Games G1 and G2
In the next theorem, we show that any Nash equilibrium of game G1 can be used to compute a Nash
equilibrium for game G2 and vice versa.
Theorem 2.6. Let (χ1?, χ2?) be a Nash equilibrium strategy profile of game G2. Then, the strategy profile
(g1?,g2?) for game G1, defined as gi? = %i(χi?), i = 1, 2, forms a Nash equilibrium strategy profile of game G1.
Conversely, if (g1?,g2?) is a Nash equilibrium strategy profile of game G1, then the strategy profile (χ1?, χ2?),
defined by χi? := ςi(gi?), i = 1, 2, is a Nash equilibrium strategy profile for game G2.
Proof: See Subsection 2.5.6.
In light of the theorem above, we want to compute a Nash equilibrium of game G2, and then project
the solution back to the original game using the operators %1 and %2 as introduced in Definition 2.1.
Since at any time step t, both virtual players observe the common information Ct, the virtual players
can compute the mean Mt of the common information based conditional belief. Since the mean Mt is a
Markov state of game G2 and both virtual players know its realization, game G2 is a game of perfect state
information. Since common information is nested, game G2 is a game of perfect recall. Also note that
in game G2, the cost functions of the virtual players are stagewise-additive. A natural solution concept
to compute the Nash equilibrium of a game of perfect information with stagewise-additive cost function is
Markov perfect equilibrium [2]. We define the Markov perfect equilibrium of G2 in the next subsection and
prove the main result of the section.
2.2.5 Markov Perfect Equilibrium of Game G2
Fix virtual player i’s control laws χi1:T−1 such that the prescription at time step t is only a function of Mt, say
χit(Ct) = ψit(Mt) for some function ψit : St → Ait, such that ψit(·)(·) is a measurable function from St × Pit
to U it at all time step t ∈ [T − 1]. Let us use H¯it to denote the set of all such maps ψit, and note that H¯it ⊂ Hit.
Then, virtual player j’s, j 6= i, (one-person) optimization problem is to minimize its stagewise additive cost
functional that depends on Mt and on virtual player i’s fixed strategy. Thus, virtual player j needs to solve a
finite horizon Markov decision problem with state space St and action space Ajt at time step t. This is made
precise in our next result.
Lemma 2.7. Consider game G2 among virtual players. Assume that virtual player i is using the strategy
{ψi1, . . . , ψiT−1} ∈ H¯i1:T−1, that is, virtual player i selects the prescriptions at time step t only as a function of
the mean Mt of the common information based conditional belief Πt:
Γit = ψit(Mt), t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}.
Then, for the fixed strategy of virtual player i, virtual player j’s (j 6= i, j ∈ {1, 2}) one-sided optimization prob-
lem is a finite horizon Markov decision problem with state Mt, control action γjt , and cost as c˜
j
t (Mt, γ
j
t , ψ
i
t(Mt))
at time step t ∈ [T − 1] and terminal cost c˜jT (MT ).
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Proof: See Subsection 2.5.7.
Note that game G2 is a dynamic game of perfect information and perfect recall. A Markov strategy of
a virtual player is defined as a collection of control laws of that virtual player at all time steps such that the
control law at time step t is a measurable map of common information based conditional mean (state of game
G2) to its action space at that time step. Lemma 2.7 states that if one virtual player sticks to Markov strategy,
then the other virtual player’s one-sided optimization problem is a finite horizon Markov decision problem.
Under certain assumptions on the cost functions of the virtual players3, there exists a Markov strategy of the
other virtual player that achieves the minimum in its Markov decision problem. Thus, there is no incentive
for the other virtual player to search for optimal strategies outside the class of Markov strategies. This is
an important observation for game G2, because one can define a refinement concept for Nash equilibrium,
called Markov perfect equilibrium [2], for game G2.
Definition 2.2. A strategy profile (ψ1?1:T−1, ψ2?1:T−1) ∈ H11:T−1×H21:T−1 is said to be a Markov perfect equilib-
rium [2] of game G2 if (i) at each time t, the control laws of the virtual players at time step t are functions
of the mean of the common information based conditional belief Mt, that is, ψit ∈ H¯it, and (ii) for all time
steps t ∈ [T − 1], the strategy profiles (ψ1?t:T−1, ψ2?t:T−1) form a Nash equilibrium for the sub-game starting at
time step t of game G2.
It should be noted that Markov perfect equilibrium is a refinement concept for Nash equilibria of games
in which players make perfect state observations. In game G2 among virtual players, a strategy profile that
is not a Markov perfect equilibrium either depends on the common information (and not just on the mean
Mt), or is not a Nash equilibrium of every sub-game in game G2, or both. We reemphasize this point later
in Section 3.5.
Given a Markov perfect equilibrium of G2, we can construct a corresponding Nash equilibrium of game
G1 using Theorem 2.6. We refer to the class of Nash equilibria of G1 that can be constructed from the
Markov perfect equilibria of G2 as the common information based Markov perfect equilibria of game G1.
Definition 2.3. If (ψ1?1:T−1, ψ2?1:T−1) is a Markov perfect equilibrium of game G2, then the strategy profile
(g1?,g2?) of the form gi? = %i(ψi?1:T−1), i = 1, 2, is called common information based Markov perfect equilib-
rium of game G1. 
A similar concept was introduced for finite games with asymmetric information in our earlier work [12].
2.2.6 Computation of Markov Perfect Equilibrium of Game G2
In this subsection, we characterize Markov perfect equilibrium of game G2 using value functions that depend
on the mean of the common information based conditional belief.
Theorem 2.8. Consider a strategy pair (ψ1?1:T−1, ψ2?1:T−1) ∈ H¯11:T−1 × H¯21:T−1. Define functions V it : Xt × P1t ×
P2t → R, called value functions of virtual player i at time t, as follows:
1. For each possible realization m = (m0,m1,m2) of MT , define the value functions:
V iT (m) := c˜iT (m) = E[ciT (XT )|MT = m] i ∈ {1, 2}. (2.10)
3See, for example, [124, Section 3.3] for a set of such assumptions.
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2. For t = T − 1, . . . , 1, and for each possible realization m of Mt, define the value functions:
V it (m) := min
γ˜it∈Ait
E
[
c˜it(Mt, γ1t , γ2t ) + V it+1(F 1t (Mt,Zt+1))
∣∣∣Mt = m, γit = γ˜it , γ−it = ψ−i?t (m)],(2.11)
assuming that the minimum exists in the equation above. Then, a necessary and sufficient condition for
(ψ1?1:T−1, ψ2?1:T−1) to be a Markov perfect equilibrium of G2 is that for every time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1},
i ∈ {1, 2} and for every realization m of Mt,
ψi?t (m) ∈ arg min
γ˜it∈Ait
E
[
c˜it(Mt, γ1t , γ2t ) + V it+1(F 1t (Mt,Zt+1))
∣∣∣Mt = m, γit = γ˜it , γ−it = ψ−i?t (m)].(2.12)
Proof: See Subsection 2.5.8.
To show that the sub-game admits a Nash equilibrium at time step t requires a fixed-point argument,
which means that the reaction curves of the virtual players intersect in the product of their strategy spaces
H¯1t × H¯2t [1]. In Chapter 3, we show that if the cost functions of the players are quadratic functions of their
arguments, then under certain conditions on the cost functions, the reaction curves of the virtual players at
every time intersect at a unique point. Thus, under those assumptions, a unique CIMPE exists in LQG games
with asymmetric information.
Remark 2.1. As stated earlier, Markov perfect equilibria constitute only a subclass of Nash equilibria of
game G2. Game G2 may have several other Nash equilibria besides Markov perfect equilibria. This implies
that game G1 may have Nash equilibria other than CIMPE. An example of a two-player two-stage game of
asymmetric information in which there is a continuum of Nash equilibria is presented in Section 3.5. 
2.3 An Algorithm to compute Common Information based Markov
Perfect Equilibrium
We can now describe a backward induction process to find a CIMPE of game G1 using a sequence of one-
stage Bayesian games. We proceed as follows:
Algorithm 1:
1. At the terminal time T − 1, for each realization m of the common information based conditional mean
at time T − 1, we define a one-stage Bayesian game SGT−1(m) where
(a) The probability distribution on (XT−1,P1T−1,P2T−1), denoted by pi, is a Gaussian distribution with
mean m and covariance ΣT−1.
(b) Agent i4 observes PiT−1 and chooses action UiT−1, i = 1, 2.
(c) Agent i’s cost is ciT−1(XT−1,U1T−1,U2T−1) + ciT (XT ), i = 1, 2.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium5 of this game is a pair of strategies (γ1∗, γ2∗), where γi∗ : PiT−1 → U iT−1 is
a measurable function such that for any realization pi ∈ PiT−1, γi∗(pi) is a solution of the minimization
4Agent i can be thought to be the same as Controller i. We use a different name here in order to maintain the distinction between
games G1 and SGT−1(m).
5See [2, 125, 3] for a definition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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problem (assuming that a minimum exists)
min
ui∈Ui
T−1
E
pi[ciT−1(XT−1,ui, γj∗(P
j
T−1)) + ciT (XT )|PiT−1 = pi],
where j 6= i, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, and the superscript pi denotes that the expectation is taken with respect
to the distribution pi. If a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (γ1∗, γ2∗) of SGT−1(m) exists, then denote the
corresponding expected equilibrium costs as V iT−1(m), i = 1, 2, and define ψiT (m) := γi∗, i = 1, 2.
2. At time t < T − 1, for each realization m of the common information based conditional mean at time
t, we define the one-stage Bayesian game SGt(m) where
(a) The probability distribution on (Xt,P1t ,P2t ), denoted by pi, admits a Gaussian density function
with mean m and covariance Σt.
(b) Agent i observes Pit and chooses action Uit, i = 1, 2.
(c) Agent i’s cost is cit(Xt,U1t ,U2t ) + V it+1(F 1t (m,Zt+1)), i = 1, 2.
Recall that the common information based conditional mean for the next time step is given by Mt+1 =
F 1t (m,Zt+1), where Zt+1 is given by (2.3). A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game is a pair of
strategies (γ1∗, γ2∗), where γi∗ : Pit → U it is a measurable function such that for any realization
pi ∈ Pit , γi∗(pi) is a solution of the minimization problem (assuming that a minimum exists)
min
ui∈Uit
E
pi[cit(Xt,ui, γj∗(P
j
t )) + V it+1(F 1t (m,Zt+1))|Pit = pi],
where j 6= i, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, Zt+1 is the increment in common information generated according to (2.1),
(2.2) and (2.3) where the control actions are taken to be Uit = ui and U
j
t = γj∗(P
j
t ). The expectation
is taken with respect to the Gaussian distribution pi with mean m and covariance Σt. If a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (γ1∗, γ2∗) of SGt(m) exists, then denote the corresponding expected equilibrium costs as
V it (m), i = 1, 2 and define ψit(m) := γi∗, i = 1, 2.
Theorem 2.9. The strategies ψi = (ψi1, ψi2, . . . , ψiT−1), i = 1, 2, defined by the backward induction process
described in Algorithm 1 and assuming that they satisfy the admissibility conditions introduced in Section 2.2.1,
form a Markov perfect equilibrium of game G2. Consequently, strategies g1 and g2 defined as
git(·, ct) := ψit(mt), i ∈ {1, 2}, t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}
form a CIMPE of game G1.
Proof: To prove the result, we just need to observe that the strategies defined by the backward
induction procedure of Algorithm 1 satisfy the conditions of Theorem 2.8 and hence form a Markov perfect
equilibrium of game G2 (see Theorem 3 of [12]).
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we used the concepts developed in our previous work [12] to study dynamic linear-Gaussian
games of asymmetric information. We proposed a refinement concept for Nash equilibrium in such games,
which we call common information based Markov perfect equilibrium.
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We made two assumptions on the information structure of the controllers, and thereafter, we identified
a virtual game of symmetric and perfect state information. Further, we showed that the original game
of asymmetric information and the virtual game of symmetric information have certain similarities. In
particular, there exists a natural bijection between the sets of Nash equilibria of the original game and the
virtual game. The problem of establishing the existence of a Nash equilibrium of the original game then
boiled down to exhibiting the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the virtual game.
Thus, if Markov perfect equilibrium exists in the virtual game, then the original dynamic game of asym-
metric information admits a Nash equilibrium, which can be computed by looking for Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium in a sequence of static Bayesian games. This also led to a numerical algorithm to compute the CIMPE.
In the next chapter, we use this algorithm to show that a large class of dynamic LQG games of asymmetric
information admits CIMPE.
2.5 Proofs
2.5.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Let ct be the realized common information at time step t. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let γit be such that git(pit, ct) = γit(pit)
for all realizations of pit ∈ Pit . Let pit(dst) = P{dst|ct}. Recall maps ξit+1, i = 1, 2 and ζt+1 from Assumption
2.1. Let St+1 ⊂ St+1 and Zt+1 ⊂ Zt+1 be Borel sets. Now, notice that
P {St+1 × Zt+1|ct} =
∫
St+1×Zt+1×U1:2t ×Y1:2t ×St
P
{
dst+1, dzt+1, du1:2t , dy1:2t , dst|ct
}
=
∫
St+1×Zt+1×U1:2t ×Y1:2t ×St
1{ζt+1(p1t ,p2t ,u1t ,u2t ,y1t+1,y2t+1)}(dzt+1)
1{ξ1t+1(p1t ,u1t ,y1t+1)}(dp
1
t+1)1{ξ2t+1(p2t ,u2t ,y2t+1)}(dp
2
t+1)1{γ1t (p1t )}(du
1
t )
1{γ2t (p2t )}(du
2
t )P{dy1t+1, dy2t+1|xt+1}P{dxt+1|xt,u1t ,u2t }pit(dxt, dp1t , dp2t ).
It should be noted that the right side of the expression above depends only on pit and the choice of pre-
scription pair (γ1t , γ2t ). Therefore, if the conditional probability measure P {St+1 × Zt+1|ct} is disintegrated
with respect to the random variable zt+1, then we get that pit+1(dst+1) := P {dst+1|ct, zt+1} depends on pit,
the choice of prescription pair (γ1t , γ2t ) and the realization of the random variable zt+1. It should be noted
that the measure update equation is a combination of integral equation and a disintegration of probability
measure, which does not depend on the choice of the strategy pair (g1,g2). This completes the proof of the
lemma.
2.5.2 Proof of Lemma 2.2
The proof is divided into three steps.
Step 1: At the first time step, since X1,W0:21 are mutually independent Gaussian random variables
and observations are affine functions of the state, we conclude that the joint measure P {ds1|c1} admits a
distribution with Gaussian density function.
Step 2: For time steps t ≥ 2, assume that all control laws used till that time are affine functions of
common and private information. Moreover, since all noise variables have full support, every possible value
of common information ct in Ct can be realized with the choice of affine control laws of the controllers. With
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affine control laws, the state, the private information and the common information random variables are
jointly Gaussian and hence the conditional distribution on the state and private information given ct admits
a Gaussian density for every ct ∈ Ct.
Step 3: Assumption 2.2 states that the common information based conditional measure pit does not
depend on the choice of control laws. Therefore, under any choice of control laws, the conditional probability
measure on the state and the private information given ct must admit a Gaussian density for every possible
realization ct ∈ Ct.
Thus, for any strategy profile of the controllers, the conditional measure pit admits a Gaussian density
at all time steps t ∈ [T − 1]. This completes the proof of the lemma.
2.5.3 Proof of Lemma 2.3
Since any Gaussian distribution is characterized by its mean and covariance, from (2.6), we know that
(Mt+1,Σt+1) = Ft((Mt,Σt),Zt+1). (2.13)
To establish the result, we need to prove that Σt does not depend on the realizations of the random variable
Ct, and F 1t is affine.
We first show that Σt does not depend on the realizations of the random variable Ct. Assume that the
control laws of both controllers at all time steps are affine in their information at that time step. Due to
linearity of system dynamics and the observation equations, the state, private informations and the common
information are jointly Gaussian. Recall that if (X,Y) are jointly Gaussian random variables, then the con-
ditional measure on X given y, denoted by P {dx|y}, admits a Gaussian density function with conditional
covariance matrix independent of the realization y. As a consequence of this result, we get that conditional
measure on St = Xt × P1t × P2t given the common information ct is a Gaussian distribution with the con-
ditional covariance matrix independent of the realization of the common information. Thus, the covariance
matrix Σt evolves according to (2.8).
Now, notice that E [St|ct] is an affine function of ct. Therefore, Mt+1 is an affine function of Ct+1 and
Mt is an affine function of Ct. Combining this with (2.13), we conclude that Mt+1 is an affine function of
Mt and Zt+1. Thus, for any time step t, F 1t is an affine function of its arguments, and Mt evolves according
to (2.7). This completes the proof of the lemma.
2.5.4 Proof of Lemma 2.4
We use nested expectation to prove this result. Let Γit = χit(Ct). This gives us
E
[
cit(Xt,U1t ,U2t )
]
= E
[
E
[
cit(Xt,U1t ,U2t )
∣∣∣Ct] ]
= E
[
E
[
cit(Xt,Γ1t (P1t ),Γ2t (P2t ))
∣∣∣Ct] ],
= E
[
c˜it(Mt, χ1t (Ct), χ2t (Ct))
]
,
where the first equality follows from the property of expectation, the second equality merely substitutes
Uit = Γit(Pit), and the third equality follows from the definition of c˜it. The above equalities, together with
Assumption 2.1 (the common information Ct always increases at all time steps t), lead us to the following
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equalities
J i(g1, g2) = E
[
E
[
. . .E
[
E
[
ciT (XT ) + ciT−1(XT−1, g1T−1(P1T−1,CT−1), g2T−1(P2T−1,CT−1))
∣∣∣∣CT−1]
+ciT−2(XT−2, g1T−2(P1T−2,CT−2), g2T−2(P2T−2,CT−2))
∣∣∣∣CT−2] . . . ∣∣∣∣C1]],
= E
[
E
[
. . .E
[
E
[
c˜iT (MT ) + c˜iT−1(MT−1, χ1T−1(CT−1), χ2T−1(CT−1))
∣∣∣∣CT−1]
+c˜iT−2(MT−2, χ1T−2(CT−2), χ2T−2(CT−2))
∣∣∣∣CT−2] . . . ∣∣∣∣C1]],
= J˜ i(χ1, χ2).
This completes the proof of the lemma. The converse can also be proved using similar arguments.
2.5.5 Proof of Lemma 2.5
Consider a realization of common information ct and realizations (m1:t, γ1:21:t ) of means and prescriptions
until time step t. From (2.7) in Lemma 2.3, we have Mt+1 = F 1t (mt,Zt+1). As a consequence of this
equation, it is sufficient to prove that
P{Zt+1|ct,m1:t, γ1:21:t } = P{Zt+1|mt, γ1:2t } for all Borel sets Zt+1 ⊂ Zt+1.
Consider an arbitrary Borel set Zt+1 ⊂ Zt+1. From Assumption 2.1, we get
Zt+1 = ζt+1(P1t ,P2t ,U1t ,U2t ,Y1t+1,Y2t+1)
= ζt+1(P1t ,P2t , γ1t (P1t ), γ2t (P2t ),Y1t+1,Y2t+1),
where we used the fact that the players used the strategies prescribed by the virtual players. Define Ot :=
P1t × P2t × Y1t+1 × Y2t+1 and
ζ˜t+1(Ot, γ1t , γ2t ) := ζt+1(P1t ,P2t , γ1t (P1t ), γ2t (P2t ),Y1t+1,Y2t+1),
where Ot ∈ Ot. Let N(·; Σ) denote the density function of a multi-variate mean-zero Gaussian random
vector with variance Σ. Now notice the following:
P{Zt+1 ∈ Zt+1|ct,m1:t, γ1:21:t } =
∫
Zt+1
∫
Xt×Xt+1×Ot
P{dzt+1, dxt, dxt+1, dot|ct,m1:t, γ1:21:t }
=
∫
Zt+1
∫
Xt×Xt+1×Ot
1{ζ˜t+1(ot,γ1t ,γ2t )}(dzt+1)P{dy
1:2
t+1|xt+1}
P{dxt+1|xt, γ1t (p1t ), γ2t (p2t )}P{dxt, dp1t , dp2t |ct,m1:t, γ1:21:t },
=
∫
Zt+1
∫
Xt×Xt+1×Ot
1{ζ˜t+1(ot,γ1t ,γ2t )}(dzt+1)P{dy
1:2
t+1|xt+1}
P{dxt+1|xt, γ1t (p1t ), γ2t (p2t )}N(st −mt; Σt)dst,
where we used the fact that the conditional distribution P{dxt, dp1t , dp2t |ct,m1:t, γ1:21:t } is a Gaussian distri-
bution with mean mt and variance Σt (recall that Σt is independent of the realizations of random variables
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by Lemma 2.3). The right side of the equation above depends only on mt and the choice of prescriptions
γ1:2t . This establishes the result of the lemma.
2.5.6 Proof of Theorem 2.6
Let (χ1?, χ2?) be a Nash equilibrium strategy profile of game G2. We want to show that the strategy profile
(g1?,g2?) is a Nash equilibrium of game G1. Let g1 ∈ G11:T−1 be an arbitrary strategy of Player 1. Define
χ1 := ς1(g1). From the definition of Nash equilibrium of game G2, we get
J1(g1?,g2?) = J˜1(χ1?, χ2?) ≤ J˜1(χ1, χ2?) = J1(g1,g2?),
where we used the result of Lemma 2.4. Similarly, we get J2(g1?,g2?) ≤ J2(g1?,g2) for all g2 ∈ G21:T−1.
Thus, strategy profile (g1?,g2?) is indeed a Nash equilibrium of game G1.
Using similar steps as above, we prove the converse. This establishes the result of the theorem.
2.5.7 Proof of Lemma 2.7
Assume that virtual player 2 uses a fixed strategy of the form Γ2t = ψ2t (Mt), t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. We show that the
virtual player 1’s problem is simply a Markov decision problem with state process {Mt}t∈{1,...,T} and actions
{Γ1t}t∈[T−1].
Suppose at time t, ct is the realization of the common information, mt is the realization of the mean
of the conditional measure pit, γ2t := ψ2t (mt), and virtual player 1 selects γ1t as its action. Recall that
P{dxt, dp1t , dp2t |ct} is a Gaussian distribution with mean mt and variance Σt. The expected instantaneous
cost is
c˜1t (mt, γ1t , ψ2t (mt)) = E
[
c1t (Xt, γ1t (P1t ), γ2t (P2t ))|ct
]
=
∫
St
c1t (xt, γ1t (p1t ), γ2t (p2t ))P{dst|ct}.
Since P{dst|ct} and γ2t are functions of mt at all time steps t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, we conclude that the cost of
virtual player 1 at time step t is only a function of mt and γ1t . Also recall that in Lemma 2.5, we proved that
{Mt}t∈{1,...,T} is a controlled Markov chain. Therefore, virtual player 1’s optimization is a Markov decision
problem with Mt as the state and γ1t as the controlling action. The corresponding statement for virtual
player 2 can also be proved using similar arguments. This completes the proof of the lemma.
2.5.8 Proof of Theorem 2.8
Suppose that the strategy profile (ψ1?, ψ2?) of virtual players is a Markov perfect equilibrium of game G2.
Fix a time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} and a virtual player i ∈ {1, 2}. By definition of Markov perfect equilibrium
(see Definition 2.2), we know that ψi?t:T−1 minimizes the expected cost of the subgame starting at time t,
E
[
c˜iT (MT ) +
T−1∑
s=t
c˜is(Ms, γis, ψ−i?s (Ms))
]
.
Applying the principle of dynamic programming, we can easily verify that (2.12) is satisfied by the control
law ψi?t .
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We now prove the converse, that is, if the pair (ψ1?, ψ2?) satisfies (2.12), then it is a Markov perfect
equilibrium of game G2, that is, it satisfies both conditions of Definition 2.2. The fact that ψi?t depends only
on mt and therefore satisfies the first condition can immediately be verified from the expression in (2.12).
We next show that the strategy pair (ψ1?t:T−1, ψ2?t:T−1) satisfying (2.12) is a sub-game perfect equilibrium for
every sub-game starting at time instant t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}. Towards this end, for a fixed sub-game strategy
ψjt:T−1 of virtual player j, let us denote the one-sided optimization problem for virtual player i 6= j at time
instant t given the Markov state mt by MDP it (ψ
j
t:T−1,mt).
Fix the strategy profile of virtual player 2 to ψ2? = {ψ2?1 , . . . , ψ2?T−1} and fix any time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T −
1}. Then, using the principle of dynamic programming for Markov decision processes, the recursion in
(2.10) and (2.11) implies that ψ1?t:T−1 is the optimal strategy of virtual player 1 for MDP
1
t (ψ2?t:T−1,mt).
Thus, ψ1?t:T−1 is the best response strategy of virtual player 1 given the strategy ψ
2?
t:T−1 of virtual player 2. A
similar argument proves that ψ2?t:T−1 is the best response strategy of virtual player 2 given the strategy ψ
1?
t:T−1
of virtual player 1. Thus, the pair (ψ1?t:T−1, ψ2?t:T−1) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the subgame starting
at time t.
Since the time step t was arbitrary, we conclude that ψ1? is the best response strategy of virtual player 1.
A similar argument proves that ψ2? is the best response strategy of virtual player 2 given the virtual player
1’s strategy ψ1?. This completes the proof of the converse part of the theorem.
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LQG Games
In this chapter, we specialize the result of Chapter 2 to LQG games. In particular, we show that every
LQG game of asymmetric information that satisfies the two assumptions on information structure that were
delineated in Chapter 2 and one assumption on the cost functions of the controllers admits a unique common
information based Markov perfect equilibrium (CIMPE). The unique CIMPE control laws of each controller
are affine in their information at all time steps. Furthermore, we can compute the CIMPE by solving a
sequence of linear equations. We also show that under certain relaxed conditions on the cost functions of
the controllers, the tuple of affine strategies of the controllers computed using the algorithm constitutes a
CIMPE of that game; we, however, cannot guarantee its uniqueness. Computation of CIMPE of an LQG game
is comparatively easier as compared to that of finite games.
The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.1, we present the general model for LQG games with
asymmetric information. In order to prove the main result of the chapter, we need an auxiliary result on a
static Bayesian LQG game. This static Bayesian LQG game is the subject of Section 3.2, where we compute
the Nash equilibrium of the game under certain assumptions on the cost functions of the players in the
static game. Subsequently, in Section 3.3, we show that under two assumptions on the information structure
and an assumption on cost functions of the controllers, a unique CIMPE exists in a dynamic LQG game of
asymmetric information. In Section 3.4, we apply the main result of the chapter to an LQG game with
global and local states to conclude the existence of a unique CIMPE. In Section 3.5, we show through an
example that there may be other Nash equilibria in a game with asymmetric information, and that using our
algorithm, we can capture only a subclass of all Nash equilibria, albeit those with some additional features,
which can be viewed as refinement. Section 3.6 provides some concluding discussions. This chapter is based
on our recent paper [8].
3.1 The Model of LQG Games
Let us now consider the special class of games where the stagewise cost functions ciT and c
i
t are quadratic
functions of their arguments:
ciT (XT ) = XTTRi11XT , cit(Xt,U1t ,U2t ) =
[
XTt ,U1Tt ,U2Tt
]
Ri
XtU1t
U2t

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where Ri :=
Ri11 Ri12 Ri13RiT12 Ri22 Ri23
RiT13 R
iT
23 R
i
33
 ,
Ri11 ≥ 0 and Riii > 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}. We refer to Gaussian games in which the cost functions are of the form
above as dynamic LQG games.
Before we analyze the dynamic LQG game, we first formulate and compute the Nash equilibrium of a
static auxiliary (Bayesian) game in the next subsection. We use the result of this auxiliary game to compute
the Nash equilibrium strategies of the dynamic LQG game in two steps:
1. The first step consists of computing a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a particular two-player static game
with asymmetric information. This is done in Subsection 3.2.
2. We then exploit the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium, the structure of the Nash equilibrium strategies of
the controllers, and the expected equilibrium costs to the controllers to obtain the main result for LQG
games in Section 3.3.
3.2 An Auxiliary Game, AG1
The static Bayesian game is described as follows: X,Y1,Y2 are jointly Gaussian random vectors such that
Yi = HiX for some matrix Hi of appropriate dimensions. The mean and covariance of the three-tuple
X,Y1,Y2 are given by
m =
mxmy1
my2
 Σ =
Σxx Σxy1 Σxy2Σy1x Σy1y1 Σy1y2
Σy2x Σy2y1 Σy2y2
 ,
where Σyiyj = Σ
1
2
yiyiΣ
1
2T
yjyj , Σyix = Σ
1
2
yiyiΣ
1
2T
xx for i, j = 1, 2. (3.1)
Since X,Y1,Y2 are jointly Gaussian random variables, the conditional expectations E[X|Yi] and E[Y−i|Yi]
are affine functions of Yi, given by
E[X|Yi] = mx + ΣxyiΣ−1yiyi(Yi −myi), (3.2)
E[Y−i|Yi] = my−i + Σy−iyiΣ−1yiyi(Yi −myi), (3.3)
where Σ−1yiyi is the generalized inverse (pseudo inverse) of Σyiyi [126] for i = 1, 2.
The cost functions of the controllers in the auxiliary game AG1 are
c1(X,U1,U2) =
[
XT,U1T,U2T
]
C
 XU1
U2
+ 2 [d1, d2, d3]
 XU1
U2
+ r1, (3.4)
c2(X,U1,U2) =
[
XT,U1T,U2T
]
E
 XU1
U2
+ 2 [f1, f2, f3]
 XU1
U2
+ r2, (3.5)
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where C =
C11 C12 C13CT12 C22 C23
CT13 C
T
23 C33
 and E =
E11 E12 E13ET12 E22 E23
ET13 E
T
23 E33
 .
with C ≥ 0, E ≥ 0, C22 > 0, E33 > 0, Cij , Eij are matrices, di, fi are row vectors of appropriate dimensions
and r1, r2 are scalar constants.
Controller i observes Yi, i = 1, 2 and selects Ui according to a decision rule gi, that is, Ui = gi(Yi),
where gi is a measurable function of Y i satisfying E[giT(Yi)gi(Yi)] <∞. Let the space of all such measurable
functions gi be denoted by AGi. This game is referred to as game AG1(m,Σ, c1, c2). We make the following
assumption on the cost functions of the controllers in AG1(m,Σ, c1, c2).
Assumption 3.1. For any square matrix A, let λ¯(A) denotes the positive square root of the maximum eigen-
value of ATA. For the matrix tuple (C,E), define K1 = C−122 C23E−133 ET23 and K2 = E−133 ET23C−122 C23. Let Ki
be the space of all matrices that are similar to Ki, i = 1, 2, that is, K˜ ∈ Ki implies there exists a square
invertible matrix L of appropriate dimensions such that K˜ = LKiL−1. There exists an i0 ∈ {1, 2} and a
matrix K ∈ Ki0 such that λ¯(K) < 1. 
In the next lemma, which builds on and follows from the earlier results in [65, 67], we show that the
Nash equilibrium of the auxiliary game AG1(m,Σ, c1, c2) that satisfies Assumption 3.1 exists in the space
AG1 ×AG2, is unique, and is affine in the information of the controllers.
Lemma 3.1. The following statements hold:
1. For the 1-stage game AG1, a pair of decision rules g1?, g2? is a Nash equilibrium if and only if they
simultaneously satisfy the following two equations,
g1?(Y1) = −C−122 dT2 − C−122 CT12E[X|Y1]− C−122 C23E[g2?(Y2)|Y1],
g2?(Y2) = −E−133 fT3 − E−133 ET13E[X|Y2]− E−133 ET23E[g1?(Y1)|Y2].
2. If the matrices (C,E) in the cost functions of game AG1(m,Σ, c1, c2) satisfy Assumption 3.1, then the
game has a unique Nash equilibrium in the class of all Borel measurable strategies AG1 ×AG2, given as
gi?(Yi) = T i(Yi −myi) + bi, (3.6)
where b1, b2 are solutions of the following pair of equations
b1 = −C−122 [dT2 + C12mx + C23b2],
b2 = −E−133 [fT3 + E13mx + ET23b1],
and are of the form
b1 = l1 + L1mx, b2 = l2 + L2mx, (3.7)
where li and Li are independent of m for both i = 1, 2, and T 1, T 2 are solutions of the following pair of
equations
T 1 = −C−122 [CT12Σxy1Σ−1y1y1 + C23T 2Σy2y1Σ−1y1y1 ], (3.8)
T 2 = −E−133 [ET13Σxy2Σ−1y2y2 + ET23T 1Σy1y2Σ−1y2y2 ]. (3.9)
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3. The expected costs to the controllers when they play according to Nash equilibrium (g1?, g2?) are
E[ci(X, g1?(Y1), g2?(Y2))] = mTΦim + Ξim + Υi, (3.10)
where the matrices Φi, Ξi and Υi for i = 1, 2 are defined by
L˜ :=
 0 0 0L1 −T 1 0
L2 0 −T 2
 , T˜ :=
I 0 00 T 1 0
0 0 T 2
 , l˜ :=
0l1
l2
 ,
Φ1 = (T˜ + L˜)TC(T˜ + L˜), Ξ1 = 2l˜TC(T˜ + L˜) + 2[d1, d2, d3](T˜ + L˜),
Φ2 = (T˜ + L˜)TE(T˜ + L˜), Ξ2 = 2l˜TE(T˜ + L˜) + 2[f1, f2, f3](T˜ + L˜),
Υ1 = r1 + 2[d1, d2, d3]l˜ + trace
(
T˜TCT˜Σ
)
+ 2l˜TCl˜,
Υ1 = r2 + 2[f1, f2, f3]l˜ + trace
(
T˜TET˜Σ
)
+ 2l˜TEl˜.
Proof: Part 1 of the lemma is proved by differentiating E
[
ci(X,Ui, g−i(Y−i))|Yi] with respect to Ui
and setting it equal to zero. For the proof of Part 2 of the lemma, see Section 3.7. For proving Part 3 of the
lemma, notice that if Ui = gi?(Yi) for i = 1, 2, then XU1
U2
 = T˜
 XY1
Y2
+ L˜m + l˜.
Now, substituting this in the expressions for c1 and c2 and taking the expectations, we get the expected costs
of the controllers. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Remark 3.1. The Nash equilibrium strategy of Player i given in (3.6) of the auxiliary game AG1 can be
rewritten as
gi?(Yi) =
[
li | Li | −T i | T i
]
1
mx
myi
Yi
 .

3.3 Generalization to Dynamic LQG Games
In this subsection, we consider LQG games that satisfy Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2. In order to prove the main
result of the section, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. Consider an LQG game G1 that satisfies Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2. Fix a time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T −
1}. Assume that the value functions V it+1, i = 1, 2 of the virtual players at time t + 1 are affine-quadratic
functions of mt+1 given by V it+1(mt+1) = mTt+1Φit+1mt+1 + Ξit+1mt+1 + Υit+1 for some appropriate positive
definite matrix Φit+1, some matrix Ξit+1 and a non-negative real number Υit+1. Then the one-stage Bayesian
game SGt(mt) at time step t with any mean mt ∈ St (defined in Algorithm 1) is an instance of auxiliary game
AG1.
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Proof: Consider a time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} and a realization ct of the common information at time
step t. We now define an auxiliary game AG1 with X,Yi and Ui given by
X = St =
XtP1t
P2t
 , Yi = Pit, Ui = Uit, i = 1, 2.
The probability measure on the state X is taken to be equal to the common information based conditional
measure pit(dst) = P {dst|ct}, that admits a Gaussian density function with mean mt (dependent on ct) and
variance Σt, which are defined in Lemma 2.3. The observation Yi of auxiliary Controller i is the private
information Pit.
We now prove that the one-stage Bayesian game SGt(mt) defined in Algorithm 1 is an instance of the
Auxiliary game AG1. First, note that Yi = HiX for some appropriate matrix Hi, i ∈ {1, 2}, which implies
that the assumption on the covariance matrix of the auxiliary game given in (3.1) is satisfied by the auxiliary
game defined above. We just need to verify that the cost functions of the controllers of the one-stage Bayesian
game are of the same form as (3.4) and (3.5).
Recall from Lemma 2.3 that Mt+1 := F 1t (mt,Zt+1), where F 1t is an affine function of mt and Zt+1.
Thus, the cost-to-go for the Controller i ∈ {1, 2} in the one-stage Bayesian game at time step t < T with
mean mt is of the form
ˇˇcit(mt;St,U1t ,U2t ,Zt+1) := cit(Xt,U1t ,U2t ) + (F 1t (mt,Zt+1))TΦit+1F 1t (mt,Zt+1)
+Ξit+1F 1t (mt,Zt+1) + Υit+1. (3.11)
Now, recall the definition of Zt+1 in Assumption 2.1, and substitute for Y1t+1 and Y2t+1 in the expression for
Zt+1 in terms of Xt, U1t , U2t and noises using (2.1) and (2.2). Thus, Zt+1 is an affine map of St, U1t , U2t and
noises W0t ,W1t+1 and W2t+1. Also recall from Lemma 2.3 that F 1t is an affine map of its arguments. Define
c¯it, i = 1, 2 as
c¯it(mt;St,U1t ,U2t ) = E
[
ˇˇcit(mt;St,U1t ,U2t ,Zt+1)|St,U1t ,U2t
]
.
Thus, the expression for cost function c¯it, i = 1, 2 are precisely of the forms
c¯1t (mt;St,U1t ,U2t ) =
[
STt ,U1Tt ,U2Tt
]
Ct
StU1t
U2t
+ 2mTt Dt
StU1t
U2t
+ r1tmt + Υ˜1t+1, (3.12)
c¯2t (mt;St,U1t ,U2t ) =
[
STt ,U1Tt ,U2Tt
]
Et
StU1t
U2t
+ 2mTt Ft
StU1t
U2t
+ r2tmt + Υ˜2t+1, (3.13)
where Ct, Dt, Et, Ft, r1t , r
2
t , Υ˜1t+1, Υ˜2t+1 are dependent on matrices Ri, Φit+1, Ξit+1 for i = 1, 2, the linear
map F 1t , the variances of noises W0t ,W1t+1 and W2t+1, and the projection function ζt+1, where ζt+1 is
defined in (2.4). The cost functions of the controllers given above are of the same form as considered in
(3.4) and (3.5). Thus, the one-stage Bayesian game at time t with mean mt is the same as auxiliary game
AG1(mt,Σt, c¯1t (mt; ·), c¯2t (mt; ·)). This completes the proof of the lemma.
48
3.3 Generalization to Dynamic LQG Games
Definition 3.1. For any LQG game G1, the corresponding one-stage Bayesian game at time step t with mean
mt and cost functions of the controllers given by (3.12) and (3.13) is referred to as AGt(G1;mt). 
Lemma 3.2 implies that the one-stage Bayesian game of the LQG game G1 at time t with mean mt is an
instance of an auxiliary game AG1(mt,Σt, c¯1t (mt; ·), c¯2t (mt; ·)), where c¯it is defined in (3.11). If the matrix
tuple (Ct, Et), as defined in (3.12) and (3.13), satisfies Assumption 3.1, then for any realization mt, Lemma
3.1 implies that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the one-stage Bayesian game at time step t, which
is affine in the private information of the controllers. Furthermore, the expected equilibrium costs are affine-
quadratic in the mean mt. This crucial observation about LQG games leads us to the next theorem, which
is also the main result of this section. First, we need the following assumption on the cost functions of the
one-stage Bayesian games of game G1.
Assumption 3.2. At every time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} of game G1, the matrix tuple (Ct, Et), as defined
in (3.12) and (3.13) and obtained using the procedure outlined in Algorithm 1 in Section 2.3, satisfies
Assumption 3.1. 
The main result of this section is now captured by the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3. Consider an LQG game G1 that satisfies Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2. If Assumption 3.2 also holds
for game G1, then it admits a unique CIMPE in the class of all Borel measurable strategies of the controllers.
Furthermore, the equilibrium strategy of Controller i ∈ {1, 2} is affine in its information at all time steps.
Proof: We follow the procedure outlined in Algorithm 1 in Section 2.3. At time step T − 1, let
mT−1 be a realization of the common information based conditional mean. Consider the one-stage Bayesian
game AGT−1(G1;mT−1) at time T − 1. Since Assumption 3.2 holds, we use the result of Lemma 3.1 to
conclude that a unique Nash equilibrium policies of the controllers exist. Furthermore, the Nash equilibrium
policies of the one-stage Bayesian game AGT−1(G1;mT−1) are affine in the conditional mean and the
private information of the controllers at that time step. Since the conditional mean mT−1 is affine in the
common information of the controllers, we conclude that the Nash equilibrium policies of the controllers in
the one-stage Bayesian game AGT−1(G1;mT−1) is affine in the information of the controllers.
We continue this process for all possible means mt ∈ St at all time steps t ∈ {T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 1} to
conclude that there is a unique CIMPE for game G1.
Remark 3.2. It should be noted that one can compute the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of game AG1 simply
by solving a set of linear equations. In the dynamic LQG game G1 satisfying the sufficient conditions of
Theorem 3.3, the controllers can just solve a set of linear equations at successive time steps to obtain the
unique CIMPE; thus, computing the equilibrium is inexpensive in the class of LQG games. 
3.3.1 LQG Games not satisfying Assumption 3.2
In this subsection, we show that even if an LQG game does not satisfy Assumption 3.2, it may still admit a
CIMPE under some mild conditions. However, we cannot claim uniqueness of that equilibrium like we did
in Theorem 3.3 in the previous subsection.
Consider the auxiliary game AG1 discussed above. We needed Assumption 3.1 in two places in the result
of Lemma 3.1 above - (i) to conclude the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium provided that it exists, and (ii) to
show the existence of matrices l1, l2, L1, L2, T 1 and T 2 as defined in (3.7), (3.8) and (3.9) above. However,
if we drop this assumption and instead make a milder assumption, then we can obtain a result that is weaker
than what we got above. First, we state the assumption we make to obtain the weaker result.
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Assumption 3.3. In game AG1, the either (I − C−122 C23E−133 ET23) is invertible or (I − E−133 ET23C−122 C23) is
invertible, and there exists a unique solution to the coupled pair of equations (3.8) and (3.9). 
If we make this assumption on the auxiliary game AG1, then we can conclude the following about the
Nash equilibrium of the game.
Lemma 3.4. If the auxiliary game AG1(m,Σ, c1, c2) satisfies Assumption 3.3, then the game admits a Nash
equilibrium. The expressions of Nash equilibrium control laws and expected costs are the same as in Lemma 3.1.
Proof: The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.1.
This brings us to the following result for LQG games that may not satisfy Assumption 3.2.
Theorem 3.5. Consider an LQG game G1 that satisfies Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2. For all time steps t ∈
{1, . . . , T − 1} and realizations of the mean mt ∈ St, obtain the one-stage Bayesian game AGt(G1;mt)
by following the steps of Algorithm 1 in Section 2.3. If AGt(G1;mt) satisfies Assumption 3.3 for all t ∈
{1, . . . , T − 1} and mt ∈ St, then game G1 admits a CIMPE.
Proof: The proof follows from the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.3. It should be noticed
that for a fixed affine strategy of Controller 1, the one-person dynamic optimization problem for Controller
2 can be solved using a dynamic programming (existence follows from Assumption 3.3) to obtain optimal
strategies that are linear in its information.
Notice that we do not claim uniqueness of the CIMPE for LQG games that do not satisfy Assumption 3.2.
3.4 An Illustrative Example
In this section, we consider an example of a two-controller non-zero sum game considered above. There are
three states in the system, out of which one is a global state that is observed by both controllers, and two
states are local states of the controllers. The state evolution is given by
X0t+1 = AX0t +B1U1t +B2U2t +W0t ,
Xit+1 = AiX0t +Di1U1t +Di2U2t +Wit, i = 1, 2,
where X0t is the global state and Xit, i = 1, 2 are the local states for t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}. The noise processes
Wit are assumed to be mutually independent mean-zero Gaussian random variables with variances Λit for
i = 0, 1, 2 and t = 1, . . . , T − 1. Controller i’s information Iit lies in a Euclidean space Iit = X 01:t×X it ×U1:21:t−1.
The cost functions of the controllers are given by
ciT (x0T ,xiT ) = x0TT Q0Tx0T + xiTT QiTxiT ,
cit(x0t ,xit,u1:2t ) = x0Tt Q0tx0t + xiTt Qitxit + u1Tt Ritu1t + u2Tt Situ2t , i = 1, 2,
where Qit, i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, t ∈ {1, . . . , T} are non-negative definite matrices and Rit and Sit , i ∈ {1, 2}, t ∈
{1, . . . , T − 1} are positive definite matrices of appropriate dimensions.
Note that the space of common information of the controllers is Ct := X 01:t × U1:21:t−1 and the space of
private information of Controller i is Pit := X it . It is easy to verify that Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold for this
system.
50
3.4 An Illustrative Example
We are interested in computing CIMPE of this game. Let us denote the conditional mean of the random
variable Xit given the common information Ct as Mit, i = 1, 2. Note that the mean is given by Mit =
AiX0t−1 + Di1U1t−1 + Di2U2t−1. The variance of Xit given the common information Ct is Λit. Define Mt :=
[X0Tt ,M1Tt ,M2Tt ]T to be the conditional mean of the states [X0Tt ,X1Tt ,X2Tt ]T given the common information
Ct. Also note that Zt+1 = [U1Tt ,U2Tt ,X0Tt+1]T. The evolution of Mt is given by
Mt+1 =
 X0t+1A1X0t +D11U1t +D12U2t
A2X0t +D21U1t +D22U2t

=: F 1t (X0t ,U1t ,U2t ,X0t+1). (3.14)
The conditional covariance matrix is
Σt+1 := diag{0,Λ1t+1,Λ2t+1}.
Let us assume that this game satisfies Assumption 3.2. By Theorem 3.3, we conclude that this game admits
a unique CIMPE. Now, we compute the unique CIMPE of this game.
1. At the terminal time T − 1, for each realization m := [x0TT−1,m1T,m2T]T of MT−1, the one-stage
Bayesian game SGT−1(m) is defined as follows
(a) The conditional probability distribution on X 0T−1 × X 1T−1 × X 2T−1 given the common information
cT−1 is a Gaussian distribution pi with mean m and covariance ΣT−1.
(b) Agent i observes XiT−1 and decides on UiT−1 for i = 1, 2.
(c) Agent i’s cost is ciT−1(x0T−1,xiT−1,u1:2T−1) + ciT (x0T ,xiT ) for i = 1, 2.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game (γ1∗, γ2∗) exists and is computed using Lemma 3.1. For a
fixed i ∈ {1, 2}, γi∗ satisfies
γi∗(xiT−1) = arg minui
T−1
E
pi
[
ciT−1(X0T−1,XiT−1,U1:2T−1) + ciT (X0T ,XiT )
∣∣∣XiT−1 = xiT−1,UiT−1 := uiT−1],
where UjT−1 := γj∗(X
j
T−1), j 6= i, i, j ∈ {1, 2}. Define ψi∗T−1(m) := γi∗ for i ∈ {1, 2}. The value
function V iT−1 is quadratic in m and of the form V iT−1(m) = x0TT−1ΦiT−1x0T−1 + miTΞiT−1mi + ΥiT−1,
where ΦiT−1 and ΞiT−1 are positive definite matrices and ΥiT−1 is a non-negative real number for
i ∈ {1, 2}.
2. At time t < T − 1, for each realization m of Mt, we define a one-stage Bayesian game SGt(m) where
(a) The probability distribution on X 0t ×X 1t ×X 2t is Gaussian with mean m and covariance Σt.
(b) Agent i observes Xit and chooses action Uit for i = 1, 2.
(c) Agent i’s cost is
cit(x0t ,xit,u1:2t ) + V it+1(F 1t (x0t ,u1t ,u2t ,X0t+1)),
where F 1t is defined in (3.14). If we expand this cost function and write it in terms of x0t ,u1t , u2t
and noise variables, then we observe that the resulting cost function is of the same form as in the
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auxiliary game AG1 considered in Subsection 3.2 above. The Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian
game SGt(m) is computed using the result in Lemma 3.1. Let (γ1∗, γ2∗) be a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium; for a fixed i ∈ {1, 2}, γi∗ satisfies
γi∗(xit) = arg minuit
E
pi
[
cit(X0t ,Xit,U1:2t ) + V it+1(F 1t (X0t ,U1t ,U2t ,X0t+1))
∣∣∣Xit = xit,Uit := uit],
where Ujt := γj∗(X
j
t ), j 6= i, i, j ∈ {1, 2}. Define ψi∗t (m) := γi∗ for i ∈ {1, 2}. The value function
V it is quadratic in m and of the form V it (m) = x0Tt Φitx0t + miTΞitmi + Υit, where Φit and Ξit are
positive definite matrices and Υit is a non-negative real number.
Define gi? = %i(ψi∗1:T−1) for i ∈ {1, 2}. Then, (g1?,g2?) forms a CIMPE for the game considered in this
section. Furthermore, the equilibrium strategies are affine in the information of the controllers.
3.5 An LQG Game with Multiple Nash Equilibria
In previous sections, we outlined an algorithm that can be used to compute Nash equilibria of games that
satisfy Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2. In this section, we exhibit an example of a game of asymmetric information
that has several Nash equilibria and a unique CIMPE. This reinforces Remark 2.1 stated after Theorem 2.8,
which points out that our algorithm computes only a subclass of those Nash equilibria that can be obtained
using the Markov perfect equilibrium of the corresponding symmetric information game between the virtual
players.
To illustrate the existence of multiple Nash equilibria, we follow the lines in Example 1 of [67, p. 241],
and consider the following two-stage game in which all variables are scalar:
x2 = x1 + u11 + u21 + w01, y11 = x1 + w11, y21 = x1 + w21,
x3 = x2 + u22 + w02, y22 = x2 + w22.
The primitive random variables {X1,W 01 ,W 02 ,W 11 ,W 21 ,W 22 } are all mutually independent, mean zero Gaus-
sian random variables with unit variance. The information structure of Controller 1 is I11 = Y 11 and I12 =
[U11 , U21 , Y 11 , Y 21 ]T, and the information structure of Controller 2 is I21 = Y 21 and I22 = [Y 22 , U11 , U21 , Y 11 , Y 21 ]T.
Since the information structure is of the one-step delayed sharing pattern type, this game satisfies Assump-
tions 2.1 and 2.2. The cost functions of the controllers are
J1(g11 , g21 , g22) = E
[
(X3)2 + (U11 )2
]
,
J2(g11 , g21 , g22) = E
[
(X3)2 + (U21 )2 + (U22 )2
]
.
The Kalman filter equations for evolution of common information based belief are given by
m02 = E [X2|c2] =
y11 + y21
3 + u
1
1 + u21, Σ02 = E
[
(X2 −m02)2
]
= 43 .
Now, we compute the CIMPE of this game.
52
3.5 An LQG Game with Multiple Nash Equilibria
3.5.1 Common Information based Markov Perfect Equilibrium
Recall that since this is an LQG game, there exists a unique CIMPE. We now apply our algorithm to compute
the CIMPE of this game. In the sub-game starting at time step t = 2, Controller 2 is the only player acting and
the cost-to-go function for the sub-game starting at t = 2 is strictly convex in the control action of Controller
2. The unique optimal control law for Controller 2 for the sub-game at t = 2, given its information, is given
by
g2?2 (i22) = −
1
2E
[
X2|i22
]
= −12E
[
X2|m02, y22
]
= −12
(
m02 +
4
7(y
2
2 −m02)
)
. (3.15)
The expected value functions of the controllers at time step 2 are
V 12 (m02) =
1
4(m
0
2)2 +
37
21 , V
2
2 (m02) =
1
2(m
0
2)2 +
41
21 .
Now, using the result of Lemma 3.1, we obtain the unique Nash equilibrium of the sub-game starting at the
first time step to be
g1?1 (y11) = −
5
59y
1
1 , g
2?
1 (y21) = −
9
59y
2
1 . (3.16)
Thus, this game has a unique CIMPE (g1?1 , (g2?1 , g2?2 )). In the next subsection, we show that there exists a
continuum of Nash equilibria in this game, and those equilibria cannot be obtained using our approach.
3.5.2 Other Nash Equilibria
In this subsection, we show that if Controller 2 uses the common information (instead of only mean m02) to
construct its control law at time step t = 2, then we have a continuum of Nash equilibrium in this game.
We now define a tuple of strategies (g1†1 , (g
2†
1 , g
2†
2 )) ∈ G11 × G21:2 of both controllers, parametrized by a
real number λ 6= −59/22:
g1†1 (y11) = −
10λ+ 5
22λ+ 59y
1
1 , g
2†
1 (y21) = −
2λ+ 9
22λ+ 59y
2
1 ,
g2†2 (i22) = −
1
2
(
m02 +
4
7(y
2
2 −m02)
)
+ λ
(
u11 − g1†1 (y11)
)
. (3.17)
We now have the following result:
Lemma 3.6. The strategy profile (g1†1 , (g
2†
1 , g
2†
2 )) is a Nash equilibrium of the game formulated above for any
value of λ 6= −59/22.
Proof: We prove that for a fixed strategy g1†1 , (g
2†
1 , g
2†
2 ) is the best response strategy of Controller 2
and vice versa.
First, fix u11 = g
1†
1 (y11). Then, g
2†
2 minimizes the cost E
[
(X3)2
∣∣u11 = g1†1 (y11), i22] (note that i22 contains
y11). One can then verify that g
2†
1 minimizes the cost functional J
2(g1†1 , (g21 , g
2†
2 )). Therefore, we conclude
that J2(g1†1 , (g
2†
1 , g
2†
2 )) ≤ J2(g1†1 , (g21 , g22)) for any g2 := (g21 , g22) ∈ G21:2.
Next, fix u21 = g
2†
1 (y21), u22 = g
2†
2 (i22). Then, the cost-to-go function for Controller 1 is at time step 1 for
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the fixed strategy of Controller 2 is
1
4(m
0
2)2 +
37
21 + λm
0
2(u11 − g1†1 (y11)) + λ2
(
u11 − g1†1 (y11)
)2
.
The control law g1†1 minimizes the cost functional of Controller 1 at time step t = 1. Thus, we conclude
J1(g1†1 , (g
2†
1 , g
2†
2 )) ≤ J1(g11 , (g2†1 , g2†2 )) for any g11 ∈ G11 .
Thus, we have proved that, in fact, there are several Nash equilibria of this game, and the Nash equilib-
rium obtained using our algorithm is just one among them (notice that the CIMPE corresponds to the choice
of λ = 0).
Remark 3.3. It has been shown in [66] that if the control actions are not shared among the controllers, then
there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the game formulated above. The unique Nash equilibrium is the
same set of control laws given in (3.15) and (3.16) with ui1 substituted with g
i?
1 (yi1) in the expression of m02.
Thus, the existence of multiple Nash equilibria in this game is due to the information available to Controller
2 at time step 2 about the action taken by the Controller 1 at time step 1. This example illustrates that more
information to controllers may be harmful in a game as it gives rise to several other Nash equilibria! 
Remark 3.4. It should also be noted that in case control actions are not shared, Assumption 2.2 does not
hold. However, [66] proved that an LQG game with one-step delayed observation sharing pattern admits a
unique Nash equilibrium. Thus, Nash equilibrium in a dynamic game of asymmetric information may exist
even in the absence of Assumption 2.2 on that game. 
3.5.3 Effects on Expected Costs
We now compare the expected costs to the controllers, if the Controller 2 plays according to a Nash equilib-
rium given by (3.17). First, note that E
[
(Y i1 )2
]
= 2, i = 1, 2 and E
[
Y 11 Y
2
1
]
= 1. This implies
(m02)2 =
2
9(22λ+ 59)2
(
(−8λ+ 44)2 + (16λ+ 32)2 + (−8λ+ 44)(16λ+ 32)) .
The expected costs to the controllers at Nash equilibrium (g1†1 , (g
2†
1 , g
2†
2 )) are given by
J1†(λ) := J1(g1†1 , (g
2†
1 , g
2†
2 )) =
1
4(m
0
2)2 +
2(10λ+ 5)2
(22λ+ 59)2 +
37
21 ,
J2†(λ) := J2(g1†1 , (g
2†
1 , g
2†
2 )) =
1
2(m
0
2)2 +
2(2λ+ 9)2
(22λ+ 59)2 +
41
21 .
If we take the limit λ→∞, we get
lim
λ→∞
J1†(λ) =
200 + 323
484 +
37
21 ≈ 2.197, limλ→∞ J
2†(λ) =
8 + 643
484 +
41
21 ≈ 2.013.
On the other hand, J1†(0) ≈ 1.832 and J2†(0) ≈ 2.092, which corresponds to the expected costs to the
controllers if they play according to the CIMPE. Clearly, Controller 2, by choosing an appropriate (very large)
value of λ, can reduce its expected cost, while increasing the expected cost to Controller 1; this observation
has connections to incentive designs where Controller 2 can be viewed as the designer (leader) in the game.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, our focus was on dynamic LQG games of asymmetric information that satisfy the two as-
sumptions on information structure we stated in Section 2.1 of the previous chapter. We established the
existence of CIMPE in a large class of such games. Further, under certain sufficient conditions on the cost
functions, this equilibrium is unique. We showed that the CIMPE can be computed by solving a sequence
of linear equations. Thus, computation of CIMPE is computationally inexpensive. We also exhibited, by
an example, that there could be other Nash equilibria in a dynamic LQG game of asymmetric information,
which are however not CIMPE.
Based on the result in [67], one can extend the results of this chapter to multi-player dynamic LQG
games of asymmetric information, by making assumptions that are similar to Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2
adapted to multi-player settings.
In the next chapter, we use the ideas introduced in this chapter to identify sufficient conditions under
which an appropriate incentive scheme exists in a multi-stage linear-Gaussian incentive design game of
asymmetric information.
3.7 Proof of Lemma 3.1
We first need several results about eigenvalues, eigenvectors, and pseudo-inverses of symmetric non-invertible
matrices. We turn our attention to the proof of Lemma 3.1 thereafter.
Lemma 3.7. In the statements below, for any square matrix D ∈ Rn×n, D−1 denotes generalized inverse of the
matrix.
1. For any square matrix D ∈ Rn×n, DD−1D = D.
2. Let D1 and D2 be matrices of appropriate dimensions. Then, the sets of non-zero eigenvalues of D1D2 and
D2D1 are the same.
3. Any symmetric matrix D ∈ Rn×n has real eigenvalues and a mutually orthogonal set of eigenvectors that
spans Rn. Thus, spectral radius of DTD = D2 is the same as the square of the spectral radius of D.
4. For any matrix D ∈ Rm×n, the matrix DT(DDT)−1D is a symmetric positive semi-definite matrix with
every non-zero eigenvalue of the matrix equal to 1.
5. Let D1, D2 be matrices of appropriate dimensions. Define a square matrix D as
D := (D1DT1 )−1D1DT2 (D2DT2 )−1D2DT1 .
Then, all eigenvalues of D are non-negative real numbers that are less than or equal to 1.
Proof:
1. See [126, Theorem 4.3.2, p. 100]
2. See [127, p. 24].
3. Since D is symmetric, it is normal, that is, it is diagonalizable via a similarity transformation [127,
Subsection 4.10.3, p. 67]. From [127, Subsection 4.10.3, p. 67], we also know that the set of
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eigenvectors of a symmetric matrix in Rn×n forms an orthonormal basis for Rn (for a proof, see [128,
Theorem 2, p. 54]).
4. The fact that DT(DDT)−1D is symmetric is clear. We first prove that DT(DDT)−1D is positive semi-
definite. Since DDT is positive semi-definite, (DDT)−1 is positive semi-definite by [127, Theorem
4.4.3, p. 109]. Thus, DT(DDT)−1D is positive semi-definite, and therefore, its eigenvalues are non-
negative real numbers. Using Part 2, we know that DT(DDT)−1D and (DDT)−1DDT have the same
set of non-zero eigenvalues. Now, let λ be a non-zero eigenvalue of (DDT)−1DDT and e be the
corresponding eigenvector. Then,
(DDT)−1DDTe = λe.
From the above equation, we note that e cannot lie in the nullspace of DT as λ 6= 0, which further
implies that eTDDTe > 0. Multiplying both sides in the above equation by eTDDT and using the
identity in Part 1, we get
eTDDT(DDT)−1DDTe = eTDDTe = λeTDDTe.
Thus, λ = 1. This completes the proof of this part of the lemma.
5. Let Pi := DTi (DiDTi )−1Di for i = 1, 2. Note that P1 and P2 are symmetric positive semi-definite
matrices and have the same dimension. Part 2 of the lemma implies that D and P1P2 have the same
set of non-zero eigenvalues. Part 4 of the lemma implies that spectral radius of Pi is equal to 1 for
i = 1, 2. Part 3 implies PTi Pi has spectral radius 1 for i = 1, 2. Let λ be a non-zero eigenvalue of P1P2
and e be the corresponding normalized eigenvector. Then, we have P1P2e = λe. Taking the usual
norm on both sides of the equation, we get
|λ|2eTe = (P2e)TPT1 P1(P2e) ≤ eTPT2 P2e ≤ eTe.
Thus, |λ| ≤ 1, which completes the proof of this part of the lemma.
Lemma 3.8. Let λ(·) denote the spectral radius of a matrix (·). Let P1, P2 and P3 be square matrices in Rn×n.
If λ(P1)λ(P2) < 1, then there exists a unique D ∈ Rn×n such that D + P1DP2 = P3 is satisfied.
Proof: See the proof of Theorem 3 in [65].
We now prove Lemma 3.1 in three steps. First, we consider another game AG2 with a different cost
function and show that games AG1 and AG2 have the same set of Nash equilibria. The cost functions of
the players in game AG2 have a form that is similar to the game considered in [65]. However, in [65], the
matrices Σyiyi , i = 1, 2 are assumed to be invertible, which we relax in this proof. In Step 2 of the proof,
we use the result from [65, 66, 67] to show that the Nash equilibrium of game AG2 exists and is affine in
the information of the players. Then, we use the Step 1 of the proof to obtain the Nash equilibrium of game
AG1.
Step 1: Consider game AG2 in which the players have the following cost functions
c¯1(X,U1,U2) = U1TC22U1 + 2U1TCT12X + 2U1TC23U2 + 2d2U1, (3.18)
c¯2(X,U1,U2) = U2TE33U2 + 2U2TET13X + 2U2TET23U1 + 2f3U2. (3.19)
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The difference in AG1 and AG2 lies in the cost functions of the players. In game AG1, cost ci has the terms
that are not dependent on Ui for i = 1, 2 whereas in game AG2, cost c¯i has only the terms dependent on Ui
for i = 1, 2. Thus, games AG1 and AG2 are strategically equivalent.
Step 2: In this step, we prove that game AG2 has a unique Nash equilibrium that is affine in the
information of the controllers. From [67, Theorem 1, p. 236], we know that if Assumption 3.1 holds, then
the Nash equilibrium strategy tuple of game AG2 exists, is unique and affine in its argument. Assume that
the Nash equilibrium strategies are given by
gi?(Yi) = T i(Yi −myi) + bi, i = 1, 2.
Then, b1, b2 must be the solutions of the following pair of equations
b1 = −C−122 [dT2 + C12mx + C23b2]
b2 = −E−133 [fT3 + E13mx + ET23b1],
and T 1, T 2 must be the solutions of the following pair of equations
T 1 = −C−122 [CT12Σxy1Σ−1y1y1 + C23T 2Σy2y1Σ−1y1y1 ],
T 2 = −E−133 [ET13Σxy2Σ−1y2y2 + ET23T 1Σy1y2Σ−1y2y2 ].
We now show that there exist pairs (b1, b2) and (T 1, T 2) which satisfy the above set of equations. If Σyiyi , i =
1, 2 are invertible, then the existence of such pairs (b1, b2) and (T 1, T 2) follow from [65]. We now prove that
such pairs exist even if Σyiyi , i = 1, 2 are not invertible. In what follows, Σ−1yiyi represents the generalized
inverse of Σyiyi , i = 1, 2.
Since Assumption 3.1 holds, there exists an i0 ∈ {1, 2} and a matrix K ∈ Ki0 such that λ¯(K) < 1.
Without loss of generality, assume that i0 = 1 and let L be the matrix such that K = LK1L−1. Let b˜1 =
Lb1, b˜2 = Lb2, T˜ 1 = LT 1 and T˜ 2 = LT 2. Now, notice that
b˜1 = −LC−122 [dT2 + C12mx + C23L−1b˜2]
b˜2 = −LE−133 [fT3 + E13mx + ET23L−1b˜1],
which admits a unique solution since λ¯(K) < 1. This further implies that a pair of (b1, b2) exists. We now
prove that there exist T 1 and T 2 satisfying the above pair of equations. Substituting the expression for T 2 in
the expression of T 1 and writing the expression in terms of T˜ 1, we get
T˜ 1 = −LC−122 CT12Σxy1Σ−1y1y1 + LC−122 C23E−133 ET13Σxy2Σ−1y2y2
+L(C−122 C23E−133 ET23)L−1T˜ 1(Σy1y2Σ−1y2y2Σy2y1Σ
−1
y1y1), (3.20)
where L(C−122 C23E−133 ET23)L−1 is equal to K. Also note that by Lemma A2 in [65, p. 327], λ¯(K) < 1
implies λ(K) < 1. Now, recall that Σyiyj = Σ
1
2
yiyiΣ
1
2T
yjyj for i, j = 1, 2. Thus, Lemma 3.7 Part 5 implies
that λ(Σy1y2Σ−1y2y2Σy2y1Σ
−1
y1y1) ≤ 1. Since λ(K)λ(Σy1y2Σ−1y2y2Σy2y1Σ−1y1y1) < 1, we conclude from Lemma 3.8
that there exists a unique T˜ 1, which satisfies (3.20). This further implies the existence of a unique T 1 in
(3.8)-(3.9). We can substitute this value of T 1 in the expression for T 2 to get its unique value.
The case of i0 = 2 is analogous to the argument as above. We first get a unique value of T 2 and then
substitute T 2 in the expression for T 1 to get the unique value of T 1. Also note that computing the value of
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b1, b2, T 1 and T 2 is equivalent to solving a linear program.
Step 3: Since games AG2 and AG1 are strategically equivalent, we can use the result of Step 2 to obtain
the Nash equilibrium strategies of the players for game AG1.
The proof of Part 2 of the lemma is thus complete.
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Chapter 4
Incentive Design in Dynamic Games
In this chapter, we study incentive design problems in dynamic games of asymmetric information. In such
games, the principal may have access to the private information of the players at the beginning of each stage,
or the actions taken by the players at the end of each stage, or both. For the case when the state space of
the game, and observation and action spaces of the players are uncountable, if the principal does not have
access to both private information and actions of the players, then the incentive design problem is difficult
to solve and is an open problem as of now. Therefore, due to the technical reasons, the central agency is
assumed to acquire the private information as well as the actions taken by the players at every stage of the
game.
As noted in Chapter 1, in incentive design problems, the cost function of each controller features a
non-trivial coupling between its action and the strategy of the principal. This coupling allows principal to
choose a strategy so as to incentivize the controller to act in a manner that is beneficial to the principal. A
two-player static incentive design game was studied in [87], and a three-player version with hierarchical
information structure was studied in [88]. However, multi-stage incentive design problems have not been
studied prior to our work.
In this chapter, we propose a new equilibrium concept for a class of incentive design games, which we
call common information based incentive scheme. We show that under certain conditions on the information
structure of the game and quadratic, stagewise additive, cost function of the principal, a common information
based incentive scheme exists. The outline of the chapter is as follows. In the next section, Section 4.1,
we formulate the multi-stage incentive design problem and state key assumptions that we make on the
problem. We also define the primary solution concept, common information based subgame-perfect incentive
scheme, that is used in the chapter in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, a single-stage incentive design problem
is formulated and an incentive scheme is derived. Then, we use the result obtained for the single-stage
incentive design problem to compute a common information based subgame-perfect incentive scheme for
multi-stage incentive design problem in Section 4.3. Finally, we provide some concluding remarks in Section
4.4. The proofs are provided at the end of the chapter. This chapter is based on our recent paper [9].
4.1 Problem Formulation
We consider an N -controller multi-stage incentive design problem, in which the controllers, at any stage
of the game, do not necessarily observe the same set of random variables. This leads us to a game of
asymmetric information. The controllers act on a system, whose state at stage t ∈ [T ] is denoted by Xt. The
controllers observe the state through possibly noisy sensors (or channels), and the observation of Controller
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i ∈ {0, . . . , N} at stage t ∈ [T − 1] is denoted by Yit. The spaces of all possible realizations of Xt and Yit are
denoted, respectively, by Xt and Yit . Controller i ∈ {0, . . . , N} decides on an action from a space U it , and its
action is denoted by Uit. Throughout the chapter, the spaces Xt, Yit , U it are assumed to be finite dimensional
Euclidean spaces.
The state of the system evolves according to the following linear dynamical equation
Xt+1 = ft(Xt,U0:Nt ,W0t ), t ∈ [T − 1],
where W0t is the actuation noise on the system. We denote the set of all possible actuation noises by W0t .
Controller i at stage t ∈ [T − 1] makes an observation that is correlated with the state according to
Yit = hit(Xt,Vit), i ∈ {0, . . . , N},
where Vit, which lies in the space Vit , is the observation noise of Controller i at stage t. We again assume
that W0t ,Vit , i ∈ {0} ∪ [N ], t ∈ [T − 1] to be finite dimensional Euclidean spaces. The random variables
{X1,W01:T−1,V0:N1:T−1} are primitive random variables, and are assumed to be mutually independent. The
maps ft and hit are assumed to be linear for all i ∈ {0, . . . , N} and t ∈ [T − 1].
4.1.1 Information Structure of the Controllers
The information available to each controller at stage t ∈ [T −1] is a subset of all information generated up to
that point, that is, {Y0:N1:t ,U0:N1:t−1}. For i ∈ {0, . . . , N} and t ∈ [T − 1], let E it and F it be defined, respectively,
as
E it := {(j, s) ∈ {0, . . . , N} × {1, . . . , t} : Controller i at stage t knows Yjs},
F it := {(j, s) ∈ {0, . . . , N} × {1, . . . , t} : Controller i at stage t knows Ujs}.
Define Iit , Ct and Pit for i ∈ {0, . . . , N} and t ∈ [T − 1] as
Iit =
∏
(j,s)∈Eit
Yjs ×
∏
(j,s)∈Fit
U js ,
Ct =
∏
(j,s)∈∩N
i=0Eit
Yjs ×
∏
(j,s)∈∩N
i=0Fit
U js ,
Pit =
∏
(j,s)∈Eit\(∩Ni=0Eit )
Yjs ×
∏
(j,s)∈Fit\(∩Ni=0Fit )
U js .
Note that Iit , Ct and Pit for i ∈ {0, . . . , N} and t ∈ [T − 1] are finite dimensional Euclidean spaces.
The vector Iit ∈ Iit denotes the information available to Controller i at stage t, where Iit is a vector
comprised of observations and control actions that are observed by the controller at stage t. The common
information of the controllers at the beginning of stage t is denoted by Ct, which takes values in Ct. The
private information of Controller i at stage t is denoted by Pit.
A multi-stage game is said to be one of symmetric information if Ct = I1t = I2t = · · · = INt at all stages.
We are interested in games where the controllers may have asymmetry in information, that is, for some
i, j ∈ [N ] with i 6= j, we have Iit 6= Ijt .
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4.1.2 Description of Each Stage
Every stage t ∈ [T − 1] comprises the following four events:
1. During the first event, each controller observes certain random variable(s): All controllers observe the
common information Ct. Controllers 0 and i simultaneously observe Pit. Controller 0, in addition to
P1:Nt , also observes P0t at stage t, which can be thought of as a side information to Controller 0 about
the state of the world at the beginning of the stage t.
2. During the second event, Controller 0 announces its control law. This event is common knowledge,
that is, all controllers know the announced control law, they know that others know the announced
control law, and ad infinitum.
3. During the third event, Controller i ∈ [N ] chooses its control law. Thereafter, it acts according to its
control law and realization of its information.
4. During the fourth (and final) event, Controller 0 observes the actions U1:Nt taken by all other con-
trollers. Thereafter, Controller 0 evaluates its own action on the basis of its announced control law (see
second event above), information, and realizations of actions u1:Nt , and applies the evaluated action.
At the final stage of the game, that is when t = T , controllers do not take any action, but they do incur
terminal costs. This completes the description of each stage of the game, which we also depict in Figure 4.1
below.
PNt P
N
tP1tP
0
t P1t
Controller 0 announces g0t : Ct × P0:Nt × U1:Nt → U0t
Controller N
Controller N
U0t := g0t (Ct,P0:Nt ,U1:Nt )
U1t UNt
U0t
Controller 0 Controller 1
Controller 1
Figure 4.1: A figure illustrating the sequence of activities at stage t ∈ [T − 1] in the multi-stage incentive
design game. Since the common information Ct is observed by all controllers, it is not depicted in the
figure.
4.1.3 Admissible Strategies and Cost Functions of the Controllers
Controller i ∈ [N ] at stage t ∈ [T − 1] chooses a control law, denoted by git : Ct × Pit → U it , which we
assume to be a Borel-measurable function. Controller 0 at stage t ∈ [T − 1] chooses a control law, denoted
by g0t : Ct × P0:Nt × U1:Nt → U0t , which again is assumed to be a Borel-measurable function. The set of all
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such control laws git is denoted by Git , i ∈ {0, . . . , N}, t ∈ [T − 1]. Let G
0
t be the space of all Borel measurable
functions g0t : Ct × P0:Nt → U0t for t ∈ [T − 1].
The set of control laws gi := gi1:T−1 is called control strategy of Controller i, and a set of strategies of all
controllers, {g0, . . . ,gN}, is called strategy profile of the controllers.
At stage t ∈ [T − 1], Controller i’s cost function is denoted by cit : Xt × U0:T → R+. At the final stage
T , the cost function is denoted by ciT : XT → R+. We assume that the cost functions of the controllers are
strictly convex, differentiable and subquadratic.
The total cost functional to Controller i, as a function of the strategy profile of the controllers, is denoted
by J i : G01:T−1 × · · · × GN1:T−1 → R+, and it is given by
J i(g0:N ) = E
[
ciT (XT ) +
T−1∑
t=1
cit(Xt,U0:Nt )
]
,
where U0t = g0t (Ct,P0:Nt ,U1:Nt ),Uit = git(Ct,Pit), i ∈ [N ] and the expectation is taken with respect to the
probability measure induced on the state, observations and actions of the controllers due to the choice of
strategy profile g0:N of the controllers.
We now define the motive of Controller 0 in the incentive design problem considered here. Consider
the optimization problem of Controller 0:
inf
g0:N∈G01:T−1×G1:N1:T−1
J0(g0:N ), (4.1)
where the strategy space of Controller 0 is taken to be G01:T−1. Controller 0 wants everyone to act as an
N + 1-agent team with the cost function
∑T
t=1 c
0
t , so that it gives the minimum expected cost to Controller 0.
Thus, Controller 0’s task at every stage is to decide on its control law so that it is in the best interest of other
controllers to act according to its optimal law at that stage in the Controller 0’s optimization problem. In the
next definition, we make this notion precise in the game framework and define what we mean by admissible
incentives.
Definition 4.1. We say that a N+1-strategy profile g0:N? ∈ G0:N1:T−1 is an admissible incentive strategy profile
for the controllers in multi-stage incentive design problem described above if it satisfies the following set of
inequalities:
J0(g0:N?) ≤ J0(g0:N ) (4.2)
and J i(g0:N?) ≤ J i(gi,g−i?) (4.3)
for all i ∈ [N ] and all g0:N ∈ G0:N1:T−1. 
Note that (4.2) is satisfied if the aforementioned Controller 0’s optimization problem admits an optimal
solution. In Subsection 4.1.5, we make assumptions to ensure that an optimal solution exists and it has
certain desirable properties.
Definition 4.2. A multi-stage incentive design problem as described above is referred to as MSIDP. The
statistics of the random variables, the state and observation equations, the cost functions, and the informa-
tion structures of the controllers are all common knowledge among the controllers in MSIDP. 
We are interested in computing the common information based subgame-perfect incentive scheme in
MSIDP that is defined in the next subsection.
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4.1.4 Common Information Based Subgame-Perfect Incentive Scheme
Definition 4.3. An N + 1-strategy tuple g0:N? ∈ G0:N1:T−1 is a common information based subgame-perfect
incentive scheme for the controllers in multi-stage incentive design problem described above if
1. g0:N? is an admissible incentive strategy profile of the controllers.
2. Let Gt(ct) denote the incentive design subgame starting at stage t where the common information of
the controllers is ct and the cost to Controller i ∈ {0, . . . , N} at stage s ∈ {t, . . . , T} is given by cis. For
every t ∈ [T − 1], the N + 1-tuple of truncated strategy profile {g0?t:T−1, . . . , gN?t:T−1} is an admissible
incentive strategy profile of the controllers for the incentive design subgame Gt(·).
The strategy of Controller i, gi?1:T−1, is called its strategy under the common information based subgame-perfect
incentive scheme. 
Our goal in this chapter is to show that under certain assumptions delineated in the next subsection, the
common information based subgame-perfect incentive scheme exists in MSIDP and can be computed using
a backward induction algorithm.
4.1.5 Key Assumptions
We place here slight variations of the same assumptions on information structure of the controllers as in
Chapter 2, but adapted to the multi-player setting considered here:
Assumption 4.1 (Evolution of Information). The common and private information evolve over stage as
follows:
1. The common information increases with stage, that is, ∩Ni=0E it ⊂ ∩Ni=0E it+1 and ∩Ni=0F it ⊂ ∩Ni=0F it+1 for
all t ∈ [T − 1]. Let D1,t+1 := ∩Ni=0E it+1 \ ∩Ni=0E it and D2,t+1 := ∩Ni=0F it+1 \ ∩Ni=0F it . Define
Zt+1 =
∏
(j,s)∈D1,t+1
Yjs ×
∏
(j,s)∈D2,t+1
U js . (4.4)
Then, Zt+1 ∈ Zt+1 denotes the increment in common information from stage t to t+ 1 and we have
Zt+1 = ζt+1
(
[P0Tt , . . . ,PNTt ,U0Tt , . . . ,UNTt ,Y0Tt+1, . . . ,YNTt+1]T
)
, (4.5)
where ζt+1 is an appropriate projection function.
2. The private information evolves according to the equation
Pit+1 = ξit+1([PiTt ,UiTt ,YiTt+1]T). (4.6)
where ξit+1 is an appropriate projection function. 
In order to introduce our next assumption, we need to introduce common information based conditional
belief at stage t ∈ [T − 1]. Fix the control laws of the controllers until stage t as g0:N1:t−1 ∈ G0:N1:t−1. Define a
conditional probability measure Πt as
Πt(dxt, dp0:Nt ) := Pg
0:N
1:t−1
{
dxt, dp0:Nt
∣∣Ct},
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which we call common information based conditional belief1, where the superscript g0:N1:t−1 denotes the fact
that the conditional probability measure depends on the choice of strategies of the controllers until the stage
t. The belief Πt is a B(Ct) measurable random variable, dependent on g0:N1:t−1, whose realization, denoted by
pit, depends on the realization of the common information ct. Our next assumption on the belief is crucial
for analysis carried out in this chapter.
Assumption 4.2 (Strategy Independence of Beliefs). At any stage t ∈ [T − 1] and for any realization of the
common information ct, the corresponding realization of common information based conditional belief pit
does not depend on the choice of control laws of the controllers. 
Several classes of dynamic games satisfy Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2; we refer the reader to [12] for a few
such examples. Furthermore, Chapter 6 and [12] covers the significance of these two assumptions in the
analysis of dynamic games with asymmetric information in great detail.
The next assumption is made in order to ensure that Controller 0’s optimization problem defined in
(4.1) admits an optimal solution, and the optimal strategies of the controllers are affine in their information.
The affine structure of the optimal strategies of the controllers is crucial to our analysis.
Assumption 4.3. The cost function c0t is quadratic at all stages t ∈ [T ]. The controllers in MSIDP have
partially nested information structure2 (see Section 1.3 for a definition of partially nested information struc-
ture). 
In the next subsection, we state a few results that are used for proving the main result in Section 4.3.
4.1.6 Preliminaries
We now state two useful results that is needed for the analysis of MSIDP. The first result is an immediate
consequence of Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2.
Theorem 4.1. Let ct ∈ Ct be the realization of common information at stage t ∈ [T − 1]. If Assumptions
4.1 and 4.2 hold, then the realization of common information based conditional measure pit admits a Gaussian
distribution function with mean denoted by mt and variance denoted by Σt. The mean mt is affine in ct and
the variance Σt is independent of the realization of common information at all stages t ∈ [T − 1].
Proof: The proof of Lemma 2.3 can be adapted to prove the above result.
Lemma 4.2. Let A,B be finite dimensional Euclidean spaces. Let A and B be random variables, taking values
in spaces A and B, respectively, such that the conditional measure P {da|b} admits a Gaussian density function
with mean D1b + D2 and variance Σ, where D1 and D2 are constant matrices of appropriate dimensions. Let
l1 : A → R+ be a Borel measurable function and define l2 : B → R+ as l2(b) = E [l1(A)|b]. If l1 is convex, then
l2 is convex. If l1 is convex differentiable, then l2 is also convex differentiable.
Proof: See Subsection 4.5.1.
In order to solve MSIDP, we decompose the multi-stage problem into a sequence of single-stage in-
centive design problems. In the next section, we introduce a model for a single-stage incentive design and
obtain expressions for appropriate incentive scheme in that problem. Thereafter, we study MSIDP in the
subsequent section.
1Note the similarity between the common information based conditional belief defined here and the one defined in Chapter 2.
2It is possible that a game satisfying Assumption 4.2 has a partially nested information structure with access to actions, but we do
not pursue study of this issue in this chapter, which is why we also introduce Assumption 4.3.
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4.2 A Single-Stage Incentive Design Problem
In this section, we consider a single-stage incentive design problem in which the state of the game is denoted
by X. Controller i observes a random variable Yi, which is assumed to be correlated with X, i ∈ {0, . . . , N}.
The space of all possible realizations of the random variables X and Yi are denoted by X and Yi, respectively.
Let µ denote the joint distribution over X × Y0:N , and assume that µ is common knowledge among the
controllers. Controller i decides on its action, denoted by Ui and taking values in Ui, on the basis of its
observation. All spaces X, Yi and Ui are assumed to be finite-dimensional Euclidean spaces, but the results
of this section can readily be generalized to the case when these spaces are Hilbert spaces (see [87] for
details). The case of Ui, i ∈ {0, . . . , N} being Hilbert spaces is of particular interest in the next section.
The strategy space of Controller i ∈ [N ] is denoted by Ki, defined as follows:
Ki =
{
γi : Yi → Ui : γi is Borel-measurable and
∫
‖γi(yi)‖2UiP
{
dyi
}
<∞
}
.
It is not hard to observe that Ki is a Hilbert space. Next, we define two different strategy spaces of Controller
0:
K0 =
{
γ0 : Y0:N → U0 : γ0 is Borel-measurable and
∫
‖γ0(y0:N )‖2U0P
{
dy0:N
}
<∞
}
,
K0 =
{
γ0 : Y0:N × U1:N → U0 : γ0 is Borel-measurable
}
.
We use the strategy space K0 to determine the optimal strategy of Controller 0 in its optimization problem.
On the other hand, K0 is the collection of all possible Controller 0’s strategies in the incentive design problem.
In what follows, for y0:N ∈ Y0:N , y−i denotes y0:N \ {yi}. Similarly, Y−i := Y0× · · · × Yi−1× Yi+1× · · · × YN .
The cost function of Controller i is denoted by bi : X × Y0:N × U0:N → R+, which is assumed to be a
strictly convex, differentiable, and subquadratic function over its domain. Let us define J˜ i : K0:N → R+ as
J˜ i(γ0:N ) := E
[
bi(X,Y0:N ,U0:N )
]
,
where U0 = γ0(Y0:N ,U1:N ),Ui = γi(Yi), i ∈ [N ] and the expectation is taken with respect to the probability
measure on the state, observations and actions of the controllers by the choice of strategies γ0:N ∈ K0:N of
the controllers.
Definition 4.4. We say that a N + 1 strategy tuple γ0:N? ∈ K0:N is an admissible incentive strategy for the
single stage incentive design problem if the tuple satisfies the following set of inequalities
J˜0(γ0:N?) ≤ J˜0(γ0:N ) and J˜ i(γ0:N?) ≤ J˜ i(γi, γ−i?)
for all i ∈ [N ]. 
We now make the following assumption.
Assumption 4.4. There exists a set of strategies α0:N? ∈ K0 ×K1:N such that
J˜0(α0:N?) = inf
α0:N∈K0×K1:N
J˜0(α0:N ). 
The single-stage incentive design problem described above satisfying Assumption 4.4 is called SSIDP.
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Remark 4.1. Since the cost bi is subquadratic, for any α0:N ∈ K0 ×K1:N , J˜ i(α0:N ) <∞ for all i ∈ [N ]. 
For a fixed yi ∈ Yi, define the Hilbert space Hyi(Y−i → U0) as follows:
Hyi(Y−i → U0) :=
{
βi : Y−i → U0 : βi is Borel-measurable and
∫
‖βi(y−i)‖2UiP
{
dy−i|yi} <∞}.
For every yi ∈ Yi, ui ∈ Ui, a Borel-measurable function βi ∈ Hyi(Y−i → U0), and α1:N ∈ K1:N , we define
Ki(yi, ui, βi, α1:i−1, αi+1:N ) := E
[
bi(X,Y0:N ,U0 = βi(y−i),U1:N )
∣∣∣yi, ui,Uj = αj(Yj), j ∈ [N ] \ {i}] .
Lemma 4.3. If bi is differentiable in u0 and ui, then Ki is Fre´chet differentiable in βi and ui, with
〈∇βiKi, β¯i〉Hyi (Y−i→U0) = E
[
∂bi
∂u0 (X,Y
0:N ,U0:N )
∣∣∣
U0:=βi(Y−i)
β¯i(Y−i)
∣∣∣∣yi, ui] , (4.7)〈∇uiKi, u¯i〉Ui = E [ ∂bi∂ui (X,Y0:N ,U0:N )∣∣∣U0:=βi(Y−i)u¯i
∣∣∣∣yi, ui] , (4.8)
where we take Uj = αj(Yj) for all j ∈ [N ] \ {i}.
Proof: The proof follows from using the fact that bi is convex, differentiable and subquadratic, Remark
4.1, and the monotone convergence theorem (Subsection 4.5.1 uses a similar approach to prove Lemma 4.2).
Let us define Li : Yi → B(Y−i → U0) and M i : Yi → Ui∗ as
Li(yi) := ∇βiKi(yi, αi?(yi), α0?(yi, ·), α1:i−1?, αi+1:N?),
M i(yi) := ∇uiKi(yi, αi?(yi), α0?(yi, ·), α1:i−1?, αi+1:N?).
Note that Li and M i depend on the set of functions α0:N?, Li(yi) ∈ H∗yi(Y−i → U0), and M i(yi) is a row-
vector of the dimension equal to dimUi. By Riesz representation theorem [129], there exists β˜yi ∈ Hyi(Y−i →
U0) such that
Li(yi)[β] =
〈
β˜yi , β
〉
Hyi (Y−i→U0)
for all β ∈ Hyi(Y−i → U0).
The expression of ∇βiKi in (4.7) implies that
β˜yi(y−i) := E
[
∂bi
∂u0 (X,Y
0:N ,U0:N )
∣∣∣
U0:=α0?(yi,y−i),Ui=αi?(Yi),i∈[N ]
∣∣∣y0:N] .
Note that the above expression for ∇βiKi induces a (Borel measurable) map from Y0:N to U0. Let P i :
Y0:N → U0 denote the map and is defined as
P i(y0:N ) := β˜yi(y−i).
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Let us rewrite the expressions of maps P i : Y0:N → U0 and M i : Yi → Ui∗3 as
P i(y0:N ) := E
[
∂bi
∂u0 (X,Y
0:N ,U0:N )
∣∣∣
U0:=α0?(Y0:N ),Ui=αi?(Yi),i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∣y0:N] ,
M i(yi) := E
[
∂bi
∂ui (X,Y
0:N ,U0:N )
∣∣∣
U0:=α0?(Y0:N ),Ui=αi?(Yi),i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∣yi] .
Recall that µ is the joint probability measure over the space X×Y0:N according to which the random variables
X and Y0:N are distributed. We make the following assumption.
Assumption 4.5. ‖P i‖2Hyi (Y−i→U0) 6= 0 for µ-almost every y
i. 
Define Qi : Y0:N → L(Ui → U0) as follows:
Qi(y0:N )[ui] =
( 〈
M i(yi), ui
〉
Ui
‖P i‖2Hyi (Y−i→U0)
)
P i(y0:N ) =
(
P i(y0:N )M i(yi)
‖P i‖2Hyi (Y−i→U0)
)
ui.
Note that P i(y0:N )M i(yi) is a matrix in RdimU0×dimUi . By a slight abuse of notation, let us use Qi(y0:N ) to
denote
Qi(y0:N ) := 1‖P i‖2Hyi (Y−i→U0)
P i(y0:N )M i(yi). (4.9)
Then, Qi is a Borel measurable function from Y0:N to RdimU0×dimUi (this space is isomorphic to L(Ui → U0)).
Let us define Ψ as
(Q1, . . . , QN ) = Ψ(µ;X× Y0:N × U0:N , b1:N , α0:N?).
We are now ready to state our main result of this section, which provides an admissible incentive strategy
profile of the controllers in the single-stage incentive design game formulated above.
Theorem 4.4. If Assumptions 4.4 and 4.5 hold, then the single stage incentive design problem SSIDP stated
above admits an admissible incentive strategy (g0?, α1?, . . . , αN?), in which the strategy of Controller 0 is an
affine function of ui for all i ∈ [N ], given by
g0?(y0:N , u1:N ) = α0?(y0:N )−
(
N∑
i=1
(
Qi(y0:N )[ui − αi?(yi)]
))
, (4.10)
where Qi, i ∈ [N ] are defined in (4.9).
Proof: The proof follows immediately from Proposition 2 in [87].
This completes the discussion on single-stage incentive design problem. We now focus on MSIDP in the
next section.
3Recall (from the List of Abbreviations) that Ui∗ denotes the dual space of Ui.
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4.3 Incentive Design in MSIDP
In this section, we consider a multi-stage incentive design problem MSIDP satisfying Assumptions 4.1, 4.2
and 4.3. Following the approach we adopted in Chapter 2, we use the common information of the controllers
at every stage to define a sequence of single-stage incentive design games. Using the result of Theorem 4.4,
we show that there exists a strategy of Controller 0 such that it is in the best interest of all controllers to use
the strategies that achieve the minimum cost to Controller 0.
4.3.1 Solution Approach
In our earlier work [12] and Chapter 2, we devised a novel solution approach to a dynamic stochastic
game with asymmetric information satisfying appropriate modifications of Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2. The
first step of the solution approach consisted of defining a virtual dynamic game of symmetric information
over enlarged state and action spaces of the virtual players, in which the state is common information
based conditional belief, and the information of each virtual player at a time step is precisely the common
information of the controllers in the original dynamic game of asymmetric information. We showed that
the two games are similar to each other in the sense that the Nash equilibrium of one game can be used
to compute the Nash equilibrium of the other game and vice-versa. Thereafter, we used Markov perfect
equilibrium of the virtual game to compute a Nash equilibrium of the original game.
In the game MSIDP considered in this chapter, we use the same solution approach as in Chapter 2 to
obtain a succession of single-stage incentive design games by a backward induction algorithm. The decom-
position for game MSIDP follows along similar lines as the decomposition process in Chapter 2 with minor
modifications. Therefore, we do not reproduce the complete details of the decomposition in this chapter.
However, for the sake of completeness, we introduce and discuss some features of the the virtual incentive
design game among virtual players in the next subsection.
4.3.2 Virtual Incentive Design Game Among Virtual Players
In this subsection, we first show that at any stage of the game t, Assumption 4.2 implies that the subgame
starting at that stage is an instance of the single stage game considered in the previous subsection. This
fact, together with Assumption 4.1, allows us to devise a backward induction algorithm that computes an
admissible incentive scheme for the multi-stage game.
Following the approach taken in [12] and Chapter 2, we now define an incentive design problem among
virtual players (VPs), which we call V-MSIDP4. In the setup, the state, observations and actions of VPs, control
laws of VPs, and cost functions of VPs are as follows:
1. At stage t ∈ [T − 1], the state of game V-MSIDP is Ct, with the state space Ct.
2. The action space of VP 0 at stage t is denoted by A0t := B(P0:Nt × U1:Nt → U0t ). The action space of VP
i ∈ [N ] at stage t is denoted by Ait := B(Pit → U it ).
3. At stage t, VP i ∈ {0, . . . , N} observes Ct (that is, the VPs observe the state perfectly), and takes an
action Γit ∈ Ait. Note that by Assumption 4.1, Ct is nested; therefore, the VPs recall the past realizations
of the state perfectly.
4The abbreviation stands for virtual-MSIDP.
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4. The control law of VP 0 at stage t is a map χ0t : Ct → B(P0:Nt × U1:Nt → U0t ). The control law of VP
i ∈ [N ] at stage t is a map χit : Ct → B(Pit → U it ). Control law of VP 0 at stage t is admissible if
χ0t (·)(·) : Ct × P0:Nt × U1:Nt → U0t
is a Borel-measurable function. Similarly, control law of VP i ∈ [N ] at stage t is admissible if
χit(·)(·) : Ct × Pit → U it
is a Borel-measurable function. The space of all admissible control laws of VP i ∈ {0, . . . , N} at stage t
is denoted by Hit.
5. The cost function of VP i ∈ {0, . . . , N} at stage t ∈ [T − 1], denoted by c˜it : Ct × B(P0:Nt × U1:Nt →
U0t )×
∏N
i=1B(Pit → U it )→ R+, is given by
c˜it(ct, γ0:Nt ) =
∫
cit(xt, γ0t (p0:Nt ,u1:Nt ), γ1t (p1t ), . . . , γNt (pNt ))P
{
dx, dp0:Nt
∣∣∣ct} .
The cost function of VP i ∈ {0, . . . , N} at the final stage, denoted by c˜iT : CT → R+, is given by
c˜iT (cT ) :=
∫
ciT (xT )P {dxT |cT }.
The fact that at every stage t ∈ [T − 1], the common information of the controllers in MSIDP forms a
state of V-MSIDP with Γ0:Nt as the controlling action can be proven along similar lines as in Lemma 2.5 in
Chapter 2 with minor modifications. Proving the statement requires Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2.
We first need to establish that an incentive scheme exists in game V-MSIDP, and that scheme can be used
to compute a common information based subgame-perfect incentive scheme of the original game MSIDP.
Since game V-MSIDP is a game of perfect information and perfect recall, we can use a backward induction
algorithm to compute an admissible incentive scheme for the game at every stage recursively, starting from
the stage T − 1. This step allows us to devise a backward induction algorithm that decomposes the com-
putation of an admissible incentive scheme in the original MSIDP into a sequence of single-stage incentive
design problems like the one studied in the previous section.
As mentioned previously, we suppress the details of this entire process, since it follows similar reasoning
as in Chapter 2. We instead directly focus on the last step mentioned in the previous paragraph, that is,
devise a backward induction algorithm that decomposes the computation of an admissible incentive scheme
in the original MSIDP into a sequence of single-stage incentive design problems. Towards this end, we first
prove a few auxiliary results in the next subsection. Thereafter, we present the main result of the chapter in
the subsequent subsection.
4.3.3 Auxiliary Results
We first introduce the following definition.
Definition 4.5 (OPTt:T−1). Fix a t ∈ [T − 1], a realization ct ∈ Ct of common information, and let pit
denote the common information based conditional measure corresponding to ct. The optimization problem
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OPTt:T−1 with common information ct is the following optimization problem:
inf
α0:N
t:T−1∈G
0
t:T−1×G1:Nt:T−1
E
[
c0T (XT ) +
T−1∑
s=t
c0s(Xs,U0:Ns )
∣∣∣∣Ct = ct,U0s = α0s(Cs,P0:Ns ),Uis = αis(Cs,Pis),
for all i ∈ [N ], s ∈ {t, . . . , T − 1}
]
,
where Xt,P0:Nt is distributed according to the measure pit, and the expectation is taken with respect to the
probability measure induced on the state, the common information, the private information, and the control
actions of the controllers by the choice of strategies of the controllers. 
Assumption 4.3 allows us to present the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5. The optimal solution to the optimization problem OPT1:T−1 exists, is unique, and it can
be obtained using a dynamic programming argument. The optimal strategies of the controllers, denoted by
(α0?1:T−1, . . . , αN?1:T−1), are affine in their arguments. Furthermore, (α0?t:T−1, . . . , αN?t:T−1) are the optimal strate-
gies of the controllers in OPTt:T−1.
Proof: The proof follows from [103]. The proof of the last statement follows from the fact that the
optimal strategies of the controllers are computed using a dynamic programming approach.
As introduced in Theorem 4.5 above, αi?t denotes the optimal control law of Controller i ∈ {0, . . . , N}
at stage t ∈ [T − 1] in the optimization problem OPT1:T−1. For i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T − 1], define V it : Ct → R+,
called value function of Controller i at stage t, as
V it (ct) := E
[
ciT (XT ) +
T−1∑
s=t
cis
(
Xs,U0:Ns
)∣∣∣∣ct,U0s := α0?s (Cs,P0:Ns ),Uis := αi?s (Cs,Pis),
∀i ∈ [N ], s ∈ {t, . . . , T − 1}
]
,
which, due to Assumption 4.1 (common information is nested), is equivalent to
V it (ct) := E
[
cit
(
Xt, α0?t (ct,P0:Nt ), α1?t (ct,P1t ), . . . , αN?t (ct,PNt )
)
+ V it+1(Ct+1)
∣∣∣∣ct].
The following lemma states the properties of the value function V it .
Lemma 4.6. The following statements hold.
1. Ct+1 is affine in U0:Nt for all t ∈ [T − 2].
2. The function V it is convex and differentiable in Ct for all t ∈ [T − 1].
3. The function V it+1 is convex and differentiable in Uit for all t ∈ [T − 2].
4. The function V it is subquadratic.
Proof: See Subsection 4.5.2.
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4.3.4 Common Information based Subgame-Perfect Incentive Scheme
For i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T − 1], define bit : Ct ×Xt × P0:Nt × U0:Nt → R+ as
biT−1(cT−1;xT−1,p0:NT−1,u0:NT−1) = ciT−1(xT−1,u0:NT−1) + E
[
ciT (XT )
∣∣cT−1,xT−1,p0:NT−1,u0:NT−1] ,
bis(cs;xs,p0:Ns ,u0:Ns ) = cis(xs,u0:Ns ) + E
[
V it+1(Ct+1)
∣∣cs,xs,p0:Ns ,u0:Ns ] , s ∈ [T − 2].
Remark 4.2. It should be noted that bit(ct; ·) is a convex, subquadratic, differentiable function over Xt ×
P0:Nt × U0:Nt for all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T − 1] (this can be proven using Lemmas 4.2 and 4.6). 
Definition 4.6. At any stage t ∈ [T − 1], for a fixed value of the common information ct ∈ Ct and the
corresponding common information based conditional belief pit, the one-stage incentive design problem at
stage t with common information ct is defined to be a single-stage incentive design problem in which
1. The state of the system is Xt.
2. The observation of Controller i is Pit.
3. The probability measure over Xt × P0:Nt is pit.
4. The control action of Controller i is Uit.
5. The cost functions of Controller i is bit(ct; ·). 
The following theorem states the precise conditions under which a common information based subgame-
perfect incentive scheme exists in a MSIDP, and provides expressions of the strategies of the controllers under
that incentive scheme.
Theorem 4.7. Consider game MSIDP formulated in Section 4.1, satisfying Assumptions 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3.
1. At any stage t ∈ [T−1], for a fixed value of common information ct, the one-stage incentive design problem
at stage t with common information ct is an instance of SSIDP.
2. For all t ∈ [T − 1], assume that Assumption 4.5 is satisfied by the one-stage incentive design problem at
stage t with common information ct for every ct ∈ Ct. For realizations ct of common information and pit
of conditional belief, let (Q1t , . . . , QNt ) be given by
(Q1t (ct; ·), . . . , QNt (ct; ·)) = Ψ(pit;Xt × P0:Nt × U0:Nt , b0:Nt (ct; ·), α0:N?t (ct; ·)),
where we further assume that {Qit} are all measurable maps. A common information based subgame-
perfect incentive scheme of the controllers exists, given by (g0?1:T−1, α1?1:T−1, . . . , αN?1:T−1), where
g0?t (ct,p0:Nt ,u0:Nt ) := α0?t (ct,p0:Nt )−
(
N∑
i=1
(
Qit(ct;p0:Nt )
[
uit − αi?t (ct,pit)
]))
,
for all t ∈ [T − 1].
Proof: See Subsection 4.5.3.
The following theorem proves that if all controllers but i act according to the strategies under the
common information based subgame-perfect incentive scheme as defined in Theorem 4.7 above, then it is in
the best interest for Controller i to act according to its strategy under that incentive scheme.
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Theorem 4.8. Using the same notations introduced in Theorem 4.7, and fixing i ∈ [N ], suppose that Controller
j ∈ [N ] \ {i} uses the strategy αj?1:T−1. Also assume that Controller 0 uses the strategy g0?1:T−1. Then, at any
stage t ∈ [T − 1], Controller i solves a one-person optimization problem that starts at stage t with common
information ct:
min
gi
t:T∈Git:T
E
[
ciT (XT ) +
T−1∑
s=t
cis(Xs,U0:Ns )
∣∣∣ct,Uis = gis(Iis), s ∈ {t, . . . , T − 1}
]
,
where U0s = g0?s (I0s,U1:Ns ), Ujs = αj?s (Ijs), j ∈ [N ] \ {i} for all t ≤ s ≤ T − 1. Then, the optimal strategy of
Controller i for the above optimization problem is αi?t:T−1.
Proof: This follows immediately from the result of Theorem 4.7 and definition of V is , t ≤ s ≤ T − 1.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter studies the finite-horizon multi-stage incentive design problem in a linear-Gaussian game of
asymmetric information. We introduced a new notion of equilibrium in dynamic incentive design problems
called common information based subgame-perfect incentive scheme, utilizing the theory developed in the
previous chapters. We assumed that the principal has a quadratic cost function and the information structure
of the controllers are partially nested. In particular, we showed that under certain assumptions, we can devise
an incentive scheme, in which the control law of the principal is affine in the control actions of the other
players.
The next chapter studies a dynamic finite game of asymmetric information with resource constrained
controllers.
4.5 Proofs
4.5.1 Proof of Lemma 4.2
Using the notation of Lemma 4.2, let V be a random variable defined as V = A−D1b−D2. Let N denote
the probability density function of a mean-zero Gaussian random variable with variance Σ. Then, V is a
random variable taking values in space A with density function N , and P {dv|b} = N(v)dv. Note that
l2(b) = E [l1(A)|b] =
∫
A
l1(a)P {da|b} =
∫
A
l1(v+D1b+D2)N(v)dv,
where the last equality was obtained by substituting a = v+D1b+D2 and using the fact P {dv|b} = N(v)dv.
It is clear from the expression above that l2 is convex in b.
Now assume that l1 is convex differentiable. Then, l2 is convex by the previous statement. We just need
to prove that l2 is differentiable. Let h ∈ B and δ ∈ [0, 1). Now, note that since l1 is convex,
δ 7→ l1(v+D1(b+ δh) +D2)− l1(v+D1b+D2)
δ
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is a monotonically decreasing function. Thus,
lim
δ→0
l2(b+ δh)− l2(b)
δ
= (∇bl2)T h =
∫
A
(
∂l1
∂a (v+D1b+D2)
)T
hN(v)dv,
which holds by monotone convergence theorem. This implies that l2 is differentiable, which establishes the
statement.
4.5.2 Proof of Lemma 4.6
The proofs of the statements are as follows:
1. By Assumption 4.1, Ct+1 = [CTt ,ZTt+1]T, where Ct is not affected by U0:Nt and Zt+1 is given by (4.4).
Since hit+1 is affine for all i ∈ {0, . . . , N} and ζt+1 is a projection function (and therefore, affine), we
conclude that Ct+1 is affine in U0:Nt .
2. We first prove that V iT−1 is convex and differentiable in cT−1. Since fT−1 is an affine function,
ciT (fT−1(xT−1,u0:NT−1,w0T−1)) is convex in xT−1,u0:NT−1. Thus, ciT−1 + ciT ◦ fT−1 is a convex differen-
tiable function in xT−1,u0:NT−1. Recall that {α0:N?T−1 } is affine in cT−1 and P0:NT−1. An application of
Lemma 4.2 yields the result for stage T − 1.
A similar argument, together with Part 1 of the lemma and the fact that {αi?t }(i,t) are affine functions,
proves that VT−2, VT−3, . . . , V1 are convex differentiable functions of their arguments.
3. This is an immediate consequence of Parts 1 and 2 of the lemma above.
4. Since the cost cit is subquadratic for every t ∈ [T ], and the state transition, observation equations and
αi?t are linear for all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ], the result follows.
The proof of the lemma is thus complete.
4.5.3 Proof of Theorem 4.7
We prove both parts of the lemma together. Consider stage T − 1 and fix i ∈ [N ] and cT−1 ∈ CT−1. The cost-
to-go function biT−1 is convex differentiable in xT−1,p0:NT−1 and u0:NT−1. By Theorem 4.5, there exist optimal
control laws of the controllers, α0:N?T−1 for the optimization problem OPTT−1. Thus, Assumption 4.4 is sat-
isfied. Furthermore, biT−1(cT−1; ·) is a convex, differentiable and subquadratic function. Thus, Theorem 4.4
implies that admissible incentive control laws exist for all controllers, and is given by (g0?T−1, α1?T−1, . . . , αN?T−1).
Since cT−1 ∈ CT−1 was chosen arbitrarily, the admissible incentive control laws exist for all possible realiza-
tions of common information at stage T − 1.
One can use a similar argument for stages T − 2, . . . , 1 to show that (g0?t:T−1, α1?t:T−1, . . . , αN?t:T−1) is an
admissible incentive strategy profile for the subgame starting at stage t, which establishes both statements
of the theorem.
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Chapter 5
Finite Games with Resource Constraints
This chapter extends the concepts developed in the previous chapters to non-zero sum games in which
the controllers have hard resource constraints. In many physical systems, the controllers may have limited
resources, which could be energy, fuel, manpower, or perhaps, even time. Each time a controller acts, some
amount of its resource is consumed, which may also depend on other controllers’ actions. The purpose
of this chapter is to study games where the controllers compete with each other to minimize their overall
expected costs, while also keeping in mind their limited resources. In particular, if a controller chooses
to act (myopically) in a manner that exhausts its resources early in the game, it may lose in terms of its
performance; by cautiously and strategically spending resources during the game, the controller may achieve
a better performance in terms of a lower total expected cost as compared to the one with myopic strategy. In
[10, 11], we studied strategic attacks on cyber- physical systems, in which jammers, having limited energy,
act to jam the communication channels of certain control systems. The theory developed in this chapter is
inspired by our solution approach and analysis in the aforementioned references.
In this chapter, we assume that the state, action and observation spaces are all finite in order to ease
exposition, without however, compromising much on the conceptual development of the ideas. The theory
we develop in this chapter can be extended to games in which the state, action and observation spaces are
finite dimensional Euclidean spaces with minimal effort.
To obtain a Nash equilibrium of the game considered here, we make three assumptions on the infor-
mation structure. Two of these assumptions have already been introduced in the context of linear-Gaussian
games in Chapter 2. To solve the problem, we require an additional technical assumption on the informa-
tion structure of the controllers – at every time step, the past actions of the controllers having constrained
resources is common knowledge. This last assumption allows us to augment the state space of the virtual
game and use techniques similar to the ones developed in Chapter 2 to compute a common information
based Markov perfect equilibrium for the game considered here.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, Section 5.1, we formulate the precise problem
and state the assumptions we make on the information structures of the controllers and the resource con-
straints of the controllers. In Section 5.3, we define a virtual game of symmetric information and resource
constrained virtual players, and obtain a Markov perfect equilibrium of the virtual game. We show that the
virtual game is related to the original game formulated in Section 5.1. The last step is similar to the one in
Chapter 2, but with a difference that now the virtual players have resource constraints. Thereafter, we devise
an algorithm to compute a CIMPE for this game in Section 5.4 using the backward induction characterization
of Markov perfect equilibrium of the virtual game. We conclude this chapter in Section 5.5.
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5.1 Problem Formulation
We consider anN -controller T+1-horizon dynamic non-zero sum stochastic game, in which some controllers
have resource constraints. The controllers act on a system, whose state at time instant t ∈ [T ] is denoted by
Xt. Controller i at time t observes a random variable Yit, which may be correlated with Xt, recalls some or
all of its past observations and actions, and acquires some information about other controllers’ past actions
and observations. Then, it decides on its action, which is denoted by Uit. At time t, the set of all states is
denoted by Xt, and the set of all possible observations and actions of Controller i are denoted by Yit and U it ,
respectively. Throughout this chapter, the sets Xt, U it and Yit are assumed to be finite sets for all i ∈ [N ] at
all t ∈ [T ].
The state of the system evolves according to the following dynamical equation
Xt+1 = ft(Xt,U1:Nt ,W0t ), t ∈ [T ],
where W0t is the actuation noise on the system. The observation equation for Controller i at time t ∈ [T ] is
Yit = hit(Xt,Wit),
where Wit is the observation noise of Controller i at time step t. We denote the support set of all possible
actuation noises W0t by W0t , and the support set of all possible observation noises of Controller i at time
t, Wit, by Wit ; that is, these are the sets where W0t and Wit take values. We again assume that Wit , i ∈
{0} ∪ [N ], t ∈ [T ] are finite sets.
The random variables {X1,W0:N1:T } are primitive random variables, and are assumed to be mutually
independent. We further assume that the state equation, observation equations of all controllers, and prob-
ability distributions of the primitive random variables are common knowledge among all the controllers.
5.1.1 Information Structures and Strategies of the Controllers
Analogous to the previous chapters, Controller i’s information vector at time instant t ∈ [T +1] is denoted by
Iit, which we assume to be a subset of {U1:N1:t−1,Y1:N1:t }. The set of all possible realizations of the information
vector Iit is denoted by Iit for all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T + 1]1.
The common information at time t is the set of all random variables whose realizations are available
to all the controllers. The common information at a time step t is denoted by Ct, and it is defined to be
Ct := ∩i∈[N ]Iit. Similarly, at each time step, we define the private information of each controller as the part
of the information that is not observed by all the controllers. The private information of Controller i at time
t is denoted by Pit := Iit \Ct. The sets of all realizations of common and private information of Controller i
at time t are denoted, respectively, by Ct and Pit .
The control law of Controller i at time step t is a map git : Ct × Pit → U it . The collection of control laws
of Controller i at all time steps, denoted by gi := {gi1, . . . , giT }, is called the strategy of Controller i. The set
of all possible control laws of Controller i at time t is denoted by Git and the space of all possible strategies
of Controller i is denoted by Gi1:T := Gi1 × · · · × GiT . An N -tuple of strategies (g1, . . . ,gN ) ∈ G1:N1:T is called a
strategy profile of the controllers.
1The information structure of each controller is defined for all time including T + 1, even though the controllers do not act at time
T + 1. The information of the controllers at time T + 1 is defined to be able to introduce resource constraints of the controllers in a
compact form.
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5.1.2 Resource Constraints of the Controllers
Let J ⊂ [N ] denote the set of controllers such that each controller in J is assumed to have a fixed amount
of resource that it can utilize during the game. The amount of resource that each controller uses at any time
step is assumed to be dependent only on the increment in the common information at the next time step. In
other words, at any time, the amount of resource Controller i consumes due to its action may also depend
on the observations of and actions taken by other controllers at that time step. However, those observations
and actions must become common knowledge at the next time instant. This will allow the controllers to
keep track of spent resources of all controllers.
Define Zt := Ct \ Ct−1, which is the increment in the common information at time t ∈ [T + 1]. The
resource constraint of Controller i is captured by the following equation:
T∑
t=1
dit(Zt+1) ≤M i,
where dit ≡ 0 for all t ∈ [T ] if i 6∈ J , and M i is a non-negative real number representing the amount of
resource available to Controller i at the beginning of the game. We can take M i = 0 for all i 6∈ J . We now
make the following technical assumption.
Assumption 5.1. For every i ∈ J , Uit ∈ Zt+1 for all time steps t ∈ [T ]. For every controller i ∈ J and at
any time step t ∈ [T ], there exists an action U˜it ∈ U it such that for all Zt+1 ∈ Zt+1 satisfying U˜it ∈ Zt+1,
dit(Zt+1) = 0. 
The assumption above implies that if a controller does not want to use its resource at any time step,
then it can choose an action at that time that does not consume its resource, regardless of the increment
in the common information of the controllers at that time step. The above assumption is satisfied by the
games considered in our papers [10, 11]. Furthermore, before choosing their actions at every time step,
all controllers know the existing resource levels of the resource constrained controllers. In Section 6.9, we
outline a method to obtain solutions in case the resource consumed by a controller at a time step is also
dependent on its private information.
5.1.3 Cost Functions and Nash Equilibrium
Each controller has a stagewise additive cost function. For a fixed strategy profile of all the controllers, g1:N ,
the total expected cost to Controller i is given by
J i(g1:N ) = E
ciT+1(XT+1) + ∑
t∈[T ]
cit(Xt,U1:Nt )
 ,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the probability measure induced on the states and action
variables by the choice of strategy profiles of the controllers.
Since the controllers do not have the same cost functions, they play a non-cooperative game with each-
other. Recall that a strategy profile of the controllers is a Nash equilibrium if no controller has an incentive
to unilaterally deviate from its strategy given that the other controllers play according to their strategies at
the equilibrium. Mathematically, {g1?, . . . ,gN?} is a Nash equilibrium if
J i(g1?, . . . ,gN?) ≤ J i(g−i?,gi), for all gi ∈ Gi1:T .
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In this chapter, we are interested in developing a framework to compute a Nash equilibrium for the above
game with resource constraints. This requires changing the solution approach adopted in [12] and Chapter
2 slightly to accommodate resource constraints.
5.2 Solution Approach
As in the previous chapters, a Nash equilibrium is hard to compute unless some restrictions are placed on
the information structures of the controllers. This is done in the next subsection.
5.2.1 Two Assumptions on the Game
We place the following two assumptions on the game formulated above. These two assumptions are anal-
ogous to the assumptions on the information structures of the controllers in Chapter 2 earlier, which were
introduced in the context of linear-Gaussian games.
Assumption 5.2 (Evolution of Common Information). We assume that the common information increases
with time, that is, Ct ⊂ Ct+1 for all time steps t ∈ [T ]. We let Zt+1 denote the increase in common
information, defined by Zt+1 := Ct+1 \ Ct. Further, we assume that common information and private
information evolve as
Zt+1 = ζt+1(P1:Nt ,U1:Nt ,Y1:Nt ), Pit+1 = ξit+1(Pit,Uit,Yit+1), i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ],
where ζt+1 and ξit+1 are fixed (projection) maps. 
To introduce our next assumption, we define some more notations. Fix a strategy profile of the con-
trollers to {g1, . . . ,gN}. With this choice of strategy profile, at time t, the conditional probability measure on
the state Xt and the private information of all controllers P1:Nt given the common information Ct, denoted
by Πg
1:N
1:t−1
t , is well-defined and expressed as
Πg
1:N
1:t−1
t (Xt,P1t , . . .PNt ) = Pg
1:N
1:t−1
{
Xt,P1t , . . .PNt
∣∣Ct} .
The conditional measure Πg
1:N
1:t−1
t is called common information based conditional belief at time t. For a specific
realization ct of the common information, the corresponding common information based conditional belief
is denoted by pi
g1:N1:t−1
t . We make the following assumption on the belief process.
Assumption 5.3 (Strategy Independence of Beliefs). Fix a time t, and let ct ∈ Ct be a realization of the
common information. Let {g1, . . . ,gN} and {g˜1, . . . , g˜N} be two strategy profiles of the controllers, both
of which induce positive probabilities on the common information ct. The common information based
conditional belief Πg
1:N
1:t−1
t is independent of the strategy profile of the controllers at time t with common
information ct if the following holds:
P
g1:N1:t−1
{
Xt,P1t , . . .PNt
∣∣ct} = Pg˜1:N1:t−1 {Xt,P1t , . . .PNt ∣∣ct} for all Xt,P1:Nt .
At every time t ∈ [T ], the common information based conditional belief Πt is independent of the strategy
profile for all ct ∈ Ct. 
As a consequence of the two assumptions made above, we have the following lemma.
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Lemma 5.1. Let g1:N ∈ G1:N1:T be a strategy profile of the controllers. Consider a time step t. Let ct be a realiza-
tion of the common information, zt+1 be the increment in common information, and let pit be the corresponding
common information based conditional belief. Then, the realization of conditional belief at the next time step is
given by
pit+1 = Ft(pit, zt+1),
where Ft is a fixed transformation that is independent of the strategy profile of the controllers.
Proof: See Equation (10) and the discussion that precedes it in [12].
Henceforth, a game that satisfies Assumptions 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 is referred to as game G1.
5.2.2 Resource States of the Controllers
We define a new random variable, denoted by Sit, i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T + 1] as
Sit :=
t−1∑
s=1
dis(Zs+1). (5.1)
The random variables Sit are realized according to the realizations of the common information. The random
variable Sit keeps track of the amount of resources that Controller i has spent until the beginning of the time
t, and it can be computed using the common information Ct. We call Sit the resource state of Controller i at
time t.
In the next section, we define a new virtual game of symmetric information, called game G2, and study
the connection between the two games.
5.3 Main Results
Analogous to the approach taken in [12] and in Chapter 2, we introduce virtual players and define a new
non-zero sum game referred to as game G2. At time t, each virtual player observes the common information
Ct of the controllers in game G1. After observing Ct, virtual player i decides on a function (hereafter called
prescriptions) γit : Pit → U it 2. In order to obtain a Nash equilibrium of game G1, we use the following four
steps:
1. We formulate game G2 in the next three subsections. We show that the Markov state of game G2 at
time t consists of N + 1-tuple of random variables – {Πt,S1t , . . . ,SNt }. Note that given the common
information Ct, the Markov state of the game G2 can be computed by all virtual players. Thus, game
G2 is a game of perfect information.
2. We show that any Nash equilibrium of game G2 can be used to compute a Nash equilibrium of game
G1 and vice-versa. In other words, there is a bijection between the sets of Nash equilibria of games G1
and G2.
2For the purpose of this chapter, we assume that if a Nash equilibrium of game G1 exists, then there exists a Nash equilibrium of
game G1 in pure strategies. However, the proof technique can readily be applied to a game G1 in which Nash equilibrium exists only
in behavioral strategies that are not induced by pure strategies.
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3. Since game G2 is a finite non-zero sum game of symmetric and perfect information, a Markov perfect
equilibrium exists in game G2. We use Markov perfect equilibrium of game G2 to obtain a Nash
equilibrium of game G1, which we call common information based Markov perfect equilibrium.
4. We devise a backward induction algorithm to compute a common information based Markov perfect
equilibrium by solving a sequence of one-stage Bayesian games.
We now formulate game G2. Let Ait be the set of all maps γit : Pit → U it ; Ait denotes the action space of
virtual player i at time t. Virtual player i at time t decides on a map χit : Ct → Ait, which is called its control
law at time t. The set of all control laws of virtual player i at time t, called its control law space, is denoted
by Hit. Given the common information Ct, Γit = χit(Ct) is the prescription chosen by virtual player i at a
time step t ∈ [T ]. Note that Γit is a random map since Ct is a random variable, and a specific realization of
Γit is denoted by γit . The control strategy of virtual player i is denoted by χi := {χi1, . . . , χiT }, and χ1:N is
called a strategy profile of the virtual players.
Remark 5.1. In case the private information space of Controller i at time t is an empty set, then the corre-
sponding virtual player just recommends an action (that is, Ait = U it ). 
Analogous to game G1, virtual player i in game G2 has a total resource constraint that is captured by
the same equation
T∑
t=1
dit(Zt+1) ≤M i.
Let pit be the common information based conditional belief and γit be the action of the virtual player i
at time step t. The cost function of virtual player i at time step t is denoted by c˜it, and it is given by
c˜it(pit, γ1:Nt ) =
∑
Xt×P1:Nt
cit(xt, γ1t (p1t ), . . . , γNt (pNt ))pit(xt,p1:Nt ).
The cost functional of virtual player i, as a function of strategies of the virtual players, is given by
J˜ i(χ1:N ) = E
c˜iT+1(ΠT+1) + ∑
t∈[T ]
c˜it(Πt,Γ1:Nt )
 ,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the probability measure induced on the common information
based conditional beliefs and actions of the virtual players by the choice of strategies of the virtual players.
This defines a non-zero sum (virtual) game of symmetric information, game G2, with resource con-
strained virtual players. This completes the formulation of game G2. We now define a natural mapping
between the strategy spaces of the players in games G1 and G2.
Definition 5.1. For i ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈ [T ], let %it : Hit → Git be an operator such that for any control law
χit ∈ Hit, we get a git ∈ Git with git = %it(χit) satisfying git(pit, ct) := χit(ct)(pit) for all ct ∈ Ct and pit ∈ Pit . For
a collection of functions χi := {χi1, . . . , χiT }, let %i(χi) be defined as the set {%i1(χi1), . . . , %iT (χiT )}.
Similarly, we let ςit : Git → Hit be an operator such that ςit ◦ %it = idHit and %it ◦ ςit = idGit . Thus, for any
git ∈ Git , if χit = ςit(git), then χit(ct)(pit) := git(pit, ct) for all ct ∈ Ct and pit ∈ Pit . For a collection of functions
gi := {gi1, . . . , giT }, let ςi(gi) be defined as the set {ςi1(gi1), . . . , ςiT (giT )}. 
We first have the following important result.
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Lemma 5.2. Let (g1, . . . ,gN ) be a pair of strategies of the controllers, and let (χ1, . . . ,χN ) be defined as
χi := ςi(gi) for all i ∈ [N ].
Then, J i(g1, . . . ,gN ) = J˜ i(χ1, . . . ,χN ) for all i ∈ [N ]. Similarly, given (χ1, . . . ,χN ), define (g1, . . . ,gN ) as
gi := %i(χi) for all i ∈ [N ].
Then, J˜ i(χ1, . . . ,χN ) = J i(g1, . . . ,gN ) for all i ∈ [N ].
Proof: See Subsection 5.6.1.
5.3.1 Relation between Games G1 and G2
We next have the following result about the relationship between games G1 and G2.
Theorem 5.3. If {g1?, . . . ,gN?} is a Nash equilibrium of game G1, then {χ1?, . . . ,χN?}, defined by
χi? := ςi(gi?), i ∈ [N ],
forms a Nash equilibrium of game G2. Conversely, if {χ1?, . . . ,χN?} is a Nash equilibrium of game G2, then
{g1?, . . . ,gN?} defined by
gi? := %i(χi?), i ∈ [N ],
forms a Nash equilibrium of game G1.
Proof: This result is an immediate consequence of Lemma 5.2.
The theorem stated above shows that there is a bijection between the sets of Nash equilibria of games
G1 and G2. In the next subsection, we identify a Markov state of game G2.
5.3.2 A Markov State of Game G2
A Markov state of a dynamic decision problem is a random variable (or a set of random variables) whose
realization at time t + 1 depends only on the realization of that random variable, the control actions of the
decision makers at time t, and some exogenous random variables that are independent of all other random
variables. Generally speaking, a dynamic decision problem can have multiple Markov states. The main goal
of this subsection is to identify a Markov state of game G2, which is our next result.
Lemma 5.4. The common information based conditional belief and the resource states {Πt,S1t , . . . ,SNt }t∈[T ] is
a controlled Markov process with the virtual players’ prescriptions γ1:Nt as the controlling actions at time t:
P
{
Πt+1,S1:Nt+1
∣∣ct, pi1:t, s1:N1:t , γ1:N1:t } = P{Πt+1,S1:Nt+1∣∣pit, s1:Nt , γ1:Nt } .
Proof: See Subsection 5.6.2.
Remark 5.2. In the previous lemma, we proved that at time t, {Πt,S1t , . . . ,SNt } is a Markov state of game G2.
Since all virtual players at time t have access to the realization of the common information ct and ck ⊂ ct
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for all k ∈ [t], each virtual player at time t knows the realizations of the past states, {pik, s1k, . . . , sNk }k∈[t], in
game G2. Thus, with {Πt,S1t , . . . ,SNt } as a state of game G2, it is a game of perfect information with perfect
recall3. 
Having identified the Markov state of game G2, we now turn our attention to a refinement of Nash
equilibrium in games with perfect information, namely Markov perfect equilibrium.
5.3.3 Markov Perfect Equilibrium of Game G2
In this subsection, we restrict the strategy spaces of the virtual players in game G2 to compute Markov
perfect equilibrium of the game. Let H¯it ⊂ Hit denote the set of all maps χit ∈ Hit such that for all ct ∈ Ct
χit(ct) = ψit(pit, s1:Nt ),
for some measurable function ψit. Thus, if virtual player i at time t chooses a control law from the set H¯it, then
it uses the common information based conditional belief Πt and the resource states {Sit}i∈[N ] to compute its
action Γit. We would like to obtain a Nash equilibrium in the restricted strategy spaces H¯11:T × · · · × H¯N1:T
of the virtual players. To do this, we need to show that at every t ∈ [T ], for any virtual player i ∈ [N ],
if all virtual players except i use the Markov state of game G2 to compute their actions, then it is optimal
for virtual player i to use the Markov state of game G2 to compute its action at that time. This result is
established in the next lemma.
Lemma 5.5. Fix i ∈ [N ]. Suppose that virtual player j for all j ∈ [N ] \ {i} at all times t ∈ [T ] selects its
prescriptions based on {Πt,S1:Nt }, that is,
Γjt = ψ
j
t (Πt,S1:Nt ) for all t ∈ [T ],
where ψjt ∈ H¯jt . Consider the one-person optimization problem faced by virtual player i at time t for the fixed
strategies ψ−i of the other virtual players:
inf
χi
t:T∈Hit:T
E
[
c˜iT+1(ΠT+1) +
T∑
k=t
c˜ik
(
Πk, ψ−ik (Πt,S
1:N
t ), χik(Ck)
)∣∣∣∣∣Sik ≤M i ∀ i ∈ [N ], k ∈ {t, . . . , T + 1}
]
.
If the optimization problem stated above admits a solution, then there exists ψit:T ∈ H¯it:T that achieves the
minimum.
Proof: See Subsection 5.6.3.
Assumption 5.1 is crucial to ensure existence of a valid solution to the one-sided optimization problem
faced by virtual player i for fixed strategies of other virtual players. Due to this assumption, at every time
step, each virtual player knows the resource state of all virtual players including of itself. This information is
then used to compute a Markov perfect equilibrium of the game4.
Remark 5.3. Suppose that Controller j ∈ J in game G1 has invested all its resource at time step t0 < T ,
that is, Sjt0 = M j . Recall the action U˜
j
t ∈ Ujt introduced in Assumption 5.1 that does not use any resource of
3A dynamic game is said to be a game of perfect information with perfect recall if at any time t, all players in the game have access
to all the past and current realizations of the state of the game.
4There could be multiple Markov perfect equilibria of the game G2.
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Controller j at time t. Define ψ˜jt for all t ≥ t0 as
ψ˜jt (Πt,S1:Nt ) =
{
γjt : Pjt → {U˜ jt }
}
for all Πt,S1:Nt .
Then, virtual player j at any time t ≥ t0 chooses ψ˜jt as its control law in the game G2. 
We now recall the definition of common-information based Markov perfect equilibrium of game G1 from
[12], adapted to the setting considered in this chapter.
Definition 5.2. Let {ψ1?, . . . ,ψN?} ∈ H¯i1:T be a Markov perfect equilibrium of game G2. Then, the strategy
profile (g1?, . . . ,gN?) of the controllers, defined as gi? := %i(ψi?), is a common-information based Markov
perfect equilibrium of game G1. 
5.3.4 Characterization of Markov Perfect Equilibrium of Game G2
Recall that Markov perfect equilibrium in a game of perfect information is computed using a backward
induction approach. In the next theorem, we define Markov perfect equilibrium of game G2 and characterize
it using “value functions” using this approach.
Theorem 5.6. Consider game G2. A strategy profile of virtual players {ψ1?, . . . ,ψN?} ∈ H¯i1:T is a Markov Per-
fect equilibrium of game G2 if and only if there exist value functions {V it }i,t satisfying the following conditions:
1. At time T , for each realization {pi, s1, . . . , sN} of {ΠT ,S1T , . . . ,SNT }, define the value function for virtual
player i as
V iT (pi, s1:N ) = min
γ˜i
E
[
c˜iT+1(ΠT+1) + c˜iT (ΠT ,Γ1T , . . . ,ΓNT )
∣∣∣∣ΠT = pi,ΓiT = γ˜i,
ΓjT = ψ
j?
T (pi, s1:N ) ∀ j ∈ [N ] \ {i}, dkT (ZT+1) + skT ≤Mk ∀ k ∈ [N ]
]
. (5.2)
Then, ψi?T (pi, s1:N ) must be the minimizing γ˜i in the expression of V iT (pi, s1:N ) above. This must hold for
all virtual players i ∈ [N ].
2. For time steps t ∈ [T − 1], for each realization {pi, s1, . . . , sN} of {Πt,S1t , . . . ,SNt }, define recursively the
value function for virtual player i as
V it (pi, s1:N ) = min
γ˜i
E
[
V it+1(Πt+1,S1:Nt+1) + c˜it(Πt,Γ1t , . . . ,ΓNt )
∣∣∣∣Πt = pi,Γit = γ˜i,
Γjt = ψ
j?
t (pi, s1:N ) ∀ j ∈ [N ] \ {i}, dkt (Zt+1) + skt ≤Mk ∀ k ∈ [N ]
]
. (5.3)
Then, ψi?t (pi, s1:N ) must be the minimizing γ˜i in the expression of V it (pi, s1:N ) above. This must hold for
all virtual players i ∈ [N ]. Here, Πt+1 = Ft(Πt,Zt+1), where Ft was defined in Lemma 5.1.
Proof: The proof of this statement follows from a minor modification of the proof of [12, Theorem 2,
p. 561].
We must note that in the definition of Markov perfect equilibrium in the theorem above, the equilibrium
strategies must also respect the resource constraints of the virtual players.
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5.4 One-Stage Bayesian Games and an Algorithm
In this subsection, we use the backward induction characterization of the Markov perfect equilibrium of
game G2 presented in Theorem 5.6 to devise an algorithm that decomposes the computation of common
information based Markov perfect equilibrium into computing for Bayesian Nash equilibria in a sequence of
one-stage (static) Bayesian games. The steps are similar to the ones employed in [12] and Chapters 2 and 4.
Consider a time step t. To ease exposition, we use St = {Πt,S1t , . . . ,SNt } to denote the Markov state of
game G2 at time t. Let F˜t denote the evolution map for Markov state of game G2 at time t, that is,
F˜t(st,Zt+1) =
{
Ft(pit,Zt+1),S1t + d1t (Zt+1), . . . ,SNt + dNt (Zt+1)
}
,
where Ft has been defined in Lemma 5.1. With this definition, St+1 = F˜t(St,Zt+1) for every t ∈ [T ]. Let us
define c¯it, t ∈ [T ] as
c¯iT (sT ;xT ,p1:NT ,u1:NT ) := ciT (xT ,u1:NT ) + E
[
ciT+1(XT+1)
∣∣∣xT ,p1:NT ,u1:NT ] , (5.4)
c¯it(st;xt,p1:Nt ,u1:Nt ) := cit(xt,u1:Nt ) + E
[
V it+1(F˜t(st,Zt+1))
∣∣∣xt,p1:Nt ,u1:Nt ] . (5.5)
This is the cost-to-go function for the Controller i in game G1 if all controllers stick to the common informa-
tion based Markov perfect equilibrium at every time step s > t. For a realization st, Controller i chooses a
map γit : Pit → U it . One can notice that this is precisely the setup of a Bayesian game, albeit with resource
constraint.
Definition 5.3. At time t ∈ [T ], the one-stage Bayesian game between Controllers 1, . . . , N with cost func-
tions (c¯1t (st; ·), . . . , c¯Nt (st; ·)) is called the one-stage Bayesian game at time step t with state st, where c¯it is
defined in (5.4) and (5.5) above. 
An algorithm to compute common information based Markov perfect equilibrium:
Along similar lines as in Chapter 2, we can now describe a backward induction process to compute a
common information based Markov perfect equilibrium of game G1 using a sequence of one-stage Bayesian
games defined above. We proceed as follows:
Algorithm 1:
1. At time T , for each realization sT of the Markov state at time T , we define a one-stage Bayesian game
SGT (sT ) where
(a) The probability distribution on (XT ,P1T , . . . ,PNT ) is piT .
(b) Agent5 i observes PiT and chooses action UiT , i ∈ [N ].
(c) Agent i’s cost is c¯iT (sT ;XT ,P1:NT ,U1:NT ), i ∈ [N ].
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium6 of this game is an N -tuple of strategies γ1:N∗, where γi∗ : PiT → U iT is a
map such that for any realization pi ∈ PiT , γi∗(pi) is a solution of the minimization problem
γi∗(pi) ∈ arg min
ui∈Ui
T
E
piT
[
c¯iT (sT ;XT ,P1:NT ,ui, γ−i∗(P−iT ))
∣∣∣PiT = pi, diT (ZT+1) + siT ≤M i],
5Agent i can be thought to be the same as Controller i. We use a different name here in order to maintain the distinction between
games G1 and SGT (sT ).
6See [2, 125, 3] for a definition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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where γ−i∗(P−iT ) := {γk∗(PkT ) : k ∈ [N ] \ {i}}, and the superscript piT indicates that the expectation
is with respect to the distribution piT . If a Bayesian Nash equilibrium γ1:N∗ of SGT (sT ) exists, denote
the corresponding expected equilibrium costs as V iT (sT ), i ∈ [N ], and define ψiT (sT ) := γi∗, i ∈ [N ].
2. At time t < T , for each realization st of the common information based conditional mean at time t, we
define the one-stage Bayesian game SGt(st) where
(a) The probability distribution on (Xt,P1t , . . . ,PNt ) is denoted by pit.
(b) Agent i observes Pit and chooses action Uit, i ∈ [N ].
(c) Agent i’s cost is c¯it(st;Xt,P1:Nt ,U1:Nt ), i ∈ [N ].
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game is an N -tuple of strategies γ1:N∗, where γi∗ : Pit → U it is a
map such that for any realization pi ∈ Pit , γi∗(pi) is a solution of the minimization problem
γi∗(pi) ∈ arg min
ui∈Uit
E
pit
[
c¯it(st;Xt,P1:Nt ,ui, γ−i∗(P−it ))
∣∣∣Pit = pi, dit+1(Zt+1) + sit ≤M i],
where γ−i∗(P−it ) := {γk∗(Pkt ) : k ∈ [N ] \ {i}}, and the expectation is taken with respect to the
distribution pit. If a Bayesian Nash equilibrium γ1:N∗ of SGt(st) exists, denote the corresponding
expected equilibrium costs as V it (st), i ∈ [N ] and define ψit(st) := γi∗, i ∈ [N ].
Remark 5.4. It should be noted that at every t ∈ [T ], the functions {V it }i∈[N ] obtained after computing for the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the one-stage Bayesian game at time t has to substituted into the expression in
(5.5) above to obtain c¯it−1. 
Theorem 5.7. The strategies ψi = (ψi1, ψi2, . . . , ψiT ), i ∈ [N ], defined by the backward induction process de-
scribed in Algorithm 1 form a Markov perfect equilibrium of game G2. Consequently, the strategy tuple g1:N
defined as
git(·, ct) := ψit(st), i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ]
form a common information based Markov perfect equilibrium of game G1.
Proof: To prove the result, we just need to observe that the strategies defined by the backward
induction procedure of Algorithm 1 satisfy the conditions of Theorem 5.6, and hence form a Markov perfect
equilibrium of game G2.
For an application of the above result, we refer the reader to [11]. In that paper, we consider an
adversarial jamming attack on a transmitter-receiver system by a strategic jammer, in which the jammer can
jam only a limited number of times throughout the game. This limit on the number of jamming actions
captures the energy constraints of the jammer. A block diagram of the setup is depicted in Figure 1.5 in
Subsection 1.1.2.
This problem is formulated as a multi-stage zero-sum game between the transmitter and the jammer.
At every stage of the game, the transmitter observes a message, which we assume to be a Gaussian random
variable independent of past messages, and then decides on whether or not to transmit the message across
the channel. The jammer can only observe whether or not a transmission is taking place, and then decides
on whether or not to jam the system. The jammer cannot observe the message being transmitted. The
jammer’s action during the stage is observed by the transmitter. The receiver receives the message, possibly
corrupted due to jammer’s action, and then decodes it according to a fixed rule. The transmitter and the
jammer constitute the two players in this zero-sum game.
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Due to the nature of the information structure of the players, this is a dynamic zero-sum game with
asymmetric information and resource constrained players. One can readily check that the game thus defined
falls into the category studied in this chapter and satisfies Assumptions 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. We use a similar
algorithm as described above to compute its saddle-point equilibrium. We showed in [11] that when playing
under a saddle-point equilibrium, the transmitter has a threshold-based transmission policy, whereas the
jammer jams according to a behavioral strategy during every stage of the game.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied a dynamic non-zero sum game of asymmetric information in which the controllers
are operating under certain resource constraints. We assumed that the amount of resource a controller in-
vests at each point of time depends only on the increment in the common information at the next time step.
Analogous to the solution approach in Chapter 2, we defined a new virtual game of symmetric information
with resource constrained virtual players, in which the state of the virtual game was the set of common infor-
mation based conditional beliefs and resource levels of all controllers. Akin to the analysis in Chapter 2, we
obtained the common information based Markov perfect equilibrium of the game of asymmetric information
by computing Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of the virtual game and then projecting the MPE back to
the original game.
The results obtained in this chapter can be extended to linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) games with
asymmetric information and resource constrained controllers in a straightforward manner, following similar
steps as taken in Chapters 2 and 3. The existence of a common information based Markov perfect equilibrium
in an LQG game with resource constrained controllers appears to be a challenge for a general model like the
one studied in this chapter. For certain specific settings, however, the existence results have been established
in [10] and [11]. In each of these papers, we considered an “LQG-type” dynamic zero-sum game between
a controller and a jammer, in which the jammer’s action space was a two-point set (to jam or to not jam) at
each time step.
The next chapter discusses some implications of the assumptions made in the previous chapters, and
conditions under which they can be weakened.
5.6 Proofs
5.6.1 Proof of Lemma 5.2
Fix a time step t ∈ [T ] and a virtual player i. Let Γit := χit(Ct). Using nested expectation, we get
E
[
cit(Xt,U1t , . . . ,UNt )
]
= ECt
[
E
[
cit(Xt,U1t , , . . . ,UNt )
∣∣∣Ct] ],
= ECt
[
E
[
cit(Xt,Γ1t (P1t ), . . . ,ΓNt (PNt ))
∣∣∣Ct] ],
= ECt
[
c˜it(Πt, χ1t (Ct), . . . , χNt (Ct))
]
,
where the first equality follows from the property of expectation, the second equality merely substitutes
Uit = Γit(Pit), and the third equality follows from the definition of c˜it. The above equalities, together with the
assumption that Ct ⊂ Ct+1 for all time steps t, lead us to the result.
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5.6.2 Proof of Lemma 5.4
First, recall that by the definition in (5.1), we get
Sit+1 = sit + dit+1(Zt+1) for all i ∈ [N ].
In the light of Lemma 5.1 and the equation above, it suffices to show that the increment in the common
information Zt+1 satisfies
P
{
Zt+1
∣∣ct, pi1:t, s1:N1:t , γ1:N1:t } = P{Zt+1∣∣pit, s1:Nt , γ1:Nt } .
In fact, we show that the distribution over Zt+1 is independent of the realizations s1:N1:t :
P
{
Zt+1
∣∣ct, pi1:t, s1:N1:t , γ1:N1:t } = P{Zt+1∣∣pit, γ1:Nt } . (5.6)
Recall from Assumption 5.2 that
Zt+1 = ζt+1(P1:Nt ,U1:Nt ,Y1:Nt ) = ζt+1(P1:Nt , γ1t (P1t ), . . . , γNt (PNt ),Y1:Nt ).
We next show that (5.6) holds:
P(Zt+1 = z|ct, pi1:t, s1:N1:t , γ1:N1:t ) =
∑
xt,xt+1,
y1:Nt+1,p1:Nt
P(Zt+1 = z,xt,xt+1,y1:Nt+1,p1:Nt |ct, pi1:t, s1:N1:t , γ1:N1:t )
Bayes′rule=
∑
xt,xt+1,
y1:Nt+1,p1:Nt
1{ζt+1(p1:Nt ,γ1t (p1t ),...,γNt (pNt ),y1:Nt+1)=z}P(y
1:N
t+1|xt+1)P(xt+1|xt, γ1t (p1t ), . . . , γNt (pNt ))
× P(xt,p1:Nt |ct, pi1:t, s1:N1:t , γ1:N1:t )
=
∑
xt,xt+1,
y1:Nt+1,p1:Nt
1{ζt+1(p1:Nt ,γ1t (p1t ),...,γNt (pNt ),y1:Nt+1)=z}P(y
1:N
t+1|xt+1)P(xt+1|xt, γ1t (p1t ), . . . , γNt (pNt ))
×pit(xt,p1:Nt ) (5.7)
where we used Bayes’ rule and the fact that
P
{
xt,p1:Nt |c1:t, pi1:t, s1:N1:t , γ1:N1:t
}
= P
{
xt,p1:Nt |ct
}
= pit(xt,p1:Nt ).
Notice that the right side of (5.7) depends only on pit and γ1:Nt . This establishes the statement of the lemma.
5.6.3 Proof of Lemma 5.5
Consider the one-sided optimization problem for the virtual player i given the fixed strategies ψ−i of the
other virtual players. The expected cost function for the virtual player i in the one-sided optimization
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problem (with fixed strategies of other virtual players) is denoted by J¯ i, and is given by
J¯ i(χi1:T ,ψ−i) = E
[
c˜iT+1(ΠT+1) +
∑
t∈[T ]
c˜it
(
Πt, ψ1t (Πt,S1:Nt ), . . . , ψi−1t (Πt,S1:Nt ),Γit, . . . , ψNt (Πt,S1:Nt )
)
∣∣∣∣Γit := χit(Ct), t ∈ [T ]],
where the expectation is taken on the probability measure induced on the common information, the beliefs,
and the actions of virtual player i due to the choice of strategies χi1:T and ψ
−i.
Note that {Πt,S1t , . . . ,SNt } is a state-constrained controlled Markov chain with controlling actions as
the actions taken by virtual player i. Applying the classical theory of Markov decision processes with state
constraints [130], we conclude that the optimal control law of virtual player i at time step t is a function
of the states {Πt,S1:Nt } alone. Since the choice of the virtual player i was arbitrary, we conclude that the
statement holds for all virtual players. This completes the proof of the lemma.
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Chapter 6
Further Thoughts and Discussions on
Games with Asymmetric Information
In this chapter, we discuss implications of the assumptions we have made in the previous chapters on games
with asymmetric information - evolution of common and private information and the strategy independence
of beliefs. We also comment on the generalizations of the models that have been studied in those games.
6.1 Evolution of Common Information
In all games considered in the previous chapters, we assumed that the common information is nested, that
is, the common information of the controllers at any time step is a part of their common information at all
future time steps. This assumption was used in two results: (i) to compute the evolution equation for the
common information based conditional beliefs, and (ii) to establish the relationship between the original
game of asymmetric information and the virtual game of symmetric and perfect information.
If the common information is not nested, however, then the evolution equation for common information
based conditional belief cannot be obtained, except perhaps, under certain special circumstances1.
Consider a strategy profile of virtual players in the virtual game and the corresponding strategy profile of
the controllers in the original game. We used the “nestedness” property of common information to establish
that the expected costs to each controller and the corresponding virtual player are equal. Again, if the
common information is not nested, then this equality of expected costs cannot be established, except under
certain special settings.
6.2 Strategy Independence of Beliefs
An assumption that was common to all the games we have considered in the thesis is strategy independence
of beliefs, which says that at every time step, the conditional measure on the state and private information of
the controllers given the common information of the controllers at that step is independent of the strategies
of the controllers until that time. The conditional measure at a time represents the belief of the controllers on
the private information of other controllers and the state of the system at that time, which we call common
information based conditional belief (in short, belief) at that time. Strategy independence of beliefs is an
assumption that ensures that the strategy of the controllers do not affect the common information based
1Consider, for example, the case when the state and the private information of the controllers are independent of the past observa-
tions and actions of the controllers.
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conditional beliefs, or in other words, the common information of the controllers is rich enough that their
strategies do not affect the beliefs.
This assumption may seem strange and stringent at a first glance, but a deeper look at the proofs will
convince the reader that it has been indispensable to the analysis carried out in all contexts. The most
important consequences of this assumption are:
1. We proved that the belief process forms a state of the virtual game in all cases. The belief at any
time step is a function of the belief and the prescriptions chosen at the previous time step. Recall that
prescriptions are maps from the private information of the controllers to their action spaces. These
statements would not hold true if strategy independence of beliefs does not hold for a dynamic game
of asymmetric information.
2. Since all virtual players have access to common information of the controllers at every time step, the
virtual players can compute the belief and use it to compute their actions (prescriptions). This allowed
us to invoke Markov perfect equilibrium concept for the virtual games of perfect information.
3. Since the Markov perfect equilibrium is computed using a backward induction algorithm, we use this
characterization for virtual game to devise an algorithm to compute the common information based
Markov perfect equilibrium of the original game of asymmetric information. The algorithm computes
Bayesian Nash equilibrium at every time for every possible realization of the belief (or common infor-
mation) in order to compute a common information based Markov perfect equilibrium of the original
game of asymmetric information.
If the strategy independence of beliefs do not hold, then the Markov perfect equilibrium for the vir-
tual game cannot be computed, since the virtual agents neither share their prescriptions, nor their
strategies.
4. The assumption allowed us to obtain a credible Markov perfect equilibrium. If the belief at a time
step depends on the strategies of any controller, then the corresponding virtual player in game G2 can
deceive other virtual players and possibly get an advantage. This may not lead to a credible Markov
perfect equilibrium, and poses severe technical difficulties to characterize a Nash equilibrium for the
virtual game. For a detailed discussion on this issue, we refer the reader to [12, Section VI].
By now, the reader should be convinced of the importance of strategy independence of beliefs, which
has been crucial not only to prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a game of asymmetric information,
but also devise an algorithm to compute it. However, there are games in which a Nash equilibrium exists
even though strategy independence of beliefs may not hold. We present two examples of such games below.
1. LQG game with one-step delayed observation sharing pattern: In this two-player game of asymmetric
information, each controller, at every time step, has access to the past observations of both players and
its current observation. Thus, the common information of both the controllers at any time is the past
observations of both the controllers, and the private information of each controller at that time is its
current observation. One can readily check that this is a game of asymmetric information in which
strategy independence of beliefs do not hold. However, this game admits a unique Nash equilibrium
under certain conditions on the cost function [66].
2. Signaling game: As mentioned in the introduction, a signaling game is a two-player two-stage game
of asymmetric information, in which the each controller acts at only one stage. The action of the
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controller acting at the first stage is observed by the controller acting at the second stage. This is a
game that does not satisfy strategy independence of beliefs. However, [31] showed that under certain
assumptions, the game admits a unique Nash equilibrium.
Both classes of games mentioned above have very special structures allowing the authors to compute a
Nash equilibrium in the respective game. However, for general classes of dynamic (or multi-stage) games,
absence of strategy independence of belief may motivate the controllers to deceive each other by manipulat-
ing the each other’s beliefs. We now briefly describe below the reason behind this. For a more detailed and
technical discussion, we refer the reader to [12].
Recall that a consequence of the first assumption was the recursion
Πt+1 = Ft(Πt,Γ1t ,Γ2t ,Zt+1),
where Πt is the common information based conditional belief at time t, Zt+1 is the increment in the common
information, and Γ1:2t are prescriptions chosen by virtual players. Suppose that the strategy independence of
belief does not hold for some dynamic game G1 of asymmetric information, and the common information
based conditional belief is dependent on the strategy of Controller 1 at some time step t0. At any time
step t ≥ t0, in order for Controller 2 to know the belief Πt exactly, the virtual player 1 needs to share its
prescriptions in game G2. If virtual player 1 does not share its prescription, then virtual player 2 needs to
know the precise strategy of virtual player 1. Now, if the virtual players neither share their prescriptions
nor their strategies, then each controller has an incentive to deviate from the Nash equilibrium to reap the
benefit of asymmetry in the beliefs caused by changing its strategy. In other words, each controller has an
incentive to “deceive” the other controller if strategy independence of belief does not hold. This assumption
assumes that the common information at every time in the dynamic game is “rich enough” so that controllers
cannot deceive each other.
In case the cost functions of the controllers are aligned (that is, they are the same at all time steps),
then the game problem is just a team problem, and Assumption 2.2 is not required. In team problems, the
agents can agree, prior to the start of the play, on what strategies they will use during the course of the play.
Moreover, since the cost functions of all the agents are aligned, no agent has an incentive to deviate from
the pre-agreed strategies; clearly if any deviation hurts one player, then it hurts all players. Consequently,
we do not need Assumption 2.2.
Thus, for general classes of dynamic (or multi-stage) games, strategy independence of beliefs may
provide a useful tool to establish the existence of Nash equilibria in such games.
We now discuss one more implication of this assumption. In order to make the ideas mathematically
precise, we use the notations of state, private information, common information and strategies as introduced
in the previous chapter, Chapter 5. Consider a game of asymmetric information, and assume that strategy
independence of beliefs holds. In that case, we have the following result:
Claim 6.1. Strategy independence of beliefs implies that for any i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ], the measure µit, defined
by2
µit(Xt,P−it ) := P
{
Xt,P−it |Iit
}
,
is independent of the past strategies of all the controllers.
2Note that the measure µit here is a random variable.
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The proof of the above claim is immediate from the definition of strategy independence of beliefs.
However, the converse does not always holds. To present the ideas succinctly, we first introduce the following
definition.
Definition 6.1. Consider an N -player T + 1-horizon dynamic game of asymmetric information. Let cit be
a function of the actions taken by Controllers j ∈ {i1, . . . , ik} ⊂ [N ] \ {i} at time t, and define Zit :=
{Xt,Pi1t , . . . ,Pikt } if cit is a function of state Xt and Zit := {Pi1t , . . . ,Pikt } otherwise. For any i ∈ [N ] and
t ∈ [T ], define the conditional measure µit as
µit(Zit) := Pg
1:N
1:t−1
{
Zit|Iit
}
,
If µit is independent of the past strategies of all the controllers for all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ], then we say that
the game satisfies strategy independence of I-beliefs.
We now present an example, where strategy independence does not hold, but strategy independence of
I-beliefs holds and a Nash equilibrium exists.
Example 6.1. In this example, we merge two games into one. Consider a three-player game of asymmetric
information, in which, at any time step, the first two players have access to past realizations of their observa-
tions and actions. The third player, at each time, observes a private random variable that is independent of all
other random variables and his past observations. This third player does not have any access to observations
or actions of the first two players.
Assume that the cost functions of the first two players, at any time, do not depend on the information
or action of the third player, and the cost function of the third player at any time is a function of only its
observation and action at that time. This game certainly admits a Nash equilibrium under some fairly general
conditions on the cost functions of the players. We further have the following observations about the game:
1. The common information of the players at any time is a null set.
2. The (information structure of) game does not satisfy strategy independence of beliefs.
3. The information structure of the game is partially nested with access to actions.
4. The game satisfies strategy independence of I-beliefs.
It is clear that strategy independence of I-beliefs can lead us to establishing existence of and devising
computational methods to obtain Nash equilibrium in a wide class of dynamic games with asymmetric infor-
mation. The next question is whether or not such general frameworks can be developed for general models
of dynamic games with asymmetric information in the future. The answer to this question, in this author’s
humble opinion, is no. We have already mentioned that there are special classes of dynamic games with
asymmetric information where (i) strategy independence of beliefs do not hold, (ii) Nash equilibria exist,
and (iii) Nash equilibria can be computed using certain algorithms. However, such special classes are scant,
and one has to exploit the structure of the underlying spaces, the cost functions and information structure
of the controllers to establish the existence result.
Remark 6.1. It is possible to extend the existence result for two sufficiently broad classes of dynamic games
with asymmetric information which do not feature strategy independence of I-beliefs: (i) zero-sum games
admitting at least one pure strategy saddle-point equilibrium, and (ii) non-zero sum games admitting unique
Nash equilibrium. 
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6.2.1 Relationship to PNIS with Access to Actions
Recall that we had defined a variant of partially nested information structure (PNIS) with access to actions
in Definition 1.4. We now make the following assertion regarding this information structure.
Assertion: Consider a game in which the primitive random variables are mutually independent of each
other. Then, the game satisfies strategy independence of I-beliefs if, and only if, the information structure is PNIS
with access to actions.
Note that this is only an assertion at this point (driven by our intuition), and we do not yet have a proof
in place. If proved, this assertion will perhaps provide a simple tool with which one can show that a dynamic
game with asymmetric information and satisfying certain conditions can be decomposed into a sequence of
static Bayesian games. In this case, establishing the existence of a Nash equilibrium of the dynamic game
will be possible by establishing the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a sequence of static Bayesian
games. Further, a computational algorithm can also be devised along the same lines as we did in the previous
chapters.
6.3 On Weakening of Strategy Independence of Beliefs
Consider a two-player LQG game with one-step delayed sharing pattern, that is, Ct consists of Y1:21:t−1 and
U1:21:t−1, and Pit = Yit for i ∈ {1, 2} at all time steps. Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold for this game. Also
recall that the setting considered in [66] is that of an LQG game with one-step delayed observation sharing
pattern, that is, Ct consists of Y1:21:t−1 only, and Pit = Yit for i ∈ {1, 2} at all time steps. Two observations
from the result of Chapter 3 and [66] are as follows:
1. The sufficient condition on the cost functions of the controllers in Chapter 3 for the existence of a
unique CIMPE is the same as the one in [66] for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium.
2. The above observation suggests that if there exists a unique CIMPE, then perhaps, we can take away
some amount of information from the controllers and still guarantee the existence of a Nash equilib-
rium (which may not be CIMPE).
One of the ways to establish the existence of solutions in dynamic decision problems is to expand the
information structure of the DMs to obtain a new virtual decision problem, so that dynamic programming (or
perhaps some other solution approach) can be applied to the new decision problem. The second step then
is to pull back the solution of the virtual decision problem in an appropriate manner to obtain a solution to
the actual decision problem. Such ideas have been discussed in some detail in [28] and [29] in the context
of zero-sum games, and we believe that the idea can be extended to more general settings as follows:
If we have a game with asymmetric information in which strategy independence of beliefs do not hold,
then we can expand the information structures of the controllers just enough so that the resulting virtual
problem satisfies strategy independence of beliefs. If CIMPE is unique, then CIMPE of the virtual problem
can be used to compute a Nash equilibrium of the original problem. This idea is based purely on intuition as
of now, and is a possible recipe by which we can weaken the strategy independence of beliefs in games with
asymmetric information. This will be a topic for investigation in the future.
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6.4 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and its Relation to CIMPE
For dynamic games with asymmetric information, the widespread solution approach that has been adopted
in the literature is the so-called Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) [70]. In this section, we focus on the
differences between CIMPE and PBE. To summarize, PBE is a general solution concept for a class of dynamic
games with asymmetric information with finite spaces, while CIMPE is a specific solution concept for a
somewhat different class of dynamic games with asymmetric information. Furthermore, the solution concept
of CIMPE can be applied to dynamic games with finite as well as uncountable spaces, which makes it an
attractive solution concept for various applications.
The notion of PBE has been developed for a class of dynamic games with asymmetric information with
finite spaces. A general model for which PBE is well-understood (see, for example, [70]) is outlined below:
1. At each stage of the game, all the players know the past actions of all the players.
2. The dynamic game is one of incomplete information; the private information (type) of the players
are fixed at the first time instant of the game, and the type of a player constitutes the only private
information of that player throughout the game.
Even for the simpler model (as compared to ours in Chapter 2) of the game described above, the analysis
and existence of a Nash equilibrium is not easy.
Our model is general because (i) the private information of the players evolves with time, and can
depend on the past actions of the players, and (ii) there is an underlying state of the game, which at any
time depends on the past actions of the players and the true realized state of the nature. There are two
reasons why we are able to get rid of many technical issues with PBE that the authors have discussed in
[70]. They are
1. The cost function of each player in our game is stagewise additive, and the cost accrued by a player at
a certain time depends only on the state at that time, and the actions taken by the players at that time.
2. We assume strategy independence of beliefs due to which we need not worry about the issues arising
out of consistency (or inconsistency) of beliefs among the players.
The consistency issue is the hardest one to deal with in games where common and private information
depend on the actions taken by the players in the past. Another technical challenge in PBE solution concept
is to identify what strategies players should take if they reach an information state off the equilibrium path.
A comparison between PBE and CIMPE does not seem a fruitful venture at this moment3. The models,
costs, and information structures of the players that have been assumed while studying these two solution
concepts are very different.
6.5 Other Nash Equilibria of the Game G1
Consider the games with asymmetric information considered in Chapters 2 and 5. We proved that every
Nash equilibrium of virtual game G2 can be used to obtain a Nash equilibrium of game G1 and vice-versa.
Also recall that game G2 is a dynamic game of perfect information, and Markov perfect equilibrium of
game G2 is a special subclass of Nash equilibria which is obtained by restricting the strategy spaces of the
3For the game considered in Chapter 2, the difference between PBE and CIMPE is, in some sense, similar to the difference between
subgame-perfect equilibrium and Markov perfect equilibrium.
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virtual players to Markov strategies and by employing a backward induction algorithm. It is well known that
Markov perfect equilibrium of a game with perfect information is a refinement of Nash equilibrium of that
game, which further means that there could be other Nash equilibria in that game which are not Markov
perfect. However, game G2 may admit other Nash equilibria that are not Markov perfect. Thus, there could
be multiple Nash equilibria in game G1 besides common information based Markov perfect equilibrium.
Markov perfect equilibrium concept have several advantages over Nash equilibrium in behavioral strate-
gies in games of perfect information. First, of course, is the fact that they can be computed using dynamic
programming. The second advantage is that this equilibrium concept removes the possibility of empty threats
given to one player by some other player. However, Markov perfect equilibrium also comes with a disadvan-
tage: it is sensitive to the cost functions of the players. A minor modification in the cost functions can lead
to very different Markov perfect equilibrium of the game. Thus, a small change in the cost functions of the
controllers in game G1 may result in significant change in the common information based Markov perfect
equilibrium of the game.
6.6 State Space of the Virtual Game
Recall that for each of the dynamic games of asymmetric information analyzed in the previous chapters, we
defined a corresponding virtual game of symmetric information, and we identified a state space of the virtual
game. The state space of the virtual game at any time was either equal or directly related to the set of all
possible realizations of common information based conditional beliefs at that time.
We could, of course, have taken the common information of the controllers at each step as the state of
the virtual game at that step. The reason for not treating common information as a state of the virtual game
is to identify the smallest possible state space for the virtual game, which notably reduces the computational
requirements for computing common information based Markov perfect equilibrium.
As an example, consider the LG game of asymmetric information studied in Chapter 2, in which the
mean of the common information based conditional belief is taken to be the state of the virtual game. The
size of the state space (set of all possible realizations of means) at a time is the same as the product space
of state space and private information space of both controllers at that time. In comparison, the common
information space may have a significantly large dimension if the horizon of the game is sufficiently long.
One can always come up with examples in which the common information based conditional belief
space at each time is as big as the common information space at that time. In such a case, there is no
computational advantage of treating belief space as the state space of the virtual game, and one can treat
common information of the controllers at a time to be the state of the virtual game at that time.
6.7 Extension to Behavioral Strategies
In the games that we have studied until now, our focus was mainly on dynamic games of asymmetric infor-
mation in which controllers act according to a pure strategy. However, as is well known, a Nash equilibrium
may not exist in pure strategies, and it is inevitable to expand the strategy spaces of the controllers to include
behavioral strategies. The results presented in the previous chapters can readily be extended to include such
dependence. To see this, we just need to expand the action space of virtual player i at time t in the virtual
game to include the set of all measurable maps γit : Pit → ℘(U it ). All the results proved in the previous
chapters hold for this case with only minor modifications.
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6.8 Zero-sum Games
Consider a dynamic two-player zero-sum game of asymmetric information, in which there are only two
controllers with c1t = −c2t for all t ∈ [T + 1]. In such a case, if a common information based Markov perfect
equilibrium exists, then due to the ordered-interchangeability property of multiple saddle-point equilibria
of zero-sum games [1], the expected costs to the controllers remain the same for all other saddle-point
equilibrium strategies of the controllers in the game. Thus, the algorithms presented in the previous chapters
provide structured ways of computing saddle-point equilibria of various classes of dynamic zero-sum games
with asymmetric information, including the ones with resource constraints.
In [11], we formulated a zero-sum dynamic game of asymmetric information and obtained a saddle-
point equilibrium of that game using this solution approach4. In [10], a zero-sum dynamic game, albeit of
symmetric information, also used a similar solution approach, though the analysis was comparatively easier
because of the symmetry of information.
6.9 A Generalization of a Result in Chapter 5
In Chapter 5, we considered a game of asymmetric information in which the controllers had resource con-
straints. One of the key assumptions there was that the amount of resource invested by each controller at
any time step depends only on the increment of the common information at that time step. Consequently,
at any time, the actions taken by the controllers with resource constraints must be common knowledge. We
now study how this assumption can be eased.
If the amount of resource invested by each controller at any time step is a function of the common
information of the controllers at that time step, then we need to expand the state space of the game among
virtual players to include common information as one of the states of the system. In this case, there is no
need to have common information based conditional belief as the state of the system, as it is a function of
common information itself. The proof that it satisfies the conditions of a state of the game among virtual
players is along the same lines as in the proof of Lemma 5.4.
In case the resource invested by each controller at a time step depends on the private information of
the controllers, then every controller forms a belief about the resource state of all the controllers. These
beliefs will be a part of the state of the game among virtual players, and the complexity of the dynamic
programming for computing the Markov perfect equilibrium of the game among virtual players will increase
multi-fold.
6.10 Conclusion
In this chapter, we discussed our thoughts on dynamic games with asymmetric information, and presented
some implications of the results proved in the previous chapters in such games. This chapter concludes the
discussions on games with asymmetric information, and Part I of the thesis ends here.
We now proceed to Part II of the thesis, in which the next three chapters focus on establishing the exis-
tence of team-optimal solutions in certain classes of static and dynamic teams with asymmetric information.
4The solution approach adopted in [11] is a motivation for the solution approach adopted in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 7
Static Teams
As discussed in Chapter 1, static teams are decision problems where (i) the cost functions of all the agents are
equal, (ii) the action of an agent does not affect the observation of any other agent, and (iii) all agents agree
to cooperate with each other in selecting their strategies (but do not necessarily exchange or share their
information). In this chapter, our focus is on static teams with asymmetric information, in which agents do
not share their observations with each other. We are interested in obtaining sufficient conditions under which
team-optimal solutions exist in static teams with asymmetric information. Furthermore, the conditions we
obtain are for teams in which state, action and observation spaces are σ-compact Polish spaces1. However,
readers who prefer simplicity can replace Polish spaces and σ-compact Polish spaces in the chapter with
either finite, countable or finite-dimensional Euclidean spaces; the results naturally apply, since all of these
spaces are σ-compact Polish spaces.
We now present an outline for this chapter. In the next section, Section 7.1, we formulate two static
team problems: team ST1 in which action spaces of the agents are compact and the cost function of the
team is non-negative, continuous and bounded, and team ST2 in which action spaces of the agents are
non-compact and the cost function is non-negative and continuous, but is allowed to be unbounded. In
Sections 7.2 and 7.3, we identify conditions under which team ST1 and ST2 admit team-optimal solutions,
respectively. In particular, we assume that (i) there is no sharing of observation, (ii) the observations of the
agents given the state are conditionally independent of each other, and (iii) the measurement/observation
channel of each agent satisfies some sufficient conditions. For team ST2, we make an additional assumption
on the structure of the cost function of the team. In Section 7.4, we state two team scenarios in which we
can drop the assumption of σ-compactness on the state, observation and action spaces. Finally, we conclude
our discussion in Section 7.5. The proofs of most of the results are provided at the end of the chapter.
7.1 Problem Formulation
We consider a standard state space model for N -agent static teams. In particular, X denotes the state of the
system, Yi denotes the observation of Agent i and Ui denotes the action of Agent i. The observations of the
agents are allowed to be correlated with the state of the system. The state space is denoted by X , and the
observation and action spaces of Agent i are denoted by Yi and U i, respectively.
1A σ-compact Polish space is a completely metrizable space, which can be written as a countable union of compact sets.
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7.1.1 Admissible Control Strategies
The agents do not share their observations with each other. We consider two notions of strategies as expli-
cated below:
Definition 7.1 (Deterministic Strategy). A deterministic strategy of Agent i is a Borel measurable map γi :
Yi → U i. The set of all such maps is denoted by Di and referred to as the deterministic strategy space of
Agent i ∈ [N ].
Definition 7.2 (Randomized Strategy). A randomized strategy of Agent i is a conditional measure pii satisfy-
ing the following two properties:
1. For every yi ∈ Yi, pii(·|yi) ∈ ℘(U i);
2. For every U ∈ B(U i), yi 7→ pii(U|yi) is a B(Yi)-measurable function.
The randomized strategy space of Agent i ∈ [N ] is denoted by Ri. 
In general, showing the existence of optimal strategies in the space deterministic strategies of the agents
is a difficult problem. However, if the strategy spaces of the agents are expanded to include randomized
strategies, then establishing the existence result is relatively more tractable. Accordingly, in this paper, we
first prove the existence of optimal strategies in randomized strategy spaces of the agents, and then show
that optimal strategies exist in deterministic strategies as well.
7.1.2 Cost Function of the Team
We let c : X × Y1:N × U1:N → R+ denote the cost function of the team. We assume that it is a continuous
function of its arguments. We use J : R1:N → R+ to denote the cost functional of the team, which is defined
as
J(pi1:N ) = E
[
c(X,Y1:N ,U1:N )
]
,
where the expectation is with respect to the probability measure induced on the random variables by the
choice of randomized strategies of the agents. We make the following reasonable assumption on the team
problem described above.
Assumption 7.1. There exists a set of randomized strategies p˜i1:N ∈ R1:N of the agents such that J(p˜i1:N ) <
∞. 
7.1.3 Main Questions
The purpose of this chapter is to identify sufficient conditions on the team problem described above which
guarantee that an optimal solution exists.
Recall that under certain technical conditions, [101] proved that a static team with convex differentiable
cost function admits a team-optimal solution. Krainak et al. [102] extended it to exponential cost functions.
However, it is not clear if optimal solutions exist in a static team problem if we assume that the cost function
is continuous but neither convex nor differentiable. Furthermore, using Witsenhausen’s static reduction
technique [35, 4], a class of dynamic team problems can be converted into static team problems. However,
even if the cost function of the dynamic team is convex in the actions of the agents, the corresponding cost
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function for the reduced static team problem may not be convex. Examples are also known where optimal
solutions do not exist (cf. discrete Witsenhausen’s counterexample in Chapter 1). Thus, showing existence
of optimal strategies of the team problem considered above for a general cost function is a first step towards
showing the existence of team optimal solutions in dynamic teams.
7.1.4 Solution Approach
In order to show the existence of an optimal solution to the team problem formulated above, we need to
make further assumptions. Accordingly, we define here two team problems ST1 and ST2.
Definition 7.3 (Team ST1). Consider the team problem with the following further assumptions:
1. The cost c belongs to Cb(X × Y1:N × U1:N ).
2. The action space U i of Agent i is compact for all i ∈ [N ]. 
We now define team problem ST2.
Definition 7.4 (Team ST2). Consider the team problem with the following further assumptions:
1. The cost c belongs to C(X × Y1:N × U1:N ). In other words, the cost c is continuous, and may be
unbounded.
2. The action spaces U i, i ∈ [N ] may be non-compact. 
We first show the existence of optimal strategies in team ST1 in the next section. We prove several
auxiliary results in the next section that are needed for the existence result. Thereafter, we use these auxiliary
results, along with a sufficient condition on the cost function c, to show the existence of optimal strategies
in team ST2 in Section 7.3.
7.2 Existence of Optimal Solution in ST1
In this section, we show that, under certain conditions, there exists a pi1:N? ∈ R1:N such that
J(pi1:N?) = inf
pi1:N∈R1:N
J(pi1:N ).
We first provide an outline of our approach to showing the existence of optimal strategies in the
static team problem. Consider a sequence {pi1:Nn }n∈N ⊂ R1:N of control strategies of the agents such that
limn→∞ J(pi1:Nn ) = infpi1:N∈R1:N J(pi1:N ). There are three issues that need to be resolved: The first issue is
that the sequence of joint measures{
N∏
i=1
piin(dui|yi)P
{
dx, dy1, . . . , dyN
}}
n∈N
may not be a weak* convergent sequence. This can be remedied by considering a convergent subsequence
of
{∏N
i=1 pi
i
n(dui|yi)P
{
dx, dy1, . . . , dyN
}}
n∈N
. The second problem is to ensure that the limit of the con-
vergent subsequence satisfies the informational constraint. This means that the conditional measure on the
action space of Agent i given the observation of that agent and the state of the limiting measure must be inde-
pendent of the state for any i ∈ [N ]. The third problem is that if for all i ∈ [N ], {piin(dui|yi)P
{
dx, dyi
}}n∈N
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converges in the weak* sense to a measure pii0(dui|yi)P
{
dx, dyi
}
for some pii0 ∈ Ri, then the expected
cost functional J may not satisfy limn→∞ J(pi1:Nn ) = J(pi1:N0 ). We overcome all these three challenges by
employing the following steps:
1. We show that for any g ∈ Ub(X ×Y1:N ×U1:N ),
{∫
g piin(dui|yi)P
{
dyi|x}}
n∈N is a uniformly equicon-
tinuous and bounded sequence of functions under some assumptions on the conditional measure
P
{
dyi|x}.
2. In order to satisfy the informational constraint of the limiting measure of any convergent subsequence
of the sequence {piin(dui|yi)P
{
dx, dyi
}}n∈N, we assume a specific structure on the conditional proba-
bility measure P
{
dx|yi}.
3. We extract a weak* convergent subsequence{
N∏
i=1
piink(du
i|yi)P{dx, dy1, . . . , dyN}}
k∈N
of the sequence of measures such that limk→∞ J(pi1:Nnk ) = J(pi
1:N
0 ).
4. Once we show that there exists a set of behavioral strategies of the agents that achieves the minimum
expected cost, we use Blackwell’s irrelevant information theorem [4, p. 457] to conclude that there
exists a set of deterministic strategies of the agents that achieves the minimum expected cost.
In order to prove existence, we require several auxiliary results that are proved in the next subsection.
The purpose of the auxiliary results is to establish results 1 and 2 above in a somewhat general setting. The
existence of optimal strategies is proven in Subsection 7.2.2. We also show in that subsection the existence
of optimal strategies in static teams when the state is degenerate and the observations of the agents are
mutually independent random variables.
Remark 7.1. Without the further regularity conditions to be presented shortly, the approach above may not
be sufficient to lead to the desired existence result for teams in which the information of the agents given
the state are not conditionally independent. This is the case, for example, when observations are shared by
the agents in a team. In Section 9.3, a counterexample of a two-agent static team is given, in which one
agent shares its observation with another agent. We show that even if sequences of the joint measures of
each agent’s action and information (which may include another agent’s observation too) converge in the
weak* sense, the corresponding sequence of joint measures over the product of all action, observation, and
state spaces need not converge. This counterexample shows that additional regularity conditions on the
cost function, observation channels, underlying distributions of primitive random variables, and topologies
on measure spaces are needed to establish the existence of optimal strategies in general static and dynamic
teams where observations may be shared. Chapter 9 studies several classes of static teams with observa-
tion sharing information structures and establishes the existence result for them under certain restrictive
assumptions. 
7.2.1 Auxiliary Results
In this subsection, we state a few lemmas that are needed to prove the existence of optimal strategies in
the static team problem formulated above. Unless otherwise stated, A, Bi, C and Yi, i ∈ [N ] denote Polish
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spaces, with generic elements in these spaces denoted, respectively, by a, bi, c and yi. We now introduce a
condition on the conditional probability measures, which will be important in proving the auxiliary results.
Definition 7.5 (Condition C1). Let A and Y be random variables such that P {dy|a} = η(a,y)ν(dy) for
some non-negative measure ν ∈ ca(Y). We say that the pair (η, ν) satisfies condition C1 if and only if
1. η is a continuous function of its arguments, that is, η ∈ C(A× Y); and
2. there exists a measurable function h(η,ν) : A×Y → R+ satisfying supa∈A
∫
h(η,ν)dν <∞, such that for
every  > 0, there exists a δ > 0 such that for any a0 ∈ A and for all a ∈ A satisfying dA(a,a0) < δ, we
have
|η(a,y)− η(a0,y)| <  h(η,ν)(a0,y).
We call h(η,ν) the variation control (VC) function of the pair (η, ν). 
If the observation is an additive noise corrupted version of the state, with the noise being Gaussian, then
the above condition holds. This is noted in the following example.
Example 7.1. Let A = Y = Rn. A sufficient condition for a pair (η, ν) to satisfy condition C1 is Y = A+W
for some Gaussian random vector W with density function N(·) and a positive definite covariance. In this
case, ν is the usual Lebesgue measure on Rn, η(a,y) = N(y− a), and the VC function for the pair (η, ν) is
h(η,ν)(a0,y) := max
a∈B(a0,1)
∥∥∥∥dηda
∥∥∥∥
2
.
Since dηda decays exponentially as ‖y‖2 →∞, h(η,ν) has the property that
∫
h(η,ν)dν <∞ and it is a constant
function over A. 
Now, we make use of the uniform continuity of a function and Condition C1 on the conditional measure
to prove the following result.
Lemma 7.1. Let ν ∈ ca(Y) be a non-negative measure and µ ∈ ℘(Y × B). Let A, B, C and Y be random
variables such that P {dy|a} = η(a,y)ν(dy), where the pair (η, ν) satisfies condition C1 with VC function h(η,ν).
Let g : A× B × C → R be a uniformly continuous and bounded function. Define the map f : A× C → R by
fµ(a, c) =
∫
B
g(a,b, c)µ(db|y)η(a,y)ν(dy).
Then, {fµ(·, ·)}µ∈℘(Y×B) is a uniformly equicontinuous and bounded map on its domain.
Proof: See Subsection 7.6.1.
We now have a corollary to this result.
Corollary 7.2. Under the same assumptions and notation as in Lemma 7.1, for every µ ∈ ℘(Y × B), fµ is a
uniformly continuous function on its domain.
We now state another important lemma, whose proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 7.1.
Lemma 7.3. Let νi ∈ ca(Yi) be a non-negative measure and µi ∈ ℘(Yi × Bi), i ∈ [N ]. Let A, Bi, C and
Yi be random variables for i ∈ [N ] such that P{dyi|a} = ηi(a,yi)νi(dyi), where each pair (ηi, νi) satisfies
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condition C1 with VC function hi. Further, assume that random variables Y1, . . . ,YN are independent given a.
Let g ∈ Ub(A× B1:N × C). Define the map f : A× C → R by
fµ1:N (a, c) =
∫
B1:N
g(a,b1:N , c)
N∏
i=1
µi(dbi|yi)ηi(a,yi)νi(dyi).
Then, {fµ1:N (·, ·)}µi∈℘(Yi×Bi) is a uniformly equicontinuous and bounded map on its domain.
Proof: See Subsection 7.6.2.
The result of Lemma 7.3 allows us to apply Arzela-Ascoli Theorem [131] on compact subsets of the
domain to obtain a convergent subsequence that converges to some bounded continuous function pointwise
(not in sup norm). We then need the following result.
Lemma 7.4. Under the same assumptions and notation as in Lemmas 7.1 and 7.3, let {µin}n∈N ⊂ ℘(Yi × Bi)
be an arbitrary sequence of measures for i ∈ [N ]. For every n ∈ N, define fn := fµ1:Nn . Further, assume that
A, C,Yi,Bi, i ∈ [N ] are all σ-compact Polish spaces. If {ζn}n∈N ⊂ ℘(A× C) is a weak* convergent sequence of
measures converging to ζ0, then there exists a subsequence {nk}k∈N such that
lim
k→∞
∣∣∣∣ ∫A×C fnkdζnk −
∫
A×C
fnkdζ0
∣∣∣∣ = 0.
Proof: See Subsection 7.6.3.
We have thus stated (and proved) all the major auxiliary results that are needed to establish the ex-
istence of optimal strategies. We next prove an additional result, which states that under some sufficient
condition, if we take a weak* convergent sequence of measures satisfying a conditional independence prop-
erty, then the limit also satisfies the conditional independence property. This result is useful to show that
the weak* convergent sequence of joint measures over the state, observation and action of Agent i does not
converge to a limit in which the control action depends on both the state and the observation.
Lemma 7.5. Let {µn}n∈N ⊂ ℘(A × B × C) be a convergent sequence of measures such that µn(da, db, dc) =
µn(dc|b)ζ(da, db), where ζ ∈ ℘(A × B). If µn w
∗
⇀ µ0 for some µ0 ∈ ℘(A × B × C), then µ0(da, db, dc) =
µ0(dc|b)ζ(da, db).
Proof: The proof follows immediately from Corollary 4.7 in [132, p. 102].
In the next subsection, we turn our attention to proving the existence of optimal strategies for the static
team problem considered in this section.
7.2.2 Existence of Optimal Strategies
In this subsection, we prove one of the main results of the chapter. We make the following assumption on
the probability measure on X × Y1:N .
Assumption 7.2. The spaces X ,Yi and U i are σ-compact Polish spaces for all i ∈ [N ]. Further, there exist
continuous functions ηi and ρi, i ∈ [N ] such that
P
{
dy1:N |x} = ∏
i∈[N ]
P
{
dyi|x} ,
P
{
dyi|x} = ηi(x,yi)νYi(dyi),
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where νYi is a non-negative measure on Yi for every i ∈ [N ]. The tuples (ηi, νYi), i ∈ [N ] satisfy Condition
C1. 
We now use the auxiliary results in the previous subsection to prove the following important theorem.
Theorem 7.6. Consider Team ST1, satisfying Assumption 7.2, where U i, i ∈ [N ] need not be compact sets. Let
g ∈ Ub(X × Y1:N × U1:N ). For every i ∈ [N ], let {λin}n∈N ⊂ ℘(U i × Yi × X ) be a convergent sequence of
measures such that λin(dui, dyi, dx) = λin(dui|yi)P
{
dx, dyi
}
, converging to some λi0 ∈ ℘(U i ×Yi ×X ). Then,
lim
n→∞
∫
g(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
(
N∏
i=1
λin(dui|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:N
}
=
∫
g(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
(
N∏
i=1
λi0(dui|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:N
}
.
Consequently, we have(
N∏
i=1
λin(dui|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:N
} w∗
⇀
(
N∏
i=1
λi0(dui|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:N
}
as n→∞.
Proof: See Subsection 7.6.4.
We now list in the following assumption the conditions that we need in order to establish the existence
of optimal strategies.
Assumption 7.3. 1. The cost function c : X × Y1:N × U1:N → R+ is continuous in its arguments and
bounded from above.
2. The action sets U i, i ∈ [N ], of all the agents are compact subsets of Polish spaces. Therefore, U i is
σ-compact Polish space for all i ∈ [N ].
3. Assumption 7.2 holds.
Remark 7.2. If we assume that the cost function c is continuous and the spaces X and Yi, i ∈ [N ] are compact
subsets of Polish spaces, then the cost function is bounded. 
Remark 7.3. It should also be noted that Part 3 of Assumption 7.3 is satisfied if (i) X and Yi, i ∈ [N ] are finite
dimensional Euclidean spaces, and (ii) the state and observations are jointly Gaussian random variables such
that Agent i observes a Gaussian noise corrupted version of the state X. 
The following theorem states that any team problem that satisfies the assumptions made above admits
a team-optimal solution.
Theorem 7.7. Every static team problem satisfying Assumption 7.3 admits a team-optimal solution in deter-
ministic strategies.
Proof: Let {pi1:Nn }n∈N ⊂ R1:N be a sequence of strategy profiles of the agents such that
J(pi1:Nn ) < inf
pi1:N∈R1:N
J(pi1:N ) + 1
n
.
We next show that there exists a convergent subsequence of this sequence {pi1:Nn }n∈N such that the limiting
behavioral strategies of the agents achieve the infimum of the expected cost functional. We organize the
proof into four steps.
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Step 1: (Tightness) Since X and Yi are Polish spaces, P{dx, dyi} is a tight measure. Since U i is compact,
the set of measures {pii(dui|yi)P{dx, dyi}}pii∈Ri is tight for all i ∈ [N ]. Define a measure λin as
λin(dui, dyi, dx) := piin(dui|yi)P
{
dx, dyi
}
, for n ∈ N, i ∈ [N ].
Step 2: (Extracting convergent subsequence) Recall that every sequence of tight measures has a conver-
gent subsequence by Prohorov’s theorem [133]. Thus, {λ1n}n∈N must have a convergent subsequence, say
{λ1nk}k∈N. Similarly, {λ2nk}k∈N must have a convergent subsequence. Since there is only a finite number (N)
of agents, we continue this process of extracting convergent subsequences of every sequence of measures to
get a convergent subsequence of a set of measures {λ1nl , . . . , λNnl}l∈N such that
λinl
w∗
⇀ λi0, as l→∞ for all i ∈ [N ],
for some set of measures {λ10, . . . , λN0 }. Recall the result of Lemma 7.5, which implies that λi0(dui, dyi, dx) =
λi0(dui|yi)P
{
dx, dyi
}
. Define pii0(dui|yi) := λi0(dui|yi) for all i ∈ [N ] and pi1:N0 := {pi10 , . . . , piN0 }.
Step 3: (Limit achieves infimum) The result of Theorem 7.6 implies that
lim
l→∞
J(pi1:Nnl ) = J(pi
1:N
0 ) = inf
pi1:N∈R1:N
J(pi1:N ).
Step 4: (Applying a result on irrelevant information due to Blackwell) [134, 135] Now, using Blackwell’s
irrelevant information theorem (see e.g. [4, p. 457]), we conclude that for fixed optimal behavioral strate-
gies of all agents other than i, there exists a deterministic strategy of Agent i that achieves the same value
of expected cost as the optimal behavioral strategy of Agent i. Thus, all agents’ strategies can be restricted,
without any loss of generality, to deterministic ones. This implies that the static team admits an optimal
solution in the class of deterministic strategies of the agents. This completes the proof of the theorem.
Remark 7.4. It must be noted that for the existence result proven above, we do not require the state space
X and observation spaces Yi, i ∈ [N ] to be compact. 
We have an immediate corollary.
Corollary 7.8. Assume that every Agent i ∈ [N ] observes Yi, which is independent of the observations of all
other agents. If the cost function is continuous in its arguments (observations and actions of the agents) and
bounded, and action spaces of the agents are compact, then the static team with independent observations admits
an optimal solution in deterministic strategies.
7.2.3 Static Team ST1 with Degraded Information
In Assumption 7.2, we assumed conditional independence of observations given the state, which we relax in
this subsection. For simplicity, we consider a two-agent static team problem, where the observation of Agent
2 is a noise corrupted version of the observation of Agent 1. We further invoke the following assumption.
The main results of Lemma 7.9 and Theorem 7.10 below, and the main idea of the proof can be extended to
multi-agent static team scenarios.
Assumption 7.4. Consider Team ST1 in which Agent 2 observes a degraded version of Agent 1’s observation.
The spaces X , Yi and U i are σ-compact Polish spaces for all i ∈ {1, 2}. There exist continuous functions ηi
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and ρi, i ∈ {1, 2} such that
P
{
dy2, dy1|x} = P{dy2|y1}P{dy1|x} ,
P
{
dy2|y1} = η2(y1,y2)νY2(dy2),
P
{
dy1|x,y2} = η1(x,y2,y1)νY1(dy1),
where νYi is a non-negative measure on Yi for i ∈ {1, 2}. The tuples (ηi, νYi), i ∈ {1, 2} satisfy Condition
C1. 
We now use the auxiliary results in the previous subsection to prove the following important lemma.
Lemma 7.9. Consider Team ST1 satisfying Assumption 7.4, where U i, i ∈ {1, 2} need not be compact sets.
Let X , Yi, U i, i ∈ {1, 2} be σ-compact Polish spaces. Let g ∈ Ub(X × Y1:2 × U1:2). For every i ∈ {1, 2}, let
{λ1n}n∈N ⊂ ℘(U i×Y1×X ) and {λ2n}n∈N ⊂ ℘(U i×Y1×Y2×X ) be convergent sequences of measures such that
λ1n(du1, dy1, dx) = λ1n(du1|y1)P
{
dx, dy1
}
and λ2n(du2, dy1:2, dx) = λ2n(du2|y2)P
{
dx, dy1:2
}
, converging to
some λ10 ∈ ℘(U1 × Y1 ×X ) and λ20 ∈ ℘(U2 × Y1 × Y2 ×X ), respectively. Then,
lim
n→∞
∫
g(x,y1:2,u1:2)
( 2∏
i=1
λin(dui|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:2
}
=
∫
g(x,y1:2,u1:2)
( 2∏
i=1
λi0(dui|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:2
}
.
Consequently, we have( 2∏
i=1
λin(dui|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:2
} w∗
⇀
( 2∏
i=1
λi0(dui|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:2
}
as n→∞.
Proof: See Subsection 7.6.5.
We can now show the existence of optimal strategies for a static team ST1 satisfying Parts 1 and 2 of
Assumption 7.3, and Assumption 7.4.
Theorem 7.10. Any two-agent static team ST1 satisfying Parts 1 and 2 of Assumption 7.3, and Assumption 7.4
admits a team-optimal solution, which is in the class of deterministic strategies of the agents.
Proof: The proof follows by mimicking the steps of the proof of Theorem 7.7 and using Lemma 7.9.
In the above theorem, we showed that an assumption of conditional independence of observations given
the state is not needed for the existence of optimal strategies in team problems; we considered a case where
the observation of one agent is a degraded version of the observation of another agent and showed that
optimal strategies exist under certain assumptions.
We note that our setting does not cover teams with observation sharing information structures, because
the technique we employed for proving Theorem 7.7 does not readily carry over to such teams. In particular,
if the agents share their observations in a certain manner, then we cannot show the equicontinuity result of
Lemma 7.3, which is used to prove Theorem 7.6. Recall that Theorem 7.6 is crucial for the proof of Theorem
7.7. See Section 9.3 for a detailed discussion and a counterexample. However, for a class of problems with
observation sharing information pattern, it is possible to use other techniques, such as dynamic programming
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or viewing the decision makers with common information as a single decision maker. We leave a systematic
analysis of this setup to future work.
This concludes the discussion in this section. In the next section, we extend the ideas developed in this
section to obtain sufficient conditions on a team problem with non-compact action spaces and unbounded
continuous cost function, for existence of a team-optimal solution.
7.3 Existence of Optimal Solution in ST2
In this section, we consider the static team problem in which the cost function is non-negative, continuous,
but may be unbounded, and the action sets may be non-compact. We build on the results proved in the
previous section to show the existence of optimal strategies of agents in such a team problem.
In the next subsection, we use the result from Theorem 7.6 to investigate the properties of the expected
cost functional, as a function of the behavioral strategies of the agents, of the team problem with unbounded
cost and non-compact action spaces.
7.3.1 Properties of the Expected Cost Functional
Our first result uses Theorem 7.6 to prove an important property of expected cost functional of team ST2.
Theorem 7.11. Recall that c : X × Y1:N × U1:N → R+ is a non-negative continuous function. Under the same
assumptions and notations as in Theorem 7.6, we get
lim inf
n→∞
∫
X×Y1:N×U1:N
c(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
N∏
i=1
λin(dui|yi)P
{
dx, dy1:N
}
≥
∫
X×Y1:N×U1:N
c(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
N∏
i=1
λi0(dui|yi)P
{
dx, dy1:N
}
.
Proof: See Subsection 7.6.6.
The theorem above says that the expected cost functional of the team is lower-semicontinuous on the
space of joint measures over the product of state, observation and action spaces of the agents. Since the
action sets are non-compact, the set of joint measures over observation and action spaces of each agent is
non-compact, and we cannot readily use Weierstrass theorem like results to prove the existence of an optimal
solution.
We address this issue in the next subsection. In particular, if the cost function has some stronger (coer-
civity like) property, then using Assumption 7.1 and Markov’s inequality, we can restrict the search of optimal
strategies of the agents to compact sets of joint measures over observation and action spaces of the agents.
7.3.2 Compactness of a Set of Probability Measures
In this subsection, we identify a sufficient condition for a set of measures to be precompact in the weak*
topology. We use this result later to show that the search for optimal behavioral strategies of the agents in
the team problem can be restricted to a weak* precompact space.
Hereafter, we will use A, B and C to denote arbitrary Polish spaces. The following theorem gives a
necessary and sufficient condition for a subset of probability measures on a Polish space A to be weak*
precompact.
106
7.3 Existence of Optimal Solution in ST2
Theorem 7.12 (Prohorov’s Theorem). [6, Theorem 8.6.2, p. 202] A set M ⊂ ℘(A) is weak* precompact if
and only if it is tight, that is, for every  > 0, there exists a compact set K ⊂ A such that µ(A \K) <  for all
µ ∈M.
We now define a class of functions and study an important result involving functions in this class.
Definition 7.6 (Class IC (A,B)). We say that a non-negative measurable function φ : A × B × C → R is in
the class IC (A,B) if φ satisfies any one of the following two conditions:
1. For every M > 0 and for every compact set K ⊂ A, there exists a compact set L ⊂ B such that
inf
K×L{×C
φ(a,b, c) ≥M.
2. For every M > 0 and every point a ∈ A, there exists an open neighborhood O ⊂ A of the point a ∈ A
and a compact set L ⊂ B such that
inf
O×L{×C
φ(a,b, c) ≥M.
We can have C = ∅. 
A large class of team problems have cost functions that belong to the class of functions defined above,
where A is the space of primitive random variables and B is an action space of some agent. This class
of functions is therefore an important one, and we will exploit this property of cost function to show the
existence of an optimal solution in a team. We first identify a few examples of functions in the class IC (A,B).
Example 7.2. Let A = B = C = Rn, and define φ1(a,b, c) := ‖b−a‖+‖c‖ and φ2(a,b, c) := ‖b−a‖2. Then,
φ1 and φ2 are in the class IC (A,B). Any non-negative continuous and increasing function on R composed
with φ1 or φ2 is also in the class IC (A,B). For example, exp(φ1(a,b, c)) and exp(φ2(a,b, c)) are in the class
IC (A,B). 
Our next result gives a sufficient condition for a set of measures to be tight, which uses the class of
functions introduced in Definition 7.6.
Lemma 7.13 (Tightness of a set of Measures). Let φ : A×B × C → R be a non-negative measurable function
in the class IC (A,B). Fix k to be a non-negative real number and let N ⊂ ℘(A) be a weak* compact set of
measures. DefineM⊂ ℘(A× B × C) as follows:
M =
{
µ ∈ ℘(A× B × C) : PrA#µ ∈ N and
∫
φ dµ ≤ k
}
.
Then, PrA×B# M is a tight set of measures. Furthermore, if φ is lower semicontinuous, then PrA×B# M is weak*
compact.
Proof: See Subsection 7.6.7.
Now that we have a sufficient condition on when a set of measures is tight, we can look at the original
static team problem in the next subsection.
107
Chapter 7. Static Teams
7.3.3 Existence of Optimal Strategies
We need the following assumption on the cost function of the team.
Assumption 7.5. The cost function c : X ×Y1:N ×U1:N → R+ is a non-negative continuous function in the
class IC
(X × Y1:N ,U i) for every i ∈ [N ]. 
It should be noted that the conditions in Assumption 7.5 are not dependent on the control strategies
that the agents choose. The following lemma identifies a set of tight measures using Lemma 7.13, with the
property that any expected cost below a certain threshold is either achieved by measures in that set or cannot
be achieved.
Lemma 7.14. Assume that Team ST2 satisfies Assumptions 7.1 and 7.2. Let p˜i1:N ∈ R1:N be the set of behav-
ioral strategies of the agents which results in finite expected cost to the team. Consider sets Pi ⊂ Ri, i ∈ [N ]
such that there exists a set of behavioral strategies pi1:N ∈ P1:N satisfying J(pi1:N ) ≤ J(p˜i1:N ). Define
Mi :=
⋃
pii∈Pi
{
λi ∈ ℘(X × Yi × U i) : λi(dui, dyi, dx) = pii(dui|yi)P{dyi, dx}}, i ∈ [N ]
If the cost function of the team satisfies Assumption 7.5, thenMi ⊂ ℘(X × Yi × U i) is a tight set of measures
for all i ∈ [N ].
Proof: The statement of the lemma readily follows from Lemma 7.13. Define M := {µ ∈ ℘(X ×
Y1:N × U1:N ) : ∫ c dµ ≤ J(p˜i1:N )}. For every i ∈ [N ], notice that any λi ∈ Mi satisfies λi = PrX×Yi×Ui# µ for
some µ ∈M. Since c is in the class IC (X × Y1:N ,U i), by Lemma 7.13,Mi is tight.
Thus, we have identified pre-compact sets of joint measuresMi, i ∈ [N ] which include the optimal joint
measures, if they exist. This brings us to the following main result of the section.
Theorem 7.15. Assume that the cost function of Team ST2 satisfies Assumption 7.5. If Assumptions 7.1 and
7.2 hold, then Team ST2 admits an optimal solution in deterministic strategies.
Proof: Let p˜i1:N ∈ R1:N be the set of behavioral strategies of the agents which results in finite expected
cost to the team. From Lemma 7.14, we know that there exist tight sets of measuresMi ⊂ ℘(X×Yi×U i), i ∈
[N ] that contain the optimal joint measures, if they exist. Consider a sequence of behavioral strategies
{pi1:Nn }n∈N ⊂ R1:N that satisfies
J(pi1:Nn ) ≤ J(p˜i1:N ), and lim
n→∞ J(pi
1:N
n ) = inf
pi1:N∈R1:N
J(pi1:N ).
Define λin(dui, dyi, dx) := piin(dui|yi)P
{
dyi, dx
}
for i ∈ [N ] and n ∈ N, and notice that {λin}n∈N ⊂ Mi.
Since {λin}n∈N is a tight sequence of measures, we know that there exists a weak* convergent subsequence
of measures. For every i ∈ [N ], let {λink}k∈N be the weak* convergent subsequence of measures converging
to λi0. From Lemma 7.5, we know that
λi0(dui, dyi, dx) = λi0(dui|yi)P
{
dyi, dx
}
for all i ∈ [N ], which means that the conditional independence property is retained in the limit. Let pii0 ∈ Ri
be such that pii0(dui|yi) = λi0(dui|yi). From the result of Theorem 7.11, we conclude that lim inf
k→∞
J(pi1:Nnk ) ≥
J(pi1:N0 ). Thus, optimal behavioral strategies of the agents exist, and the optimal behavioral strategy of Agent
i is the conditional measure λi0(dui|yi).
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Moreover, applying Blackwell’s irrelevant information theorem [4, p. 457], there exists a set of deter-
ministic strategies which achieve the same cost as the one achieved using optimal behavioral strategies of
the agents. This completes the proof of the theorem.
Corollary 7.16. Consider a two-agent static team ST2. Assume that the cost function of Team ST2 satisfies
Assumption 7.5. If Assumptions 7.1 and 7.4 hold, then Team ST2 admits an optimal solution in deterministic
strategies.
Proof: The proof follows from arguments similar to those used in the proof of Theorems 7.10 and
7.15.
Corollary 7.17. Assume that the cost function of Team ST2 is continuous in its arguments and the action spaces
of the agents are compact subsets of Polish spaces. Furthermore, assume that Team ST2 satisfies Assumption 7.1.
If either Assumption 7.2 or Assumption 7.4 holds for Team ST2, then the team admits an optimal solution in
deterministic strategies.
Proof: If the action spaces of the agents are compact, then the Assumption 7.5 on the cost function
holds automatically. Then, we apply the result of Theorem 7.15 to establish the statement.
7.4 Relaxing the Assumption of Spaces being σ-Compact Polish
Spaces
Throughout this chapter, we established the existence result under the assumption that the state, action and
observation spaces are σ-compact Polish spaces. This assumption was an essential ingredient for proving
Theorem 7.6, where we used Arezela-Ascoli type arguments in a specific fashion that required the spaces
to be a countable union of compact sets. However, if the agents in the team do not observe any random
variable (in other words, their observation spaces are null sets), then we can drop this assumption, as the
counterpart of Theorem 7.6 is not required for proving the existence result in this setting. Thus, we have the
following result.
Theorem 7.18. Consider Team ST2 in which the agents do not observe any random variable. Assume that
X and U i, i ∈ [N ] are Polish spaces. If the team satisfies Assumptions 7.1 and 7.5, then the team admits an
optimal solution in deterministic strategies of the agents.
Remark 7.5. Note that in the setting considered in Theorem 7.18 above, a deterministic strategy of an agent
is just an action of that agent because there is no observation. 
This theorem can be used in certain settings as follows. Recall that any team with asymmetric informa-
tion can be lifted to one over strategy spaces (call this a virtual team problem). Now, if the strategy spaces
of the agents in the original team problem are Polish spaces, then the action spaces of the virtual agents in
the corresponding virtual team problem are also Polish. The above theorem then gives a tool to establish the
existence of a team-optimal solution to the original team problem by invoking the equivalence of original
team and virtual team problems. We use this idea and the above theorem in Chapter 9 later to conclude the
existence of optimal solutions in a class of teams with observation sharing information structures.
Another team problem where we do not need to place the assumption of σ-compactness is when there
is only one decision maker in the team, that is, it is a one-person optimization problem with information
constraints.
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Theorem 7.19. Consider a single-agent optimization problem in which X denotes the state of the system, Y
and U denote, respectively, the observation and the action of the agent. If the cost function c : X × Y × U →
R+ is a non-negative continuous function and in the class IC (X × Y,U) and Assumption 7.1 holds, then this
optimization problem admits an optimal solution.
Remark 7.6. Note that in both settings considered in this subsection, we do not place any assumption on the
distributions of the primitive random variables. 
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we identified sufficient conditions under which a static team with no-observation sharing
information structure admits a team-optimal solution. Several challenges were overcome to establish the
existence result. In particular, we identified a sufficient condition under which a convergent sequence of
measures over state, observation and action spaces of all agents satisfies informational constraints in the
limit. We showed that if the cost function has certain properties, then we can restrict the search for optimal
strategies of the controllers to a compact set. This allowed us to use Weierstrass Theorem to conclude the
existence of optimal strategies.
In the next chapter, our focus is on dynamic teams with no-observation sharing information structures.
We use some of the techniques developed in this chapter to establish the existence of team-optimal solutions
for a class of such teams.
7.6 Proofs
7.6.1 Proof of Lemma 7.1
Since g is uniformly continuous, we can assume that for every  > 0, there exists a δ > 0 such that for all
a0 ∈ A, c0 ∈ C and a ∈ A, c ∈ C satisfying dA(a,a0) < δ, dC(c, c0) < δ, we have
sup
b∈B
|g(a,b, c)− g(a0,b, c0)| < 2.
Let M := supa∈A
∫
h(η,ν)dν <∞. Consider any probability measure µ ∈ ℘(Y × B). Then, we get
|fµ(a, c)− fµ(a0, c0)|
=
∣∣∣∣∫Y×B g(a,b, c)µ(db|y)η(a,y)ν(dy)−
∫
Y×B
g(a0,b, c0)µ(db|y)η(a0,y)ν(dy)
∣∣∣∣ ,
≤
∫
Y×B
∣∣∣g(a,b, c)η(a,y)− g(a0,b, c0)η(a0,y)∣∣∣µ(db|y)ν(dy),
≤ ‖g‖∞M+
∫
Y×B
∣∣∣g(a,b, c)− g(a0,b, c0)∣∣∣µ(db|y)η(a0,y)ν(dy),
< (‖g‖∞M + 2).
Also notice that {fµ(·, ·)}µ∈℘(Y×B) is bounded by ‖g‖∞. This completes the proof of the lemma.
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7.6.2 Proof of Lemma 7.3
We mimic the steps of the proof of Lemma 7.1 to prove this statement. Note that {fµ1:N (·, ·)}µi∈℘(Yi×Bi) is
uniformly bounded by ‖g‖∞. Now, we prove that this family of functions is equicontinuous.
Let us define η, M and ν as
η(a,y1:N ) :=
N∏
i=1
ηi(a,yi), M = max
i∈[N ]
sup
a∈A
∫
Yi
hidνi, ν(dy1:N ) =
N∏
i=1
νi(dyi).
First, note that for any a ∈ A and i ∈ [N ],∫
Yi
ηi(a,yi)νi(dyi) =
∫
Yi
P
{
dyi|a} = 1. (7.1)
Let  > 0. Let δi > 0 be such that for any dA(a,a0) < δi, we have
|ηi(a,yi)− ηi(a0,yi)| <  hi(a0,yi).
Pick δ = mini∈[N ] δi. Fix a0 ∈ A. Now, for a ∈ A such that dA(a,a0) < δ, notice the following:
∣∣η(a,y1:N )− η(a0,y1:N )∣∣ ≤ N∑
j=1
j−1∏
i=1
ηi(a0,yi)
∣∣∣ (ηj(a,yj)− ηj(a0,yj)) ∣∣∣ N∏
i=j+1
ηi(a,yi)

≤ 
 N∑
j=1
j−1∏
i=1
ηi(a0,yi)
N∏
i=j+1
ηi(a,yi)
hj(a0,yj)
 ,
where terms with
∏0
i=1 and
∏N
i=N+1 are replaced by 1. Using the above expression, we get∣∣∣∣∣
∫
B1:N×Y1:N
g(a,b1:N , c)
(
N∏
i=1
µi(dbi|yi)
)(
η(a,y1:N )− η(a0,y1:N )
)
ν(dy1:N )
∣∣∣∣∣
< ‖g‖∞
N∑
j=1
∫
Y1:N
j−1∏
i=1
(ηi(a0,yi)dνi)
N∏
i=j+1
(ηi(a,yi)dνi)
hj(a0,yj)dνj
≤ ‖g‖∞NM, (7.2)
where we used (7.1). Since g is uniformly continuous, for every  > 0, there exists a δ > 0 such that for all
a0 ∈ A, c0 ∈ C and a ∈ A, c ∈ C satisfying dA(a,a0) < δ, dC(c, c0) < δ, we have
sup
b1:N∈B1:N
|g(a,b1:N , c)− g(a0,b1:N , c0)| < 2.
Using the inequality above and (7.2), one can show that
|fµ1:N (a, c)− fµ1:N (a0, c0)| < (‖g‖∞NM + 2),
which establishes the result.
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7.6.3 Proof of Lemma 7.4
In order to prove the lemma, we first need the following result.
Lemma 7.20. Let A be a Polish space. Let {hn : A → R}n∈N be a convergent sequence of continuous and
uniformly bounded functions and h0 : A → R be a continuous function such that for any compact subset A ⊂ A,
supa∈A |hn(a)− h0(a)| → 0 as n→∞. Let {µn}n∈N∪{0} ⊂ ℘(A) be a weak* convergent sequence of measures
such that µn
w∗
⇀ µ0 as n→∞. Then,
lim
n→∞
∫
A
hndµn =
∫
A
h0dµ0, and lim
n→∞
∣∣∣∣∫A hndµn −
∫
A
hndµ0
∣∣∣∣ = 0.
Proof: Since {µn}n∈N is a weak* convergent sequence, it is tight, which further implies that for any
 > 0, there exists a compact set A ⊂ A such that µn(A{ ) <  for every n ∈ N ∪ {0}. Fix  > 0. Since hn
converges uniformly to h0 over the compact set A, there exists N,1 ∈ N such that
|hn(a)− h0(a)| < , for all a ∈ A and n ≥ N,1.
Let M be the uniform bound on the sequence of functions {hn}n∈N. Then, ‖h0‖∞ ≤ M . Thus, for any
n ≥ N,1, we get∣∣∣∣∫A hndµn −
∫
A
h0dµn
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∫
A
|hn(a)− h0(a)|dµn(a) +
∫
A{
|hn(a)− h0(a)|dµn(a) < (1 + 2M). (7.3)
By the definition of weak* convergence of measures, there exists N,2 ∈ N such that∣∣∣∣∫A h0dµn −
∫
A
h0dµ0
∣∣∣∣ <  for all n ≥ N,2.
Take N = max{N,1, N,2}. Now, for n > N, we have∣∣∣∣∫A hndµn −
∫
A
h0dµ0
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣∫A hndµn −
∫
A
h0dµn
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣∫A h0dµn −
∫
A
h0dµ0
∣∣∣∣ < 2(1 +M). (7.4)
Now, consider the following inequalities for n ≥ N:∣∣∣∣∫A hndµn −
∫
A
hndµ0
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣∫A hndµn −
∫
A
h0dµ0
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣∫A h0dµ0 −
∫
A
hndµ0
∣∣∣∣
< 2(1 +M)+ (1 + 2M) = (3 + 4M),
where the first inequality is just the triangle inequality on the real line, whereas the second inequality follows
from (7.3) and (7.4). This completes the proof of the lemma.
Now, we turn our attention to the proof of Lemma 7.4, which is done in two steps:
Step 1: By Lemma 7.3, we know that {fn} is a sequence of uniformly equicontinuous and uniformly
bounded functions. In this step, we show that there exists a subsequence {fnk}k∈N and f0 ∈ Cb(A×C) such
that fnk converges to f0 uniformly over any compact set in A× C.
Since A × C is σ-compact, there exists a countable collection of compact sets Kn ⊂ A × C such
that A × C = ∪n∈NKn. Let Lm = ∪mk=1Kk. By the Arzela-Ascoli Theorem [131], for every m ∈ N,
there exists a convergent subsequence {fnm
k
}k∈N and a continuous function fm0 : Lm → R such that
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sup(a,c)∈Lm |fnmk (a, c)− fm0 (a, c)| → 0 as k →∞. We can take {nm+1k }k∈N to be a subsequence of {nmk }k∈N
for every m ∈ N. Now, since Lm ⊂ Lm+1, we conclude that fm0 agrees with fm+10 on set Lm for every m ∈ N.
Using Cantor’s diagonalization argument, we get a subsequence {fnk}k∈N and a continuous function f0 such
that fnk → f0, where the convergence is uniform over any compact set in A × C. Furthermore, since fn is
uniformly bounded, f0 is also bounded.
Step 2: Using the result of Lemma 7.20, we get
lim
k→∞
∣∣∣∣∫A×C fnkdζnk −
∫
A×C
fnkdζ0
∣∣∣∣ = 0.
This establishes the statement of Lemma 7.4.
7.6.4 Proof of Theorem 7.6
Let us define a functional J˜ as:
J˜(λ1:N ) :=
∫
g(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
(
N∏
i=1
λi(dui|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:N
}
,
where λi ∈ ℘(U i × Yi × X ). We proceed with the proof in two steps. In the first step, we show that there
exists a subsequence {nk}k∈N such that limk→∞ J˜(λ1:Nnk ) = J˜(λ1:N0 ). Then, we show that limn→∞ J˜(λ1:Nn ) =
J˜(λ1:N0 ) using the first step.
Step 1: Consider the expressions,
∣∣∣∣ ∫ g(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
(
N∏
i=1
λin(dui|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:N
}
−
∫
g(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
(
N∏
i=1
λi0(dui|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:N
} ∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ N∑
j=1
∫
g(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
(
j−1∏
i=1
λi0(dui|yi)
) N∏
i=j+1
λin(dui|yi)

(
λjn(duj |yj)− λj0(duj |yj)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:N
} ∣∣∣∣
≤
N∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣ ∫ g(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
(
j−1∏
i=1
λi0(dui|yi)ηi(x,yi)νYi(dyi)
)
 N∏
i=j+1
λin(dui|yi)ηi(x,yi)νYi(dyi)
(λjn(duj , dyj , dx)− λj0(duj , dyj , dx))∣∣∣∣, (7.5)
where the integration is taken over the space X ×Y1:N ×U1:N . Replace the product terms∏0i=1 and∏Ni=N+1
by 1 in those expressions. In the statements of Lemma 7.1 and its corollary and Lemma 7.3, take B = U i×Yi
for an appropriate index i, replace A by X and C by appropriate product spaces.
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Applying Corollary 7.2, we conclude that the function
∫
U1:j−1×Y1:j−1
g(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
(
j−1∏
i=1
λi0(dui|yi)ηi(x,yi)νYi(dyi)
)
is uniformly continuous in x, yj:N and uj:N . Next, we use Lemma 7.3 to conclude that the sequence of
functions{∫
U−j×Y−j
g(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
j−1∏
i=1
λi0(dui|yi)ηi(x,yi)νYi(dyi)
 N∏
i=j+1
λin(dui|yi)ηi(x,yi)νYi(dyi)
}
n∈N
is uniformly equicontinuous and bounded on X ×Yj×Uj for every j ∈ [N ]. Then, there exists a subsequence
{nl}l∈N by Lemma 7.4 for j = 1 such that as l→∞,∣∣∣∣ ∫
(
g(x,y1:N ,u1:N )
(
N∏
i=2
λinl(du
i|yi)ηi(x,yi)νYi(dyi)
))(
λ1nl(du
1, dy1, dx)− λ10(du1, dyi, dx)
) ∣∣∣∣→ 0.
Along the sequence {nl}l∈N, there exists a further subsequence {nlm}m∈N for j = 2 such that second term
in the summation in (7.5) goes to zero as k → ∞. Continue this process for j = 3, . . . , N to arrive at a
subsequence {nk}k∈N such that each component of the sum in (7.5) converges to 0 as k →∞. Thus, we get
lim
k→∞
J˜(λ1:Nnk ) = J˜(λ
1:N
0 ).
Step 2: We now claim that limn→∞ J˜(λ1:Nn ) = J˜(λ1:N0 ), which we prove by contradiction. Suppose
that limn→∞ J˜(λ1:Nn ) does not exist or is not equal to J˜(λ1:N0 ). In this case, there exists an 0 > 0 and a
subsequence {nm}m∈N such that
|J˜(λ1:Nnm )− J˜(λ1:N0 )| > 0 for all m ∈ N.
From Step 1 of the proof, we know that there exists a further subsequence {nmk}k∈N such that
lim
k→∞
J˜(λ1:Nnmk ) = J˜(λ
1:N
0 ),
which is a contradiction. Thus, limn→∞ J˜(λ1:Nn ) = J˜(λ1:N0 ), which completes the proof of the first part of the
theorem.
Since the first part of the lemma holds for all uniformly continuous functions, we arrive at the second
result by [7, Theorem 9.1.5, p. 372].
7.6.5 Proof of Lemma 7.9
First, note that the information constraints of the limits λ10 and λ
2
0 are satisfied due to Assumption 7.4 and
Lemma 7.5. To establish the result, we follow the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 7.6 in Subsection
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7.6.4 above with some minor modifications. Consider the following expressions:
∣∣∣∣ ∫ g(x,y1:2,u1:2)
( 2∏
i=1
λin(dui|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:2
}− ∫ g(x,y1:2,u1:2)( 2∏
i=1
λi0(dui|yi)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:2
} ∣∣∣∣(7.6)
≤
∣∣∣∣ ∫ g(x,y1:2,u1:2)λ2n(du2|y2) (λ1n(du1|y1)− λ10(du1|y1))P{dx, dy1:2} ∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣ ∫ g(x,y1:2,u1:2)λ10(du1|y1) (λ2n(du2|y2)− λ20(du2|y2))P{dx, dy1:2} ∣∣∣∣,(7.7)
where the integration is taken over the space X × Y1:2 × U1:2. Let us rewrite the first summand in the
equation above as∫
g(x,y1:2,u1:2)λ2n(du2|y2)
(
λ1n(du1|y1)− λ10(du1|y1)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:2
}
=
∫
X×Y1×U1
(∫
Y2×U2
g(x,y1:2,u1:2)λ2n(du2|y2)P
{
dy2|y1})(λ1n(du1|y1)− λ10(du1|y1))P{dx, dy1} .
In the expression above, we substitute P
{
dy2|y1} = η2(y1,y2)νY2(dy2), and then use Lemma 7.1 to con-
clude that the sequence of functions{∫
U2×Y2
g(x,y1:2,u1:2)λ2n(du2|y2)η2(y1,y2)νY2(dy2)
}
n∈N
is uniformly equicontinuous and bounded on X × Y1 × U1. Then, there exists a subsequence {nl}l∈N by
Lemma 7.4 such that as l→∞,∣∣∣∣ ∫ g(x,y1:2,u1:2)λ2nl(du2|y2) (λ1nl(du1|y1)− λ10(du1|y1))P{dx, dy1:2} ∣∣∣∣→ 0.
Consider now the second summand in (7.7), and rewrite it as∫
g(x,y1:2,u1:2)λ10(du1|y1)
(
λ2n(du2|y2)− λ20(du2|y2)
)
P
{
dx, dy1:2
}
=
∫
X×Y2×U2
(∫
Y1×U1
g(x,y1:2,u1:2)λ10(du1|y1)P
{
dy1|x,y2})(λ2n(du2|y2)− λ20(du2|y2))P{dx, dy2} .
We apply Corollary 7.2 to conclude that the function∫
U1×Y1
g(x,y1:2,u1:2)λ10(du1|y1)η1(x,y2,y1)νY1(dy1)
is uniformly continuous in x, y2 and u2. Thus, as l→∞, we get∣∣∣∣ ∫ g(x,y1:2,u1:2)λ10(du1|y1) (λ2nl(du2|y2)− λ20(du2|y2))P{dx, dy1:2} ∣∣∣∣→ 0.
This implies that along the subsequence {nl}l∈N, (7.6) converges to 0 as l → ∞. We can now mimic Step 2
of the proof of Theorem 7.6 in Subsection 7.6.4 to complete the proof of the lemma.
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7.6.6 Proof of Theorem 7.11
By Theorem 7.6, for any m ∈ N,
lim
n→∞
∫
(min{c,m})
N∏
i=1
λin(dui|yi)P
{
dx, dy1:N
}
=
∫
(min{c,m})
N∏
i=1
λi0(dui|yi)P
{
dx, dy1:N
}
.
Notice that min{c,m} ↗ c as m→∞. We get
lim inf
n→∞
∫
c
N∏
i=1
λin(dui|yi)P
{
dx, dy1:N
} ≥ lim inf
k→∞
∫
min{c,m}
N∏
i=1
λin(dui|yi)P
{
dx, dy1:N
}
=
∫
(min{c,m})
N∏
i=1
λi0(dui|yi)P
{
dx, dy1:N
}
.
The left-side of the equation is independent of m and the right-side of the equation holds for any m ∈ N.
Taking the limit as m→∞ and using the monotone convergence theorem, we get
lim inf
n→∞
∫
c
N∏
i=1
λin(dui|yi)P
{
dx, dy1:N
} ≥ ∫ c N∏
i=1
λi0(dui|yi)P
{
dx, dy1:N
}
.
This establishes the theorem.
7.6.7 Proof of Lemma 7.13
First, we recall a general version of Markov’s inequality.
Lemma 7.21 (Generalized Markov’s Inequality). Let φ : A → R be a non-negative measurable function and
A ⊂ A be a Borel measurable set such that infa∈A φ(a) > 0. Then,
P {A} ≤ E [φ1A]infa∈A φ(a) .
Proof: Note that (infa∈A φ(a))1A(a) ≤ φ(a)1A(a) for all a ∈ A. Taking expectations on both sides
leads us to the result.
We want to show that the set of measures inM is tight. Toward this end, we fix  > 0, and show that
there exist compact sets K ⊂ A and L ⊂ B such that PrA×B# µ(K × L) = µ(K × L × C) > 1− 2 for all
µ ∈M. This proves that the set of measuresM is tight.
Since the set of measures N is tight, there exists a compact set K ⊂ A such that ζ(K{ ) <  for all
ζ ∈ N . Pick M ∈ R+ sufficiently large such that M > k/. We carry out the analysis for the two cases
separately.
1. Assume that φ satisfies the first condition in Definition 7.6. Given M andK, let L ⊂ B be the compact
set such that
inf
(a,b,c)∈(K×L{×C)
φ(a,b, c) ≥M.
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Now note that µ(K{ × B × C) <  for all Borel sets B ⊂ B. Let E = (K × L){ × C and note that
E = (K × L{ × C)
⋃
(K{ × B × C).
Define E1 = K × L{ × C and E2 = (K{ × B × C). It is easy to verify that E1
⋂
E2 = ∅. We now use
generalized Markov’s inequality (Lemma 7.21) to get
µ(K × L{ × C) = µ(E1) ≤
E [φ1E1 ]
infx∈E1 φ(x)
≤ k
M
< 
for all µ ∈ M, where 1E1 is the indicator function over the set E1. By the additivity property of
probability measures, we get µ(E) = µ(E1) + µ(E2) < 2.
2. Now suppose that φ satisfies the second assumption. For every a ∈ K, let Oa ⊂ A be the open
neighborhood of a ∈ K and La ⊂ B be the compact set in B such that
inf
(a,b,c)∈(Oa×L{a×C)
φ(a,b, c) ≥M.
Notice that {Oa}a∈K is an open cover for K. By the definition of compactness, there exists a finite
subcover, say {Oaj}nj=1, such that K ⊂ O :=
⋃n
j=1 Oaj . Define L :=
⋃n
j=1 Laj ⊂ B, which is a
compact set in B. Since Laj ⊂ L, we get Oaj × L{ ⊂ Oaj × L{aj and as a result of this inclusion, we
conclude
inf
(a,b,c)∈(Oaj×L{×C)
φ(a,b, c) ≥ inf
(a,b,c)∈(Oaj×L{aj×C)
φ(a,b, c) ≥M,
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Notice that⋃nj=1(Oaj ×L{ ) = O×L{ . Since over each set Oaj ×L{ , the infimum
of φ is greater than or equal to M , we conclude that
inf
(a,b,c)∈(O×L{×C)
φ(a,b, c) ≥M.
Now again define E := (K×L){×C, E1 := O×L{×C, E2 := (K{×B×C), and note that E ( E1
⋃
E2.
By a similar argument as in Part 1 of this proof, we conclude that µ(E1) <  and µ(E2) < , which means
µ(E) < 2.
Note that K ×L is a compact set in A×B and its complement has small measure. Thus, we conclude that
the set of probability measures PrA×B# M is tight.
If φ is lower semi-continuous, then µ 7→ ∫ φ dµ is a lower semi-continuous functional [117, Lemma
4.3]. Thus, we conclude thatM is in fact weak* closed, and thereforeM is weak* compact. This completes
the proof of the lemma.
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Dynamic Teams
In this chapter, our focus is on dynamic teams with asymmetric information, and in particular, those in which
agents do not share their observations. Recall that in a dynamic team, there is at least one agent whose action
at a time affects the information of some agent acting at a later time step. We assume that at each time step,
the agents do not share their observations with each other, and also do not recall their past observations. This
leads to a team with non-classical information. Under certain conditions on the observation channels and
the distributions of noise variables, we establish the existence of team-optimal strategies in such teams. We
focus here on teams in which the state, observation and actions of the agents belong to Polish spaces. Again
all the arguments here apply to simpler problems where Polish spaces are replaced with finite, countable or
finite-dimensional Euclidean spaces.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. In Section 8.1, we formulate the preciseN -agent T -step dynamic
team problem with no-observation sharing information structure. This general formulation encompasses
several well-known dynamic teams as special cases. In Section 8.2, we use the static reduction technique
of Witsenhausen [35] to reduce the original N -agent T -step dynamic problem into a NT -agent static team
problem. In Section 8.3, we prove the main existence result. Section 8.4 specializes the result of Section
8.3 for a class of dynamic LQG teams. Finally, we conclude our discussions in Section 8.5. The proof of one
result is presented at the end of the chapter.
8.1 Problem Formulation
Within a state-space model, we consider an N -agent dynamic team problem with an arbitrary information
structure. Let the state at time instant t ∈ [T ] be denoted by Xt, and the space of all possible states at
time t be denoted by Xt. The action of Agent i at time t lies in a space U it , and its action is denoted by Uit.
The agents observe the plant states and past control actions through noisy sensors (or channels), and the
observation of Agent i at time t is denoted by Yit, which lies in a space Yit . Throughout the chapter, the
spaces Xt,U it ,Yit are assumed to be complete separable metric spaces (also called Polish spaces, such as Rn
or the space of measures over Rn) at all time steps t ∈ [T ] and for all agents i ∈ [N ].
The state of the system evolves according to
Xt+1 = f˜t(X1:t,U1:N1:t ,W0t ), t ∈ [T ], (8.1)
where W0t is the actuation noise on the system. We denote the realization space of all possible actuation
noises byW0t . Agent i at time t ∈ [T ] makes an observation which depends on past states and control actions
118
8.1 Problem Formulation
according to
Yit = h˜it(X1:t,U1:N1:t−1,Wit), (8.2)
where Wit, which takes values in the spaceWit , is the observation noise of Agent i at time t. We again assume
that Wit , i ∈ {0} ∪ [N ], t ∈ [T ] are Polish spaces. We make the following assumption on the state transition
functions and the observation functions of the agents.
Assumption 8.1. The state transition functions f˜t and observation functions h˜it, i ∈ [N ], are continuous
functions of their arguments for all time steps t ∈ [T ]. 
The random variables {X1,W0:N1:T } are primitive random variables, and are assumed to be mutually
independent. We let ξX1 denote the probability measure on X1 and ξWit denote the probability measure on
Wit for i ∈ {0} ∪ [N ] and t ∈ [T ].
8.1.1 Information Structures and Strategies of the Agents
At each instant of time, we assume that the only information each agent acquires is its own observation, that
is, Iit := Yit. Each agent uses its information to determine its control action. Toward this end, we allow the
agents to act in a predetermined fashion, and when they act they either choose a deterministic strategy, or a
randomized or behavioral strategy. We define these two notions of strategies below:
Definition 8.1 (Deterministic Strategy). A deterministic strategy for an Agent i at time t is a Borel measurable
map γit : Yit → U it . Let Dit be the space of all such maps, which we call the deterministic strategy space of
Agent i ∈ [N ] at time t ∈ [T ].
Definition 8.2 (Behavioral or Randomized Strategy). A behavioral strategy of Agent i at time t is a condi-
tional measure piit satisfying the following two properties:
1. For every yit ∈ Yit , piit(·|yit) ∈ ℘(U it );
2. For every U ∈ B(U it ), yit 7→ piit(U|yit) is a B(Yit)-measurable function.
Let Rit denote the behavioral strategy space of Agent i ∈ [N ] at time t ∈ [T ]. 
Remark 8.1. For an agent at any time step, any deterministic strategy is by definition also a behavioral
strategy. For example, if γit is a deterministic strategy of Agent i at time t, then the corresponding (induced)
behavioral strategy is piit(duit|yit) = 1{γit(yit)}(duit). Thus, the set of behavioral strategies of an agent subsumes
the set of deterministic strategies of that agent. 
As a consequence of the remark above, throughout this chapter, we will work with behavioral strategies
of an agent with the understanding that this also covers deterministic strategies of that agent as well.
8.1.2 Cost Functional of the Team
The team is equipped with a cost function c˜, which is assumed to be a non-negative continuous function
of all states X1:T+1, observations Y1:N1:T and actions U1:N1:T of the agents. However, we can substitute (8.1)
recursively so that the cost function becomes purely a function of the primitive random variables {X1,W01:T },
observations Y1:N1:T and the control actions of all agents, U1:N1:T . Therefore, for a fixed realization of the
primitive random variables, observations and control actions of the agents, the cost incurred by the team can
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be written as c(x1,w01:T ,y1:N1:T ,u1:N1:T ) for some c, which is clearly related to c˜. We have the following result
on the cost function c.
Lemma 8.1. If Assumption 8.1 holds, then the cost function c is continuous.
Proof: Note that by construction, c is generated by c˜ as
c(x1,w01:T ,y1:N1:T ,u1:N1:T ) = c˜(x1, f˜1(x1,u1:N1 ,w01), · · · , f˜T (x1:T ,u1:N1:T ,w0T ),y1:N1:T ,u1:N1:T ),
where xt is substituted as a function of x1,w01:t−1 and u1:N1:t−1 using (8.1) for all t ∈ [T ]. Since c˜ and {ft}t∈[T ]
are continuous functions of their arguments, we conclude that c is a continuous function on X1 ×W01:T ×
Y1:N1:T × U1:N1:T .
In standard optimal control problems, the cost function of the team is taken to be a sum of stage-wise
cost functions, in which the cost function at every time step depends on the current state and actions of the
agents. However, we do not assume such a structure on the cost function of the team problem considered in
this chapter. This general cost function encompasses ones that appear in certain classes of communication
systems, economic systems, and feedback control over noisy channels.
Throughout this chapter, we use J : R1:N1:T → R+ to denote the cost functional of the team, which is
defined as
J(pi1:N1:T ) = E
[
c(x1,w01:T ,y1:N1:T ,u1:N1:T )
]
,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the measure induced on the random variables by the choice
of behavioral strategies pi1:N1:T . We make the following natural assumption on the team problem described
above.
Assumption 8.2. There exists a set of behavioral strategies p˜i1:N1:T ∈ R1:N1:T of the agents, which results in finite
expected cost to the team. 
8.1.3 Challenges and Proof Technique
Some of the challenges associated with dynamic teams with asymmetric information have been reviewed in
the first chapter of the dissertation. In particular, the dynamic team problem, when viewed as an optimization
problem over strategy spaces, may not be convex and/or continuous. Furthermore, we know an example of
a team, discrete Witsenhausen’s counterexample, in which an optimal solution does not exist1. Our goal in
this chapter is to identify some sufficient conditions on dynamic teams, so that we can readily conclude that
they admit optimal solutions.
The zeroth step of the proof technique is to expand the strategy space of each agent to include also
its behavioral strategies, just like it was done in the previous chapter. Thereafter, to establish the existence
result, we adopt a three-step proof technique outlined below:
Step 1: We employ Witsenhausen’s static reduction technique [35] to transform the original N -agent
T -horizon dynamic team into a NT -agent static team with independent observations.
Step 2: We use Markov’s inequality in a sequential fashion, and exploit the structure of the cost func-
tion and Assumption 8.2 to restrict the search for optimal joint measures of each agents’ action and
observation to a weak* compact set.
1Recall the discussion on discrete Witsenhausen’s counterexample from Chapter 1.
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Step 3: Using a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 7.15 in the previous chapter, we use
Blackwell’s irrelevant information theorem to conclude that there exists a set of deterministic strategies
that achieves the optimal expected cost to the team.
In the next section, we focus on Step 1, that is, we use Witsenhausen’s static reduction technique to
convert a class of dynamic team problems to static teams with independent observations. The next two steps
are tackled in the subsequent section.
8.2 Static Reduction of The Dynamic Team Problem
It was shown in [35] that a large class of N -agent T -time step dynamic stochastic control problems with
certain information structures can be equivalently written as NT -agent static optimization problems. In
order to define the equivalent static problem, we introduce the following notation:
Ω0 = X1 ×W01:T , Ωit =Wit , i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ].
We let ω0 and ωit denote generic elements of Ω0 and Ωit, respectively. Note that Ω0 and Ωit are Polish spaces,
endowed with the probability measures ξΩ0 and ξΩit , respectively, which are defined as
ξΩ0 := ξX1ξW01 . . . ξW0T , ξΩit := ξWit , i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ].
With this notation, the cost function of the team is written as c : Ω0×Y1:N1:T ×U1:N1:T → R+, and we recall that
it is continuous. Also recall that Agent i at time t observes Yit only, that is, its information set is a singleton.
Now, using the static reduction argument, we can transform the original problem to a static team prob-
lem with a different cost function. Toward this end, let us rewrite the observations of the agents as
yit = hit(ω0, ωit,u1:N1:t−1). (8.3)
Note that due to Assumption 8.1, the functions hit, i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ] are continuous maps of their arguments.
We now make the following assumption.
Assumption 8.3. For every (i, t) ∈ [N ]× [T ], there exists a probability measure νit ∈ ℘(Yit) and a continuous
function ϕit : Yit × Ω0 × U1:N1:t−1 → R+ such that
P
{
yit ∈ Y|ω0,u1:N1:t−1
}
=
∫
Y
ϕit(yit;ω0,u1:N1:t−1)νit(dyit) for all Y ∈ B(Yit).
Define ϕ : Ω0 × Y1:N1:T × U1:N1:T → R+ as
ϕ(ω0,y1:N1:T ,u1:N1:T ) :=
N∏
i=1
T∏
t=1
ϕit(yit;ω0,u1:N1:t−1).
By definition, ϕ is a continuous function of its arguments. 
In the next lemma, we state a sufficient condition on the mapping hit and the noise statistics ξΩit such
that the above assumption is satisfied.
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Lemma 8.2. Assume that all state, action, observation and noise spaces are Euclidean spaces of appropriate
dimensions. For all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ], let
hit(ω0, ωit,u1:N1:t−1) := hˇit(ω0,u1:N1:t−1) + ωit,
where hˇit is a continuous map of its arguments. If ξΩit admits a zero-mean Gaussian density function η
i
t for all
i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ], then Assumption 8.3 holds for the dynamic team problem.
Proof: Note that ηit is strictly positive at all points in its domain Ωit, and Ωit = Yit . For every i ∈ [N ]
and t ∈ [T ], define ϕit and νit as
ϕit(yit;ω0,u1:N1:t−1) :=
ηit(yit − hˇit(ω0,u1:N1:t−1))
ηit(yit)
, νit(dyit) = ηit(yit)dyit.
Since hit is continuous, hˇ
i
t is a continuous map for all i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ]. Thus, ϕit is a continuous map of its
arguments. Furthermore, ϕit is strictly positive in its domain. It is easy to see that with this definition,
P
{
yit ∈ Y|ω0,u1:N1:t−1
}
=
∫
Y
ϕit(yit;ω0,u1:N1:t−1)νit(dyit) for all Y ∈ B(Yit),
which establishes the statement.
We now define the reduced static team problem corresponding to the dynamic team described above.
Definition 8.3 (Reduced static team problem). Consider the NT -agent static team problem with the agents
indexed as (i, t). Agent (i, t) observes a random variable Yit with probability measure νit , which is indepen-
dent of observations of all other agents. Agent (i, t), based on the realization yit of its observation, chooses a
control action uit. The cost function for the team is given by
c(ω0,y1:N1:T ,u1:N1:T )ϕ(ω0,y1:N1:T ,u1:N1:T ).
We call the static team problem thus defined as reduced static team problem and refer to it as RST problem.

We now recall the following result from [35], which shows that any dynamic problem and its corre-
sponding reduced static problem are equivalent optimization problems over the same space of strategies of
the agents.
Theorem 8.3 ([35]). Let J : R1:N1:T → R+ be the expected cost functional of the dynamic team problem, and
JRST : R1:N1:T → R+ be the expected cost functional of the corresponding reduced static team problem, defined as
JRST (pi1:N1:T ) =
∫
c ϕ
N∏
i=1
T∏
t=1
piit(duit|yit)νit(dyit)P {dω0} , pi1:N1:T ∈ R1:N1:T .
Then, for any pi1:N1:T ∈ R1:N1:T , we have J(pi1:N1:T ) = JRST (pi1:N1:T ).
It should be noted that for any dynamic team problem that admits a reduced static problem, the corre-
sponding RST may not satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 7.15. Thus, the results we proved for static teams
cannot be applied to conclude the existence of a solution to a dynamic team problem. We illustrate the
difficulty in using such a approach in the following example.
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Witsenhausen’s Counterexample
Witsenhausen’s counterexample is a two-agent dynamic LQG team problem, first studied by Witsenhausen in
[30]. The first agent observes a mean-zero unit variance Gaussian random variable y1 and decides on a real
number U1. The second agent observes Y2 := U1 + W2, where W2 is a mean-zero Gaussian noise with unit
variance, and decides on another real number U2. The behavioral strategy space of Agent i is Ri, i = 1, 2.
The cost function of the team is given by
cD(y1, u2, u2) = (u1 − y1)2 + (u2 − u1)2.
It is well known that the above dynamic team problem admits an optimal solution [30]. The dynamic
team problem can be reduced to a static team problem using Lemma 8.2 [35]. In the corresponding RST
problem, each agent observes a mean-zero unit variance Gaussian random variable that is independent of
the observation of the other agent. The cost function for the RST is
cS(y1, u1, u2) =
(
(u1 − y1)2 + (u2 − u1)2
)
exp
(−u21 + 2y2u1
2
)
.
The cost function for the dynamic problem cD is in classes IC (Y1,U1) and IC (Y1 × Y2 × U1,U2). The cost
function cS for the corresponding RST is in the class IC (Y1 × Y2 × U1,U2) (which follows from Lemma 8.5
to be introduced and proved later). However, cS is not in the class IC (Y1,U1) because as |u1| → ∞, the cost
goes to zero for any fixed value of y1. Therefore, the result of Theorem 7.15 is not applicable to the RST
problem.
The above example illustrates that the results we obtained for the static team problems in Sections 7.2
and 7.3 are not readily applicable to all dynamic team problems that admit static reductions. A certain struc-
ture on the cost function of a dynamic team and further assumptions on the corresponding RST problem are
needed to prove the existence of a team-optimal solution. In the next subsection, we state the assumptions
that we make on the dynamic team problem in order to establish existence.
8.2.1 Assumptions on Dynamic Team
In order to show the existence of optimal strategies in dynamic teams, we assume the following structure.
Assumption 8.4. 1. The dynamic team problem satisfies Assumptions 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3.
2. The agents in the team do not share their observations with anyone. Any agent who acts more than
once does not recall its past observation(s).
3. The cost function c of the dynamic team problem is in the structural form
c(ω0,y1:N1:T ,u1:N1:T ) =
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
cit(uit, ω0,u1:N1:t−1,y1:N1:t−1,yit) + κ(ω0,y1:N1:T ,u1:N1:T ),
where cit is a non-negative and continuous function in the class IC
(
Ω0 × U1:N1:t−1 × Y1:N1:t−1 × Yit ,U it
)
for
all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ], and κ is a non-negative continuous function of its arguments.
4. For all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ], the continuous function ϕit : Yit × Ω0 × U1:N1:t−1 → R+, as defined in
Assumption 8.3, is strictly positive at all points in its domain.
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In the rest of this section, we consider dynamic team problems satisfying Assumption 8.4. Let us first
recall the following features of the corresponding RST problem:
1. If the behavioral control strategy of Agent i at time t is piit, then the joint measure on U it × Yit in the
corresponding RST problem is piit(duit|yit)νit(dyit).
2. Recall from Assumption 8.2 that there exists a set of behavioral strategies p˜i1:N1:T that achieves a finite
cost J(p˜i1:N1:T ) in the dynamic team. Since RST and dynamic team problems are equivalent problems
(see Theorem 8.3), RST also achieves the same cost with the behavioral strategies p˜i1:N1:T .
Let {Pit ⊂ Rit}i∈[N ],t∈[T ] be the set of behavioral strategies of the agents such that there exists pi1:N1:T
satisfying piit ∈ Pit and
J(pi1:N1:T ) ≤ J(p˜i1:N1:T ).
Define λit(duit, dyit) := piit(duit|yit)νit(dyit) for piit ∈ Pit , and letMit denote the set of all such λit.
If the optimal behavioral strategies of the agents exist, then the optimal behavioral strategy of Agent
(i, t) in the RST problem must lie in the set Mit. In order to establish the existence of optimal strategies
in the dynamic team problem, we show that Mit is a tight set of measures using a similar approach as in
Lemma 7.14. In the next subsection, we prove some auxiliary results that are needed to show that the set
of measuresMit is tight. This is a crucial part of the proof of existence of optimal strategies in the dynamic
team problem.
8.2.2 Auxiliary Results
Our first auxiliary result is as follows.
Lemma 8.4. 1. For any i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ] and any ω0 ∈ Ω0 and u1:N1:t−1 ∈ U1:N1:t−1, we have∫
Yit×Uit
ϕit(yit;ω0,u1:N1:t−1)λit(duit, dyit) = 1.
2. For any i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ] and λit ∈ ℘(Yit × U it ),∫
Ω0×Y1:N1:T ×U1:N1:T
cit(uit, ω0,u1:N1:t−1,y1:N1:t−1,yit)ϕ(ω0,y1:N1:T ,u1:N1:T ) dλ1:N1:T P {dω0}
=
∫
Ω0×Y1:N1:t−1×U1:N1:t−1×Yit×Uit
c¯it(uit, ω0,u1:N1:t−1,y1:N1:t−1,yit) dλ1:N1:t−1 dλit P {dω0} ,
where
c¯it(uit, ω0,u1:N1:t−1,y1:N1:t−1,yit) = cit(uit, ω0,u1:N1:t−1,y1:N1:t−1,yit)×
ϕit(yit;ω0,u1:N1:t−1)×
t−1∏
s=1
N∏
j=1
ϕjs(yjs;ω0,u1:N1:s−1). (8.4)
Proof:
1. The statement holds for all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ] by the definition of ϕit in Assumption 8.3.
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2. This is a consequence of the first statement.
Recall that we introduced a class of functions IC (·, ·) in Definition 7.6. In the next lemma, we show
that if we multiply a function in this class with a lower-semicontinuous function that does not vanish in its
domain, then the resulting function also belongs to the same class. We use this result to show that the cost
in (8.4) belongs to the class IC
(
Ω0 × U1:N1:t−1 × Y1:N1:t−1 × Yit ,U it
)
.
Lemma 8.5. Let φ1 : A × B → R be a measurable function and φ2 : A → R+ be a lower-semicontinuous
function that is strictly positive everywhere in its domain. If φ1 is in the class IC (A,B), then the product
function φ := φ1φ2 is also in the class IC (A,B).
Proof: Fix m > 0 and a compact set K ⊂ A. Define M := mmina∈K φ2(a) . Then, by the property of class
IC (A,B) functions, there exists a compact set L ⊂ B, depending on K and M , such that
inf
K×L{
φ1(a,b) ≥M.
Now, due to the property of infimum, we get
inf
K×L{
φ(a,b) ≥ inf
K×L{
φ1(a,b) min
K
φ2(a) = m,
which completes the proof of the statement.
As a result of the lemma above, we have the following fact.
Lemma 8.6. The function c¯it, as defined in (8.4), is a non-negative and continuous function in the class
IC
(
Ω0 × U1:N1:t−1 × Y1:N1:t−1 × Yit ,U it
)
.
Proof: By Assumption 8.4, cit(uit, ω0,u1:N1:t−1,y1:N1:t−1,yit) is in the class IC
(
Ω0 × U1:N1:t−1 × Y1:N1:t−1 × Yit ,U it
)
.
Now, in the statement of Lemma 8.5, take the functions φ1 and φ2 as
φ1(uit, ω0,u1:N1:t−1,y1:N1:t−1,yit) := cit(uit, ω0,u1:N1:t−1,y1:N1:t−1,yit)
φ2(ω0,u1:N1:t−1,y1:N1:t−1,yit) := ϕit(yit;ω0,u1:N1:t−1)×
t−1∏
s=1
N∏
j=1
ϕjs(yjs;ω0,u1:N1:s−1),
and note that φ2 is a continuous and strictly positive function in its domain (see Part 4 of Assumption 8.4).
As a consequence of the result in Lemma 8.5, we obtain that the function c¯it is non-negative and continuous
in the class IC
(
Ω0 × U1:N1:t−1 × Y1:N1:t−1 × Yit ,U it
)
. This completes the proof of the lemma.
We now have all the auxiliary results needed for showing existence. In the next subsection, we prove
that any dynamic team as described above admits a team-optimal solution in deterministic strategies of the
agents.
8.3 Proof of Existence of Optimal Strategies
Our first result in this subsection is that Mit is a tight set of measures for all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ]. This
implies that during the search of optimal strategies of the agents in the RST problem, we can restrict the
joint measures on the action and observation spaces of Agent (i, t) to a tight set of measuresMit.
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Lemma 8.7. The set of measuresMit is tight for all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ].
Proof: See Section 8.6.
We now turn our attention to showing the existence of optimal strategies in dynamic team problems.
We use the result of the lemma above to prove this fact in the next theorem.
Theorem 8.8. If a dynamic team problem satisfies Assumption 8.4, then it admits a team-optimal solution in
deterministic strategies.
Proof: Consider a sequence of behavioral strategies of the agents {(pi1:N1:T )n}n∈N ⊂M1:N1:T that satisfies
limn→∞ J((pi1:N1:T )n) = inf J(pi1:N1:T ), where J is the expected cost functional of the dynamic team problem. Let
{(λit)n}n∈N ⊂Mit be defined as
(λit)n(duit, dyit) = (piit)n(duit|yit)νit(dyit), n ∈ N.
Since {(λit)n}n∈N is a tight sequence of measures, we know that there exists a weak* convergent subsequence
of measures. For every i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ], let {(λit)nk}k∈N be the weak* convergent subsequence of measures
converging to (λit)0. Define the behavioral strategy (piit)0(duit|yit) = (λit)0(duit|yit) for all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ].
Since cϕ is a continuous function, from the result of Theorem 7.11, we conclude that
lim inf
k→∞
∫
c ϕ d(λ1:N1:T )nkP {dω0} ≥
∫
c ϕ d(λ1:N1:T )0P {dω0} ,
or, equivalently, lim inf
k→∞
J((pi1:N1:T )nk) ≥ J((pi1:N1:T )0). Thus, optimal behavioral strategies of the agents ex-
ist in the RST problem, and the optimal behavioral strategy of Agent (i, t) is the conditional measures
(piit)0(dui|yi). Since RST is equivalent to a dynamic team problem, this is also the optimal behavioral strategy
of Agent i at time t in the dynamic team problem.
Moreover, by Blackwell’s irrelevant information theorem [4, p. 457], there exists a set of deterministic
strategies which achieves the same cost as the one achieved using optimal behavioral strategies of the agents,
which establishes the result.
We have the following corollary to the theorem above for dynamic teams in which the agents have
compact action spaces. We do not require Parts 3 and 4 of Assumption 8.4 to show the existence of optimal
strategies for this problem.
Corollary 8.9. Let us consider a dynamic team problem in which U it is compact for all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈
[T ]. If Parts 1 and 2 in Assumption 8.4 hold, then the dynamic team problem admits an optimal solution in
deterministic strategies of the agents.
Proof: As a result of Assumption 8.3, the dynamic team problem is equivalent to a reduced static
team problem defined in Definition 8.3. Note that due to the assumption, the cost function of the reduced
static team problem is continuous. Applying the result of Corollary 7.17 to the reduced static team problem,
we conclude that the reduced problem admits an optimal solution in deterministic strategies. The optimal
strategy of Agent (i, t) in the reduced static team problem is also the optimal strategy of Agent i at time step
t in the dynamic team problem due to the equivalence of the two team problems. This completes the proof
of the theorem.
We now revisit Witsenhausen’s counterexample.
126
8.3 Proof of Existence of Optimal Strategies
Revisiting Witsenhausen’s Counterexample
Recall that we were unable to prove the existence of a solution to the corresponding RST problem of Witsen-
hausen’s counterexample using the results we obtained for static team problems in Sections 7.2 and 7.3. We
now outline the essential steps of the proof above adapted to the RST of Witsenhausen’s counterexample.
Let ν1 ∈ ℘(Y1) and ν2 ∈ ℘(Y2) be probability measures that admit mean-zero unit-variance Gaussian
density functions. First note that if both agents apply zero control, then the expected cost is E
[
Y 21
]
= 1,
which is finite. Let R1 and R2 be the behavioral strategy spaces of the first and the second controller,
respectively. Let P1 ⊂ R1 and P2 ⊂ R2 be the sets of behavioral strategies of the controllers such that there
exist pi1 ∈ P1 and pi2 ∈ P2 which yield J(pi1, pi2) ≤ 1. Now, the following four steps lead to the existence of a
team-optimal solution to this problem with non-classical information.
1. For any pi2 ∈ R2, we have∫
Y2×U2
cS pi2(du2|y2)ν2(dy2)
≥
∫
Y2×U2
(u1 − y1)2 exp
(−u21 + 2y2u1
2
)
1√
2pi
exp
(
−y
2
2
2
)
pi2(du2|y2)dy2,
= (u1 − y1)2
∫
Y2×U2
1√
2pi
exp
(−(y2 − u1)2
2
)
pi2(du2|y2)dy2
= (u1 − y1)2,
where the first inequality follows from dropping the quadratic term (u2 − u1)2 from the expression of
cS , the second equality is immediate, and the third equality follows from the fact that
pi2(du2|y2) 1√2pi exp
(−(y2 − u1)2
2
)
dy2
is a probability measure over U2 × Y2. This is also a consequence of Lemma 8.4.
2. The function (u1− y1)2 is in the class IC (Y1,U1), and the function (u2−u1)2 exp
(−u21+2y2u1
2
)
is in the
class IC (U1 × Y1 × Y2,U2) by Lemma 8.6.
3. The set of measuresMi, defined by
Mi :=
{
λi ∈ ℘(Yi × Ui) : λi(dui, dyi) = pii(dui|yi)νi(dyi), pii ∈ Pi
}
is tight for i ∈ {1, 2} by Lemma 8.7. The proof essentially uses Points 1 and 2 above, coupled with
Lemma 7.13 in a sequential fashion. Using Point 1, we conclude∫
U1×Y1
(u1 − y1)2λ1(du1, dy1) ≤ E
[
Y 21
]
= 1
for all λ1 ∈M1 (or equivalently pi1 ∈ P1). Then, using Point 2 and Lemma 7.13, we conclude that the
set of measuresM1 is tight. Now, notice that∫
Y1:2×U1:2
(u2 − u1)2 exp
(−u21 + 2y2u1
2
)
dλ1 dλ2 ≤ E
[
Y 21
]
= 1.
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Since M1 is tight and (u2 − u1)2 exp
(−u21+2y2u1
2
)
is in the class IC (U1 × Y1 × Y2,U2) (see Point 2
above), we conclude thatM2 is tight by Lemma 7.13.
4. Finally, using same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 7.15, one can conclude that there exist
optimal strategies of the agents.
Notice that the above proof of existence of a solution to Witsenhausen’s counterexample is completely dif-
ferent from either of the proofs given in [30] and [33].
This concludes the discussion in this section. In the next section, we show the existence of optimal
solution in LQG team problems with “no-observation sharing” information structures using the results of this
section.
8.4 LQG Teams
We now consider a class of dynamic team problems in which the state, action and observation spaces are
Euclidean spaces, the state transition and observation functions are linear, and the primitive random vari-
ables are mutually independent Gaussian random variables. In particular, we assume that the observation
equation for Agent (i, t) is given by
yit = hit(ω0,u1:N1:t−1) + ωit, (8.5)
where hit is a linear function of its arguments and ω
i
t is a zero-mean Gaussian random vector with positive
definite covariance.
We assume that the cost function of the dynamic team problem is quadratic in the actions of the agents
and is of the following form:
c(ω0,y1:N1:T ,u1:N1:T ) =
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
‖uit − pit(ω0,u1:N1:t−1,y1:N1:t−1,yit)‖2Rit + κ(ω0,y
1:N
1:T ,u1:N1:T ), (8.6)
where {Rit}i∈[N ],t∈[T ] is a sequence of positive definite matrices of appropriate dimensions, {pit : Ω0×U1:N1:t−1×
Y1:N1:t−1 × Yit → U it}i∈[N ],t∈[T ] is a sequence of continuous functions2 and κ is a non-negative continuous
function. We henceforth refer to teams satisfying the above assumptions and having a cost function of
the form (8.6) as LQG team problems with no-observation sharing, and address existence of team-optimal
solutions below.
Theorem 8.10. Consider a dynamic LQG team problem as formulated above, where the agents do not share
their observations and the observation of each agent as given by (8.5) is corrupted by additive Gaussian noise. If
the cost is given by (8.6), then the dynamic LQG team admits a team-optimal solution in deterministic strategies.
Proof: In order to establish the result, we need to verify that all parts of Assumption 8.4 are satisfied
by the LQG team problem.
The linearity of state transition and observation equations implies that Assumption 8.1 is satisfied and
{hit}i∈[N ],t∈[T ], as defined in (8.5), are continuous functions. If we apply zero control action, then the
expected cost is finite because the cost is quadratic in the primitive random variables and their distributions
2In most cases of interest, {pit}i∈[N ],t∈[T ] are linear maps, which is the reason why we have called this class of teams LQG, realizing
that in general, with pit ’s nonlinear, c is not going to be quadratic in the u
i
t ’s.
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are Gaussian. Thus, Assumption 8.2 is satisfied. Since the observation noises are additive and Gaussian,
Assumption 8.3 is satisfied. Furthermore, due to the Gaussian nature of observation noise, we also conclude
that ϕit is strictly positive at all points in its domain for all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ] (see the proof of Lemma 8.2).
The cost function c is continuous. Since pit is continuous, the function ‖uit − pit(ω0,u1:N1:t−1,y1:N1:t−1,yit)‖2Rit
lies in the class IC
(
Ω0 × U1:N1:t−1 × Y1:N1:t−1 × Yit ,U it
)
for all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ]. The statement is then simply a
consequence of Theorem 8.8.
We have thus identified conditions under which an LQG team problem admits an optimal solution.
8.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we focused on dynamic teams with no-observation sharing information structure over Polish
spaces. Under certain sufficient conditions, we established the existence of a team-optimal solution in a
dynamic team. We also specialized the result to dynamic LQG teams, which have received significant atten-
tion in the literature in the past. Note that, contrary to the assumption in Chapter 7, the state, action and
observation spaces need not be σ-compact Polish spaces for the results to hold in this chapter.
In the next chapter, we consider certain classes of teams with observation sharing information structures
and establish the existence of team-optimal solutions in them using the theory we developed in Chapter 7
and this chapter.
8.6 Proof of Lemma 8.7
Assumption 8.2 and the structure of the cost function of the team as defined in (8.4) imply that for any
i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ], we have∫
Ω0×Y1:N1:t−1×U1:N1:t−1×Yit×Uit
c¯it(uit, ω0,u1:N1:t−1,y1:N1:t−1,yit) dλ1:N1:t−1 dλit P {dω0} ≤ J(p˜i1:N1:T )
for any choice of λ1:N1:T ∈ N 1:N1:T . Also, Lemma 8.6 implies that c¯it is in the class IC
(
Ω0 × U1:N1:t−1 × Y1:N1:t−1 × Yit ,U it
)
.
We now use the result of Lemma 7.13 and the principle of mathematical induction to prove the result.
Step 1: Consider Agent (1, 1). We know that c¯11 is in the class IC
(
Ω0 × Y11 ,U11
)
and a non-negative
continuous function. Moreover, the measure on Ω0 × Y11 is tight. Using the result of Lemma 7.13, we get
that N 11 is a tight set of measures.
Step 2: Using the same argument as in Step 1, we conclude that Mi1 is a tight set of measures for all
i ∈ [N ].
Step 3: Let us assume thatMis is a tight set of measures for all i ∈ [N ] and 1 ≤ s ≤ t− 1. Consider any
Agent (i, t). Then, c¯it is a non-negative continuous function in the class IC
(
Ω0 × U1:N1:t−1 × Y1:N1:t−1 × Yit ,U it
)
.
Moreover, the set of all possible measures on Ω0 × U1:N1:t−1 × Y1:N1:t−1 induced by N 1:N1:t−1 is tight becauseMis is
tight for all i ∈ [N ] and 1 ≤ s ≤ t − 1 by the induction hypothesis. Therefore, using the result of Lemma
7.13, we get thatMit is a tight set of measures.
This completes the induction step and we conclude that Mit is tight for all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ]. This
completes the proof of the lemma.
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Teams with Observation Sharing
Information Structures
In this chapter, we use the results proved in the previous two chapters on the existence of team-optimal
strategies in teams with no-observation sharing information structure to establish the existence of team-
optimal solutions in certain teams with observation sharing information structures. In order to establish the
existence result, we restrict the observation spaces of certain agents in a team to be countable. However, for
most general cases of interest, where observation spaces of the agents are uncountable, our approach does
not work. One of the major reasons for the failure of our approach in establishing the existence result for
teams with observation sharing information structures is that the weak* topology on measure spaces does
not appear to be strong enough so that a counterpart of the result in Theorem 7.6 holds for such teams (in
which observations are shared among agents).
One primary goal here is to identify conditions under which we can use the results proved in the previous
two chapters on static and dynamic teams with no-observation sharing information structures to establish
the existence of optimal solutions in teams with observation sharing information structures. The main math-
ematical technique to establish the existence result is that we transform the original team problem with
observation sharing information structure to a virtual team with no-observation sharing information struc-
ture over an expanded state, observation and action spaces. Thereafter, using some results from point-set
topology, we show that the results from the previous chapters are applicable to the virtual team. This allows
us to establish the existence of team-optimal solutions in a class of virtual teams, thereby establishing the
existence of team-optimal solutions in corresponding teams with observation sharing information structures.
We now outline the organization of this chapter. We first note in the next section, Section 9.1, some
mathematical challenges associated with viewing a team with observation sharing information structure as
a team with no-observation sharing information structure over expanded action spaces of the agents. In this
section, we also consider a simple two-agent static team with unidirectional observation sharing information
structure and identify three different techniques for establishing the existence result in that team1 under
various conditions. We study static and dynamic teams with countable observation spaces of the agents in
Section 9.2 with the understanding that under certain assumptions, a dynamic team can be converted to a
static one using Witsenhausen’s static reduction technique. In Section 9.3, we present a counterexample to
show that our proof technique cannot be generalized to teams with more general (observation and action
sharing) information structures. In that counterexample, the observation spaces of the agents are assumed
to be uncountable. We also provide some intuitions on why our solution approach fails for teams with more
1All three techniques discussed there leverages the results proved in Chapter 7.
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general information structures. Section 9.4 concludes the discussion of this chapter. The chapter ends with
some discussion and proof of a result used in the chapter.
9.1 Static Teams with Observation Sharing Information Structures
To illustrate the main idea succinctly, let us consider a two-agent static team problem. We use here the same
notation as introduced in Chapter 7. Assume that Agent i observes Yi and Agent 2 shares its observation
with Agent 1. Thus, Y2 is the common information between the agents, and Y1 is the private information
of Agent 1. Let c : X × Y1:2 × U1:2 → R+ denote the cost function of the team, which we assume to be
continuous.
In [136], a class of finite dynamic teams with asymmetric information was studied, where dynamic
programming fails to work. Using the common information of the agents at every time step, the authors
obtained a backward induction decomposition for computing the optimal solution. The main idea there
was that one can equivalently map the original dynamic team with asymmetric information into a dynamic
virtual team of symmetric information with an expanded state, action and observation spaces of the virtual
agents. Using the same approach for the static team at hand, albeit with arbitrary state, observation and
action spaces of the agents, we now define a new virtual team with a single agent2. To define the single-
agent virtual team problem, we need to specify the state, action and observation spaces of the virtual agent
and its cost function.
The virtual agent observes the common informationY2. In order to introduce its action space, we define
some notations. Let A denote the set of all measurable functions ζ : Y1 → U1. The action space of the virtual
agent is denoted by U˜ := A×U2. Every strategy of the virtual agent induces a map from Y1×Y2 to U1×U2.
An admissible strategy of the virtual agent is a map χ : Y2 → U˜ , such that
χ(Y2)(Y1) = {ζY2(Y1),U2} is a measurable map from Y1 × Y2 to U1 × U2. (9.1)
Now, define the cost function of the virtual agent, denoted by c˜ : X × Y2 × U˜ → R+, as
c˜(x,y2, u˜) =
∫
Y1
c(x,y1,y2, ζ(y1),u2)P
{
dy1|x,y2} , (9.2)
where u˜ = {ζ,u2}. Note that with this definition of the virtual team problem, it is a single-agent optimization
problem with information constraint.
At first glance, the description of the virtual team problem may seem complete. However, in order to
establish the existence of an optimal solution to the virtual team problem using the results of Chapter 7,
three technical issues have to be addressed:
1. We need to introduce a metric on A, so that the space A of measurable functions, endowed with this
metric, becomes a Polish space3. We also need to characterize compact subsets of the space A.
2. The strategy spaces of the agents in the original team problem and the corresponding strategy space of
the virtual agent need to be defined in an appropriate manner.
3. We need to establish the continuity (or lower semicontinuity) of the cost function c˜ over X × Y2 × U˜ .
We also need to establish that c˜ is in class IC
(X × Y2, U˜) (see also Remark 9.2 below).
2Calling it a “virtual team problem” is, perhaps, a misnomer; it is merely an optimization problem with information constraint.
3Note that if Y1 is a finite or a countable set with discrete metric, then A = (U1)Y1 , which is a Polish space under certain metrics.
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The first issue noted above is the most difficult one to resolve, and remains as an area for future research.
A subtle point associated with the second issue is the following. For every tuple of measurable functions
γ1 : Y1 × Y2 → U1 and γ2 : Y2 → U2 that are admissible strategies of Agents 1 and 2, respectively, in the
original team problem, there should be an admissible strategy of the virtual agent γ : Y2 → U˜ in the virtual
team problem such that for any realization y2, we must have
γ(y2) = {γ1(·,y2), γ2(y2)}.
The converse of the previous statement must also hold. We will say that ESS (equivalence of strategy spaces)
is satisfied if the last two statements are satisfied for the original and the virtual team problems4.
Suppose that the first two technical issues have been addressed – A is a Polish space under some metric
and admissible strategy space of the virtual agent is well-defined. We then need to check if ESS is satisfied,
and then prove the equivalence of the original and the virtual team problems. In most cases of interest, ESS
would imply the equivalence of the two team problems.
Remark 9.1. Suppose that the admissible strategy of the agents in the original team problem is any mea-
surable strategy, and the definition of admissible strategy of the virtual agent is as given in (9.1). Then, we
immediately conclude that ESS is satisfied. 
Once A is endowed with a metric, one has to tackle the third technical issue by first establishing conti-
nuity or lower semicontinuity of c˜. Thereafter, we need to check if c˜ is in class IC
(X × Y2, U˜). After all the
three aforementioned technical issues are addressed, one can apply the result on static teams developed in
Chapter 7 to teams with observation sharing information structure5.
Remark 9.2. In the third point stated above, we do not require c˜ to be in class IC
(X × Y2, U˜) to restrict the
search for optimal joint measures (over the virtual agent’s observation and action spaces) to a tight set. If c is
in class IC
(X × Y1 × Y2, U2), then there exists a tight set of joint measures M˜2 ⊂ ℘(X ×Y1×Y2×U2) that
contains the optimal joint measure for Agent 2 in the original team problem (see Lemma 7.14 for a similar
argument). If we are able to prove that c˜ is in class IC
(X × Y2, A), then the search for optimal behavioral
strategy of the virtual agent can be restricted to tight setsM1 ⊂ ℘(X ×Y2×A) andM2 := PrX×Y2×U2# M˜2 ⊂
℘(X × Y2 × U2) of joint measures. The proof techniques of Lemma 7.14 and Theorem 7.15 will then need
to be modified to establish the existence using this approach; we refer the reader to Subsection 9.5.1 for an
in-depth treatment of this technique. 
Remark 9.3. In the previous two chapters, we assumed that the cost function of the team is continuous.
However, the results of the chapters hold if the cost function is taken to be lower semicontinuous, a fact that
we freely use in this chapter. More on this will appear in Section 10.2 later. 
In the next two subsections, we show that the approach stated above can be applied if either Y1 or Y2
is countable. In the third subsection below, we show that one could use a different method to establish and
compute a team-optimal solution to the static team considered above. Thereafter, in the fourth subsection
below, we summarize the approaches taken in each of the subsections to enable us to establish the existence
of optimal solutions in teams with more general information structures.
4In other words, there should be a bijection between the admissible strategy spaces of the agents in the original team and the virtual
agent(s) in the virtual team problem.
5To apply the results of Chapter 7, we need to know a characterization for compact sets in the (topological) space of measurable
functions A. If Y1 is a finite set and U1 is a finite dimensional Euclidean space, then A is a finite-dimensional Euclidean space of
appropriate dimensions. We can endow A with any `p norm (for p ∈ [1,∞]), which will make it a Polish space. Then, compactness of
a set in A is equivalent to that set being closed and bounded.
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9.1.1 The Case of Countable Y1 and Uncountable Y2
In this subsection, we consider the case when Y1 is countable and Y2 is a Polish space (possibly uncountable),
and show that the technical difficulties that we outlined for the general case is tractable for this case. To
ease the exposition, we first consider the case when Y1 is finite.
Theorem 9.1. Consider the two-agent static team with observation sharing information structure formulated
above, in which Y1 is a finite set with a discrete metric. Assume further that (i) c is a non-negative lower
semicontinuous function, (ii) c is in class IC
(X × Y1 × Y2,U i) for i ∈ {1, 2}, and (iii) For every y1 ∈ Y1, the
conditional measure6 P
{
y1|x,y2} is continuous in (x,y2) ∈ X × Y2. If the static team (which has observation
sharing information structure) satisfies Assumption 7.1, then it admits an optimal solution.
Proof: We check that all three points mentioned above are satisfied for this static team problem. The
proof is divided into three steps:
Step 1: One can endow the space A := (U1)Y1 with sup norm. The compact set in A is well-defined: A
set A is compact in A if, and only if, it’s projection onto every coordinate of (U1)Y1 is compact.
Step 2: The strategy space of virtual agent is the set of all Borel measurable functions γ : Y2 → A×U2.
Further, the original and the virtual teams are equivalent, since Y1 is finite.
Step 3: Since c is non-negative lower semicontinuous, and (x,y2) 7→ P{y1|x,y2} is non-negative con-
tinuous, we immediately conclude that c˜ is lower semicontinuous (observe from (9.2)). Since c is in class
IC
(X × Y1 × Y2,U i) for i ∈ {1, 2} and Y1 is finite, we have for every M > 0, for every compact set
K ⊂ X × Y2, there exist compact sets Li := Li(M,K) ⊂ U i such that
inf
K×Y1×Li{×U−i
c(x,y1:2,u1:2) ≥M, for i ∈ {1, 2}.
The cost function of the virtual agent is written as
c˜(x,y2, u˜) =
∑
y1∈Y1
c(x,y1,y2, γ1(y1),u2)P
{
y1|x,y2} .
Now, fix M > 0 and K ⊂ X × Y2. Define L ⊂ A × U2 as L := (L1)Y1 × L2. It is easy to see that L is a
compact set in U˜ := A× U2. With this definition, we readily obtain
inf
K×L{
c˜(x,y2, u˜) ≥M.
Now, we can apply the existence result of Theorem 7.15 obtained for Team ST2 to the virtual team problem to
conclude that the virtual team admits an optimal solution. Since the virtual team is equivalent to the original
team with observation sharing information structure, we establish the existence of optimal strategies of the
agents in the original team problem.
If Y1 is a countable set with a discrete metric, the following result follows.
Theorem 9.2. Consider the same setting as in Theorem 9.1, except that now Y1 is countable. Under the three
hypotheses of Theorem 9.1, an optimal solution exists.
Proof: The extension requires the following two well-known results from general topology:
6The conditional measure here is conditional probability mass function since Y1 is finite.
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1. A countable product of completely metrizable spaces is completely metrizable in the product topology
[137, Theorem 24.11, p. 178]. A corollary of the preceding statement is that a countable product of
Polish spaces is Polish.
2. Tychonoff’s Theorem: An arbitrary product of compact spaces is compact in the product topology
[137, Theorem 17.8, p. 120]. For the purpose of this proof, we use the result for countable product of
compact spaces.
We endow the space A := (U1)Y1 with the product topology, which implies that A is a Polish space by the
first result above. The results in the first two steps in the proof of Theorem 9.1 follow immediately for this
problem. We need to establish the results in the third step of the proof of Theorem 9.1.
We first prove that c˜ is lower semicontinuous. First, recall the definition of c˜ from (9.2):
c˜(x,y2, {γ,u2}) =
∑
y1∈Y1
c(x,y1,y2, γ(y1),u2)P
{
y1|x,y2} .
Consider convergent sequences {xn}n∈N ⊂ X , {y2n}n∈N ⊂ Y2, {u2n}n∈N ⊂ U2, and {γn}n∈N ⊂ A, conver-
gent to x∞, y2∞, u2∞, and γ∞, respectively, in their respective topologies. Since c is non-negative lower
semicontinuous function and P
{ · |x,y2} is non-negative continuous in (x,y2), for each y1 ∈ Y1, we have
lim inf
n→∞ c(xn,y
1,y2n, γn(y1),u2n)P
{
y1|xn,y2n
} ≥ c(x∞,y1,y2∞, γ∞(y1),u2∞)P{y1|x∞,y2∞} .
The following inequality holds due to the definition of lim inf (one can also invoke Fatou’s lemma here):
lim inf
n→∞
∑
y1∈Y1
c(xn,y1,y2n, γn(y1),u2n)P
{
y1|xn,y2n
}
≥
∑
y1∈Y1
lim inf
n→∞ c(xn,y
1,y2n, γn(y1),u2n)P
{
y1|xn,y2n
}
.
From the above two inequalities, we have
lim inf
n→∞ c˜(xn,y
2
n, {γn,u2n}) ≥ c˜(x∞,y2∞, {γ∞,u2∞}).
The inequality above establishes that c˜ is lower semicontinuous.
We next prove that c˜ is in class IC
(X × Y2, A) (see also Remark 9.2). Let M > 0 and K ⊂ X ×Y2 be a
compact set. For every y1 ∈ Y1, there exists a compact set L1y1 ⊂ U1, such that
inf
K×{y1}×L1{
y1
×U2
c(x,y1:2,u1:2) ≥M.
Define L˜1 =
∏
y1∈Y1 L
1
y1 ⊂ A, and note that it is a compact set in A by Tychonoff’s theorem. Thus, for any
(x,y2) ∈ K, u2 ∈ U2 and γ1 ∈ L˜1{, we get
c˜(x,y2, γ1,u2) =
∑
y1∈Y1
c(x,y1:2, γ1(y1),u2)P
{
y1|x,y2} ≥M,
which establishes the fact that c˜ is in class IC
(X × Y2, A). The existence of a team-optimal solution then
follows immediately by following the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 7.15.
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9.1.2 The Case of Uncountable Y1 and Countable Y2
We now consider a two-agent static team problem, similar to the one described above, but with countable
Y2 and uncountable Y1 (must be a Polish space). To solve this, we decompose the original team problem
into countably many two-agent virtual team problems. For each y2 ∈ Y2, consider the following virtual
team problem given y2: virtual Agent 1 observes Y1 and decides on U1, and virtual Agent 2 does not
observe any random variable and decides on U2. The probability measure on the tuple (X,Y1) is given by
P
{
dx, dy1|y2}. The cost function of the virtual team given y2, denoted by c˜y2 : X × Y1 × U1:2 → R+, is
given by
c˜y2(x,y1,u1,u2) = c(x,y1,y2,u1,u2).
Under appropriate assumptions on the probability measure P
{
dx, dy1, dy2
}
and the cost c, we can use
Theorem 7.15 to conclude the existence of optimal strategies of the virtual agents in the virtual team problem
for fixed y2. Since this holds for all y2, we obtain the existence result for this team.
Theorem 9.3. Suppose that Y2 is countable. Suppose that there exist a continuous function η1 ∈ C(X×Y1×Y2)
and a non-negative measure νY1 over Y1 such that
P
{
dy1|x,y2} = η1(x,y2,y1)νY1(dy1).
If (i) c is non-negative lower semicontinuous function and is in the class IC
(X × Y1 × Y2, U i) for i = 1, 2, (ii)
the tuple (η1, νY1) satisfies Condition C1, and (iii) Assumption 7.1 is satisfied, then the team admits an optimal
solution in deterministic strategies of the agents.
Proof: For each y2 ∈ Y2, we first show that c˜y2 is in class IC
(X × Y1, U i) for i = 1, 2. Fix i ∈ {1, 2}
and y2 ∈ Y2. Consider M > 0 and a compact set K ⊂ X × Y1. Since c is in class IC (X × Y1 × Y2, U i),
there exists a compact set Liy2 := Li(M,K× {y2}) ⊂ U i, depending on y2, such that
inf
K×Li{
y2
×U−i
c˜y2(x,y1,u1:2) ≥M.
This implies that c˜y2 is in class IC
(X × Y1, U i) for i = 1, 2. Since c is lower semicontinuous, c˜y2 is lower
semicontinuous. Applying Theorem 7.15, we conclude that an optimal solution exists for the virtual team
problem given y2.
Let (γ˜1∗y2 , γ˜2∗y2) be the optimal strategy for the virtual team problem given y2. Define γ1? : Y1 ×Y2 → U1
as γ1?(y1,y2) := γ˜1∗y2(y1), and γ2? : Y2 → U2 as γ2?(y2) := γ˜2∗y2 , we arrive at the result. Note here that γ1?
thus defined is a measurable map.
Remark 9.4. If A is a countable set with a discrete metric, and B is any measure space, then the space of
all measurable functions γ : A → B is equal to the space BA of all functions γ˜ : A → B. Thus, when either
Y1 or Y2 is countable, we obtain the existence result readily because the measurability issues do not arise
while decomposing the original team with observation sharing to a new team with no-observation sharing
information structures. If A is uncountable, then the space of measurable functions γ : A → B is a strict
subset of the space BA. 
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9.1.3 The Case of Uncountable Y1 and Uncountable Y2
In this subsection, we consider the case when both observation spaces are uncountable Polish spaces. To
establish the existence of optimal solution to this team problem, we will use another strategy, which is
unlike the ones mentioned above. For the purpose of this section, assume that the cost function of the
team, c : X × Y1:2 × U1:2 → R+, is a non-negative lower semicontinuous function and in the classes
IC
(X × Y1 × Y2, U1) and IC (X × Y1 × Y2, U2).
To prove the existence result, we decompose the original team problem sequentially into two optimiza-
tion problems with information constraints. Since Agent 1 observes (Y1,Y2) and Agent 2 observes only Y2,
we can assume (since this is a team problem) that Agent 1 has access to U2 before taking its action7 U1.
Thus, for a given realization of y1,y2,u2, Agent 1’s optimization problem is
inf
u1
E
[
c(X,y1,y2,u1,u2)
∣∣∣y1,y2,u2] .
Since c is in class IC
(X × Y1 × Y2, U1), it is in class IC (X × Y1 × Y2 × U2, U1) (the proof of this fact
is immediate from the definition). Thus, Agent 1’s optimization problem admits an optimal solution8 by
Theorem 7.19. We make the following assumption:
Assumption 9.1. There exists an optimal strategy of Agent 1, γ˜1? : Y1 × Y2 × U2 → U1, such that it is a
continuous map. 
Remark 9.5. In Section 10.3, we present a set of sufficient conditions on a static team that implies that
the optimal strategies of the agents are continuous in their observations. In particular, if (i) all spaces are
finite dimensional Euclidean spaces, (ii) the cost function of the static team c is strictly convex and twice
differentiable in its arguments, and (iii) P
{
dx|y1,y2} = ρ(x,y1,y2)dx, where ρ is a smooth distribution
function, then under certain further conditions, Assumption 9.1 is satisfied by the static team. 
Now, for the given strategy γ˜1? of Agent 1 (defined in Assumption 9.1), let us look at the optimization
problem from Agent 2’s viewpoint. For a given realization y2 of Agent 2’s observation, Agent 2’s optimization
problem is
inf
u2
E
[
c(X,Y1,y2, γ˜1?(Y1,y2,u2),u2)
∣∣∣y2] .
Let us define c˜ as c˜(x,y1,y2,u2) := c(x,y1,y2, γ˜1?(y1,y2,u2),u2). In Agent 2’s optimization problem, c˜ is
the cost function of Agent 2. If Assumption 9.1 holds, then c˜ is a lower semicontinuous function of its argu-
ments. Furthermore, since c is in the class IC
(X × Y1 × Y2, U2), c˜ is also in the class IC (X × Y1 × Y2, U2)
(the proof is immediate). Consequently, Agent 2’s optimization problem admits an optimal solution, say
γ2? : Y2 → U2, by Theorem 7.19. Now, define γ1? : Y1 × Y2 → U1 as
γ1?(y1,y2) := γ˜1?(y1,y2, γ2?(y2)).
It is easy to verify the result of the following theorem:
Theorem 9.4. Suppose that the cost function of the team, c, is non-negative lower semicontinuous function and
7Note that we are expanding the information of Agent 1 here. Recall from the discussion in Subsection 1.4.1 that this is one of the
techniques used in decision problems to compute their solutions, provided that they exist. The reason we can use this technique here is
because Agent 2’s information is acquired by Agent 1.
8There could be more than one optimal solution to Agent 1’s optimization problem.
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in the classes IC
(X × Y1 × Y2, U1) and IC (X × Y1 × Y2, U2). If Assumptions 7.1 and 9.1 hold, then the
strategy tuple (γ1?, γ2?) forms an optimal solution of the team.
Proof: Since γ˜1? is an optimal solution to Agent 1’s optimization problem, for any measurable function
γ˜1 : Y1 × Y2 × U2 → U1 and almost-every realization y1,y2,u2, we have
E
[
c(X,Y1,Y2, γ˜1?(Y1,Y2,U2),U2)
∣∣∣y1,y2,u2] ≤ E [c(X,Y1,Y2, γ˜1(Y1,Y2,U2),U2)∣∣∣y1,y2,u2] . (9.3)
Now, for any measurable maps γ1 : Y1 × Y2 → U1 and γ2 : Y2 → U2, we have
J(γ1?, γ2?) = E
[
E
[
c(X,Y1,Y2, γ˜1?(Y1,Y2,U2),U2)
∣∣∣Y1,Y2,U2] ∣∣∣U2 = γ2?(Y2)]
≤ E
[
E
[
c(X,Y1,Y2, γ˜1?(Y1,Y2,U2),U2)
∣∣∣Y1,Y2,U2] ∣∣∣U2 = γ2(Y2)]
≤ E
[
E
[
c(X,Y1,Y2, γ1(Y1,Y2),U2)
∣∣∣Y1,Y2,U2] ∣∣∣U2 = γ2(Y2)]
= J(γ1, γ2),
where the first inequality is due to the fact that γ2? is an optimal solution to Agent 2’s optimization problem,
and the second inequality is due to (9.3). Assumption 9.1 is required here to ascertain that Agent 2’s
optimization problem admits an optimal solution. The proof of the theorem is thus complete.
Remark 9.6. Note that to prove the above theorem, we do not need to place any condition on the distribution
of the primitive random variables (X,Y1,Y2). This happens because we are solving a single agent optimiza-
tion problem twice, both times using the result of Theorem 7.19. Recall that for the result of Theorem 7.19
to hold, no restriction is placed on the distribution of the primitive random variables. 
Remark 9.7. Define c† : Y2 × U2 → R+ as
c†(y2,u2) := E
[
c(X,Y1,y2, γ˜1?(Y1,y2,u2),u2)|y2] .
In the above theorem, we can substitute Assumption 9.1 with the following hypothesis: c† is lower semi-
continuous in its arguments. One can readily check that since c is in the class IC
(X × Y1 × Y2, U2), c† is
in the class IC
(Y2, U2). Note however that Assumption 9.1 neither implies nor is implied by the preceding
hypothesis. 
The solution technique described above can readily be extended to static teams with hierarchical infor-
mation structures in which there is a strict ordering of agents based on their information: Any agent in the
ordering has access to the information of all the agents preceding itself9. In this setting, we first expand the
information of each agent to include the actions of all the agents preceding itself in the ordering. We then
solve the optimization problem of the agent having the maximum information over its expanded strategy
space. Then, we recursively solve for the optimal strategies of all the agents over their expanded strategy
spaces. After obtaining the optimal strategies of all agents over their expanded strategy spaces, we then
substitute the optimal strategy of the first agent in the ordering into the optimal strategy (over the expanded
strategy space) of the next agent in the order, and continue this process until we obtain a set of strategies of
all the agents in their original strategy spaces. The set of strategies of the agents thus obtained constitutes a
team-optimal solution of the original team problem. We need to make appropriate (continuity) assumptions
9Consider, for example, an N -agent static team in which Agent i observes {Y1:i}.
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on the optimal strategies of the agents over their expanded strategy spaces so that each agent’s optimization
problem admits an optimal solution.
The solution approach outlined above can also be extended to teams in which the ordering of the agents
(on the basis of their information) is not strict. This technique has been used in [103], somewhat implicitly,
to establish the celebrated result: Any LQG team with partially nested information structure has linear
optimal solution (in the class of all Borel measurable strategies of the agents).
As one can notice, there are two advantages of using this approach. The first is that we do not require
any assumption on the distributions of the underlying random variables. The second advantage is that this
approach provides a structured way of determining the optimal policies of the agents (assuming they exist)
recursively, as long as one can compute the optimal policy of each agent in the team over the expanded
information structure during the recursion.
9.1.4 Summary of the Results
Let us summarize the findings in the above three subsections in a suitable fashion so that it allows us to
extend the results to more general frameworks.
• In Subsection 9.1.1, the common information space of the agents was uncountable, and the private
information spaces of the agents were either countable or null sets. In this case, we defined a single
agent virtual team problem in which virtual agent observes common information and decides on maps
from private information spaces to the action spaces of the corresponding agents in the original team
problem. We can then establish the existence of optimal strategy of the virtual agent in the virtual team
problem – an optimization problem with an information constrained decision maker. If an optimal
solution exists in the virtual team problem, then we can pull back the optimal solution of the virtual
team to the original team problem, thereby establishing the existence of a team-optimal solution in the
original team problem.
• In Subsection 9.1.2, the common information space of the agents was countable, whereas the private
information spaces of the agents were either Polish spaces or null sets. In this case, we decomposed
the original team problem into countably many virtual team problems – for each possible realization
of the common information, we defined a virtual team problem with the same number of (virtual)
agents as in the original team problem. In the virtual team problem, each virtual agent observes the
private information and then decides on an action of the corresponding agent. For every realization of
the common information, if we can establish the existence of an optimal solution to the corresponding
virtual team problem, then we can establish the existence of an optimal solution to the original team
problem.
• In Subsection 9.1.3, the specific form of information structure was exploited: Since one of the agents
had all the information that the other agent had, the team problem was decomposed into two single-
agent optimization problems. Under certain sufficient conditions, we established the existence of a
team-optimal solution to this team. To establish the result, we did not place any restriction on the
distribution of the primitive random variables. The main approach consisted of (i) expanding the
information of the agent having access to the other agent’s observation to include the other agent’s
action variables, (ii) solving the optimization problem (over the expanded strategy space) faced by the
agent with more information, and (iii) solving the optimization problem faced by the agent having
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least information next, and (iv) substituting the expression of optimal strategy obtained in Step (iii)
into the expression for optimal strategy obtained in Step (ii).
Thus, the cardinality of common information space becomes crucial in order to apply the results of Chap-
ters 7 and 8 to conclude the existence of optimal strategies in teams with observation sharing information
structures. Based on the intuitions developed above, we study multi-agent stochastic teams with observation
sharing information structures in the next section. In what follows, we do not focus on the solution approach
implemented in Subsection 9.1.3, since its extension to a team where it can be adopted is straightforward.
9.2 Multi-Agent Teams with Countable Observation Spaces
A static team with more than two agents and more general (observation-sharing) information structure can
also be analyzed in an analogous fashion10 as in the previous subsections. In such a case, the common
information can be used to transform the original team problem into some other equivalent virtual team
problem (or countably many virtual team problems if the common information space is countable), establish
the existence of an optimal solution of the latter (virtual) team(s), thereby establishing the existence result
for the former.
However, there could be cases when the common information of the agents could be null set even if
there is sharing of observations among agents. Consider, for example, a three-agent static team, where
Agents 1, 2 and 3 observe, respectively, the tuples (Y1,Y2), (Y2,Y3), and (Y3,Y1). In such cases, the
analysis done in the previous subsections cannot be applied. The purpose of this subsection is to establish
the existence result for such general settings under the assumption that Yi is countable with a discrete metric
for every i ∈ [N ].
A dynamic team with observation sharing information structure and that admits a static reduction can
first be reduced to a static problem, and then the reduced static team should be analyzed for establishing the
existence of team-optimal solution in the original dynamic problem.
9.2.1 Static Teams
We now consider an N -agent static team problem with an arbitrary, but fixed, observation sharing informa-
tion structure. For the static team considered in this section, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 9.2. 1. The observation space of Agent i, Yi, is countable with a discrete metric for every
i ∈ [N ]. The spaces X and U i, i ∈ [N ] are Polish spaces.
2. The map x 7→ P{y1:N |x} is continuous.
3. The cost function c is lower semicontinuous, and is in the class IC
(X × Y1:N , U i) for every i ∈ [N ]. 
Remark 9.8. Note that we relax here the following two assumptions we made for Team ST2 in Chapter 7:
(i) X and U i, i ∈ [N ] are σ-compact spaces, and (ii) Y1, . . . ,YN are independent given X. 
Note that in [101], the author also considered a static team problem with arbitrary information struc-
ture. However, in that paper, he assumed that the cost function of the team is convex differentiable, and
observation spaces are arbitrary (measure) spaces11. In our case, we require the cost function to be only
10In case there are more than two agents, one may need to restrict the state, observation, and action spaces of the agents to σ-compact
Polish spaces.
11The main result of [101] is that person-by-person optimal solution in a class of such teams is also team-optimal.
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lower semicontinuous in its arguments, but we also require the observation spaces of the agents to be count-
able spaces with discrete metrics.
We let Ii denote the information space of Agent i, which is defined as the product of the observation
spaces of the agents whose observations are acquired by Agent i. Thus, Ii is a countable set for all i ∈ [N ].
We now describe an N -agent virtual team problem, in which the observation space of each virtual agent
is a null set. Virtual Agent i takes an action, denoted by γi, which lies in the set Ai := (U i)Ii . The cost
function of the virtual team, denoted by c˜ : X ×A1:N → R+, is given by
c˜(x, γ1:N ) =
∑
y1:N∈Y1:N
c(x,y1:N , γ1(i1), . . . , γN (iN ))P
{
y1, . . . ,yN |x} . (9.4)
We have the following result that establishes the lower semicontinuity of c˜.
Lemma 9.5. Suppose that a static team satisfies Assumption 9.2 Part 1 and 2. If c is lower semicontinuous,
then c˜, as defined in (9.4), is lower semicontinuous. If c is in the class IC
(X × Y1:N , U i) for all i ∈ [N ], then c˜
is in the class IC
(
X , (U i)Ii
)
for all i ∈ [N ].
Proof: We use an approach similar to the one used in the proof of Theorem 9.2. First, define Ai :=
(U i)Ii for every i ∈ [N ], where Ai is endowed with the product topology (thus, it is a Polish space).
Consider two convergent sequences {xn}n∈N ⊂ X and {γin}n∈N ⊂ Ai, converging to x∞ and γi∞,
respectively, for all i ∈ [N ]. This implies for every fixed ii ∈ Ii, we get γin(ii) → γi∞(ii). Since c is
non-negative lower semicontinuous and x 7→ P{y1:N |x} is non-negative continuous, for every realization
y1:N ∈ Y1:N , we get
lim inf
n→∞ c(xn,y
1:N , γ1n(i1), . . . , γNn (iN ))P
{
y1:N |xn
} ≥ c(x∞,y1:N , γ1∞(i1), . . . , γN∞(iN ))P{y1:N |x∞} .
By the property of lim inf, we get the lower semicontinuity of c˜ (see the proof of Theorem 9.2 for a similar
argument).
We now show that for any i ∈ [N ], if c is in the class IC (X × Y1:N , U i), then c˜ is in the class
IC
(
X , (U i)Ii
)
. Fix i ∈ [N ], M > 0 and a compact set K ⊂ X . Since c is in the class IC (X × Y1:N , U i), for
every realization y1:N ∈ Y1:N , there exists a compact set Liy1:N := Liy1:N (K,M) ⊂ U i such that
inf
K×{y1:N}×Li{
y1:N
×U−i
c(x,y1:N ,u1:N ) ≥M. (9.5)
Define L˜i := L˜i(K,M) ⊂ Ai as
L˜i(K,M) = PrI
i
 ∏
y1:N∈Y1:N
Liy1:N (K,M)
 ,
where PrI
i
is the projection operator that maps the product space (U i)Y1:N onto (U i)Ii . Then, by Tychonoff’s
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theorem, L˜i is a compact set12. Now, notice that for any x ∈ K, γi ∈ L˜i{ and γ−i ∈ A−i, we get
c˜(x, γ1:N ) =
∑
y1:N∈Y1:N
c(x,y1:N , γ1(i1), . . . , γN (iN ))P
{
y1, . . . ,yN |x}
≥
∑
y1:N∈Y1:N
M P
{
y1, . . . ,yN |x} = M,
where we used (9.5). The above inequality implies that
inf
K×L˜i{×A−i
c˜(x, γ1:N ) ≥M,
which completes the proof of the lemma.
The above lemma can now be used to restrict the search for optimal strategies of the virtual agents to a
tight set of measures over their action spaces (recall that virtual agents do not observe any random variable).
One can then use similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 7.15 to arrive at the following result.
Theorem 9.6. Any N -agent static team satisfying Assumptions 7.1 and 9.2 admits an optimal solution in
deterministic strategies of the agents.
Remark 9.9. Observations in a wide variety of real-world systems are obtained through sensors and/or com-
municated through noisy channels, whose outputs lie in finite sets. Thus, the assumption of the observation
spaces of the agents being finite or countable sets is not vacuous from the viewpoint of applications. 
9.2.2 Dynamic Teams
Theorem 9.6 leads to the following existence result on dynamic teams with observation sharing information
structures:
Theorem 9.7. Consider any dynamic team with observation sharing information structure that satisfies (i)
Assumption 8.4 Parts 1, 3 and 4, and (ii) Yit is countable for all i ∈ [N ] and t ∈ [T ]. Then, the dynamic team
admits an optimal solution in deterministic strategies of the agents.
Proof: The proof follows similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 9.2 and Lemma 9.5.
The next subsection studies an example, where we exhibit the technical challenges associated with
establishing the existence of optimal solutions in teams with observation sharing information structures
where the observation spaces of the agents are uncountable.
9.3 A Counterexample
In this subsection, we consider a two-agent static team problem with the same information structure as in
Section 9.1: the observation of Agent 2 is shared with Agent 1. However, in this example, the spaces Y1 and
Y2 are taken to be uncountable sets. The purpose of this counterexample is twofold: (i) To show that the
proof technique that we adopted in Chapter 7 to establish the existence of optimal solution to Teams ST1 and
ST2 cannot be readily generalized to teams with more general information structures, and (ii) To illustrate
12This follows due to the fact that projection function from a product of two spaces, endowed with the product topology, to each of
the two spaces is a continuous function [137].
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that weak* topology on the space of joint measures of agents’ actions and information is not sufficient for
establishing the existence of optimal solutions in such teams (that is, teams in which the observation spaces
of the agents are uncountable).
Let Y1 = Y2 = [0, 1] and U1 = U2 = {0, 1}. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Y i be a uniformly distributed random
variable taking values in Yi that is observed by Agent i. Further, assume that Y 1 and Y 2 are mutually
independent random variables. Take the cost function of the team as
c(y1:2, u1:2) = u1(1− u2).
Note that the cost is a non-negative, continuous, and bounded function of its arguments. Agent 1 decides on
u1 based on the realizations y1 and y2, and Agent 2 decides on u2 based on the realization y2. It is clear that
the aforementioned static team admits an optimal solution, which is to use u1 ≡ 0 and u2 ≡ 1 regardless of
the realization of the two observations (there are, of course, other optimal solutions too).
We now show that if we take weak* convergent sequences of measures
{
pi1n(du1|y1, y2)dy1 dy2
}
n∈N
and{
pi2n(du2|y2)dy2
}
n∈N
that preserve informational constraints in the limit, then the corresponding sequence of
joint measures over observations and actions of both agents, that is,
{
pi1n(du1|y1, y2)pi2n(du2|y2)dy1 dy2
}
n∈N
may not converge in the weak* limit. Consequently, a result similar to that of Theorem 7.6 may not hold
for static teams with observation sharing information structures. This also shows that we need stronger
assumptions on the underlying distributions of the primitive random variables and topologies on the measure
spaces to establish the existence of optimal strategies in teams with observation sharing information patterns.
Remark 9.10. To solve this problem, we can use the technique of Subsection 9.1.3. However, our motivation
here is different from solving the problem. We want to illustrate that – identifying sufficient conditions on
a team with general (observation and control sharing) information structure so that it admits an optimal
solution – requires a different set of tools, and perhaps a different solution approach, than what is developed
in the thesis. 
We now construct the sequences {pi1n}n∈N and {pi2n}n∈N. For any n ∈ N, define hn : [0, 1]→ {0, 1} as
hn(y) =
{
1 if [2ny] is even
0 otherwise.
Define An ⊂ [0, 1] as
An = {1} ∪
2n−1−1⋃
k=0
[
2k
2n ,
2k + 1
2n
)
. (9.6)
Then, hn(y) = 1 for all y ∈ An and 0 otherwise. Note that Lebesgue measures of An and A{n are equal and
1
2 . We also note that
hn(y)(1− hn(y)) = 0 for all y ∈ [0, 1]. (9.7)
Consider sequences of strategies of Agents 1 and 2, given by
pi1n(du1|y1, y2) = 1{hn(y1)hn(y2)}(du1), pi2n(du2|y2) = 1{hn(y2)}(du2), n ∈ N.
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We have the following result.
Lemma 9.8. The sequences of joint measures {pi1n(du1|y1, y2)dy1dy2}n∈N and {pi2n(du2|y2)dy2}n∈N converge in
the weak* sense13, respectively, to
pi10(du1|y1, y2)dy1dy2 =
(
3
41{0}(du
1) + 141{1}(du
1)
)
dy1dy2,
pi20(du2|y2)dy2 =
(
1
21{0}(du
2) + 121{1}(du
2)
)
dy2.
Proof: See Subsection 9.5.2.
Note that u1 and u2 are independent of the realizations y1 and y2 in the limit. For any natural number
n ∈ N, we have∫
c(y1, y2, u1, u2)pi1n(du1|y1, y2)pi2n(du2|y2)dy1dy2 =
∫
c(y1, y2, hn(y1)hn(y2), hn(y2))dy1dy2,
= hn(y1)hn(y2)(1− hn(y2)) = 0,
where we used (9.7). However, in the limit, we get∫
c(y1, y2, u1, u2)pi10(du1|y1, y2)pi20(du2|y2)dy1dy2 = P
{
u1 = 1, u2 = 0
}
= 18 .
As a consequence of the above discussion, we claim the following.
Lemma 9.9. The sequence of measures
{
pi1n(du1|y1, y2)pi2n(du2|y2)dy1 dy2
}
n∈N
does not converge to
pi10(du1|y1, y2)pi20(du2|y2)dy1 dy2
in the weak* topology.
Proof: The proof follows from the preceding discussions.
Let us recall the flow of ideas in this section:
1. We considered a team with observation sharing information structure in which multiple optimal solu-
tions exist.
2. We considered a sequence of behavioral strategies {(pi1n, pi2n)}n∈N of the agents such that
(a) J(pi1n, pi2n) = 0 for all n ∈ N;
(b) the sequence of joint measures of each agent’s action and information converges in weak* topol-
ogy;
(c) since J(pi10 , pi20) > 0, the sequence of overall joint measures over both agents’ action and observa-
tion spaces does not converge in weak* topology.
It appears that if both observation spaces are uncountable Polish spaces and one agent shares its ob-
servation with the other agent, then convergence in weak* topology on the probability measures over each
agent’s action and information is not sufficient to ensure that overall joint measures also converge in the
13The two sequences of measures also converge in the topology of setwise convergence.
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weak* sense. Consequently, we need to endow the space of probability measures over each agent’s action
and information with a stronger topology (say topology of setwise convergence or norm convergence) to
ensure that the overall joint measures converge in weak* sense. We leave this topic for future research.
9.3.1 A Comment on the Counterexample
In the previous section, it may not be clear to the reader what led to the failure of the approach we outlined
in Section 9.1 for the counterexample above. In order to pinpoint the reason, a digression from the original
discussion is required. We consider the following problem. Let Y and U be uncountable Polish spaces and
let µ ∈ ℘(Y) be a probability measure over Y. Consider the set D of all measurable functions γ : Y → U .
How can we turn D into a Polish space?
Suppose we consider a subset D1 ⊂ D of second-order measurable functions, that is,
D1 :=
{
γ ∈ D :
∫
Y
‖γ(y)‖2U µ(dy) <∞
}
.
One can immediately notice that D1 is a vector space. In fact, the vector space D1 is a Banach space, but in
general, not separable. Thus, this approach does not work.
Instead, let us endow the space D with a very peculiar topology. Consider the space of all joint measures
N ⊂ ℘(U × Y) such that for every ν ∈ N , we have (i) PrY#ν = µ, and (ii) there exists γ ∈ D such
that ν(du|y) = 1{γ(y)}(du). One can easily conclude that there is a natural bijection between the space of
functionsD and the subsetN of probability measures. One can endowD with the coarsest topology such that
this natural bijection is a homeomorphism. Is the space D a Polish space with this topology? Unfortunately,
the answer is no due to the following reason.
Since N is a subset of a complete separable metric space, it is a separable metric space. However, N
is neither an open nor a closed set14. Thus, N is not a Polish space, which further implies that D is not a
Polish space. In the counterexample studied in the previous section, the reason for the failure is due to the
aforementioned fact. See also some related discussions in [132], where the authors study a new topology,
called the topology of information, on the space of probability measures over Polish spaces.
9.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied certain classes of teams with observation sharing information structures, and
proved the existence of team-optimal solutions for them. For a team with observation sharing information
structure, we showed that if the observation spaces of the agents are countable sets with discrete metrics,
then under certain mild conditions, a team-optimal solution exists. To prove this result, we reformulated
the original team problem over strategy spaces of the agents, and then established the existence of optimal
strategies by leveraging the main results of Chapters 7 and 8.
In the next chapter, we study some applications of the theory developed in Chapters 7, 8, and this
chapter. We also present some extensions of the results proved in these chapters.
14One can use Lemma 9.8 to show that N is not closed. To show that N is not open, one needs to show that N { is not closed,
which can be showed by the following example: Let Y = {y} and U = {u1, u2}. Consider {µn}n∈N ⊂ N { ⊂ ℘(Y × U) given by
µn(u1, u2, y) = 11+n1{u1} +
n
1+n1{u2} for all n ∈ N. Then, µn
w∗
⇀ µ0, where µ0(u1, u2, y) = 1{u2} ∈ N . Thus, N { is not closed.
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9.5.1 On Remark 9.2
In Remark 9.2, we noted that it suffices to prove that c˜ is in classes IC
(X × Y2, A) and IC (X × Y2, U2). In
this case, the search for optimal behavioral strategies can be restricted to tight sets M1 ⊂ ℘(X × Y2 × A)
andM2 ⊂ ℘(X ×Y2 ×U2) of joint measures. To establish the existence of an optimal solution to the virtual
team, the following lemma will be useful.
Lemma 9.10. Suppose that X , Y, U1 and U2 are Polish spaces, and let ν ∈ ℘(X × Y). Let {µ1n}n∈N ⊂
℘(X × Y × U1) and {µ2n}n∈N ⊂ ℘(X × Y × U2) be two weak* convergent sequences of measures satisfying
µin(dui, dy, dx) = µin(dui|y)ν(dx, dy), i ∈ {1, 2}, converging to µ10 and µ20, respectively15. Define a sequence of
measures {λn}n∈N ⊂ ℘(X × Y × U1 × U2) such that
λn(dx, dy, du1, du2) = µ1n(du1|y)µ2n(du2|y)ν(dx, dy).
Then, any weak* convergent subsequence of {λn}n∈N converges to a measure λ0 ∈ ℘(X ×Y ×U1×U2) given by
λ0(dx, dy, du1, du2) = λ0(du1, du2|y)ν(dx, dy),
with PrX×Y×U
i
λ0 = µi0 (this limiting measure λ0, however, need not be unique).
Furthermore, if µ10(du1|y) or µ20(du2|y) is induced by a measurable function, then the sequence {λn}n∈N
converges to a unique limit λ0, where λ0 satisfies
λ0(dx, dy, du1, du2) = µ10(du1|y)µ20(du2|y)ν(dx, dy). (9.8)
Proof: Since the sequence of measures {λn}n∈N is tight by Lemma 4.1 in [132, p. 101], there exists a
weak* convergent subsequence. Consider any weak* convergent subsequence, say {λnk}k∈N, with the limit
denoted by λ0. Note that for every k ∈ N, we have
λnk(dx, dy, du1, du2) = λnk(du1, du2|y)ν(dx, dy) = µ1nk(du1|y)µ2nk(du2|y)ν(dx, dy).
By Lemma 7.5, the limit λ0 of the subsequence satisfies
λ0(dx, dy, du1, du2) = λ0(du1, du2|y)ν(dx, dy).
Since pullback of a sequence of measures is a weak* continuous operation [116, Lemma 5.2.1, p. 118], we
know that
PrX×Y×U
i
λ0(dx, dy, dui) = µi0(dx, dy, dui) = µi0(dui|y)ν(dx, dy) i ∈ {1, 2}.
Now we prove the second part of the statement. Disintegration of measure λ0 gives
λ0(dx, dy, du1, du2) = λ0(dui|uj ,y)µj0(duj |y)ν(dx, dy),
15Note that the limit measures µ10 and µ
2
0 satisfy the information constraints due to Lemma 7.5.
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where i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. Now, if µj0(duj |y), for any j ∈ {1, 2}, is induced by a measurable function in the
equation above, then λ0(dui|uj ,y) can simply be replaced with λ0(dui|y) without any loss. Consequently,
(9.8) holds. In this case, (i) the sequence {λn}n∈N admits a unique cluster point, and (ii) since {λn}n∈N
is tight, every subsequence of {λn}n∈N has a further convergent subsequence (due to Prohorov’s theorem),
which converges to λ0 (since the sequence has a unique cluster point). Therefore, the sequence {λn}n∈N
converges in the weak* topology16 to λ0. The proof of the lemma is thus complete.
Now, coming back to the virtual team problem, suppose {µ1n}n∈N ⊂ M1 and {µ2n}n∈N ⊂ M2 are
sequences of measures such that
lim
n→∞
∫
c˜ µ1n(da|y2)µ2n(du2, dy2, dx)→ inf
µ1,µ2
∫
c˜ µ1(da|y2)µ2(du2, dy2, dx),
where infimum is taken over all (µ1, µ2) that satisfy all information and marginal constraints. One can
immediately notice that the above lemma can be used to extract a convergent subsequence of the joint
measures {µ1n(da|y2)µ2n(du2, dy2, dx)}n∈N, whose limit achieves the minimum expected cost in the virtual
team problem (as long as c˜ is lower semicontinuous) and satisfies the informational constraints.
9.5.2 Proof of Lemma 9.8
We want to show that pi2n(du2|y2)dy2 converges weakly to
pi20(du2|y2)dy2 =
(
1
21{0}(du
2) + 121{1}(du
2)
)
dy2.
Let g ∈ Cb(Y2 × U2), and note that g is uniformly continuous. Recall An ⊂ [0, 1] from (9.6), which satisfies
y ∈ An, hn(y) = 1. Consider the following∣∣∣∣ ∫ g(y2, hn(y2))dy2 − 12
∫
(g(y2, 0) + g(y2, 1))dy2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1∑
i=0
1
2
∣∣∣∣ ∫
An
g(y2, i)dy2 −
∫
A{n
g(y2, i)dy2
∣∣∣∣.
For  > 0, let δ > 0 be the number such that for all y˜2, y2 ∈ Y2 satisfying |y˜2 − y2| < δ, we get
|g(y˜2, i)− g(y2, i)| < .
Pick the natural number N such that 12N < δ. Then, for any n ≥ N , we have
g(y2, i) < g
(
y2 + 12n , i
)
+ .
16This claim can be proved by contradiction. Suppose that the sequence has a unique cluster point, but does not converge. Then, there
exists an open neighborhood of λ0 and a subsequence {λnk}n∈N such that the subsequence lies in the complement of the neighborhood
of λ0. This subsequence has a further subsequence that converges to λ0, a contradiction. Thus, the sequence {λn}n∈N must converge
to λ0.
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Furthermore, if y2 ∈ An \ {1}, then y2 + 12n belongs to A{n. This implies∣∣∣∣ ∫
An
g(y2, i)dy2 −
∫
A{n
g(y2, i)dy2
∣∣∣∣
<
∣∣∣∣ ∫
An\{1}
g
(
y2 + 12n , i
)
dy2 −
∫
A{n
g(y2, i)dy2
∣∣∣∣+ 2 < .
Since the above inequality holds for both i ∈ {0, 1}, we conclude that
lim
n→∞
∣∣∣∣ ∫ g(y2, hn(y2))dy2 − 12
∫
(g(y2, 0) + g(y2, 1))dy2
∣∣∣∣ = 0.
Thus, pi2n(du2|y2)dy2 converges weakly to
pi20(du2|y2)dy2 =
(
1
21{0}(du
2) + 121{1}(du
2)
)
dy2.
We now show that pi1n(du1|y1, y2)dy1 dy2 also converges weakly to
pi10(du1|y1, y2)dy1 dy2 =
(
3
41{0}(du
1) + 141{1}(du
1)
)
dy1dy2.
Let g ∈ Cb(Y1 × Y2 × U1). In fact, g is uniformly continuous. Consider the following∣∣∣∣ ∫ g(y1, y2, hn(y1)hn(y2))dy1dy2 − ∫ (34g(y1, y2, 0) + 14g(y1, y2, 1)
)
dy1dy2
∣∣∣∣
≤
1∑
i=0
(
1
4
∣∣∣∣ ∫
An
∫
An
g(y1, y2, i)dy2dy1 −
∫
An
∫
A{n
g(y1, y2, i)dy2dy1
∣∣∣∣
+14
∣∣∣∣ ∫
An
∫
An
g(y1, y2, i)dy2dy1 −
∫
A{n
∫
A{n
g(y1, y2, i)dy2dy1
∣∣∣∣
+14
∣∣∣∣ ∫
An
∫
An
g(y1, y2, i)dy2dy1 −
∫
A{n
∫
An
g(y1, y2, i)dy2dy1
∣∣∣∣
)
.
By the same argument as above, we can prove that as n→∞, the right side of the above equation goes
to 0. This establishes the statement of the lemma.
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Applications and Extensions
In this chapter, we apply the results obtained in the previous three chapters to establish the existence of
team-optimal solutions to a wide class of static and dynamic teams with asymmetric information. We also
determine a set of sufficient conditions on a static team with no-observation sharing information structure
under which the team-optimal strategies of the agents in the static team are continuous in their measure-
ments.
In the next section, we turn our attention to examples of teams, some of which are LQG teams with
non-nested (non-classical) information structures. Existence of team-optimal strategies in some of the team
problems formulated in the next section is established for the first time.
10.1 Applications of The Existence Results
In this section, we present some examples of teams with asymmetric information and establish the existence
of team-optimal policies in them. In all the examples that fall into the classical LQG team framework,
Theorem 8.10 leads to the conclusion that team-optimal strategies exist. Except for the scalar Witsenhausen’s
counterexample and the Gaussian test channel, existence of optimal strategies was not known for any of the
LQG teams considered in this section. We also establish the existence of Nash equilibria in certain Bayesian
games that are strategically equivalent to team problems.
10.1.1 Static LQG Teams
Assume that X and W i, i ∈ [N ] are mutually independent scalar mean-zero Gaussian random variables with
finite variance. Let Y i = X + W i. One can then verify that if X is the state of the system and Y i is the
observation of Agent i, then the team satisfies Assumptions 7.2. Consider the following four cost functions
of the team:
c1(x, y1:N , u1:N ) =
N∑
i=1
(
(ui)4 − (ui − x)2
)2
,
c2(x, y1:N , u1:N ) =
∣∣∣∣x+ N∑
i=1
ui
∣∣∣∣+ N∑
i=1
|ui − x|,
c3(x, y1:N , u1:N ) =
∣∣∣∣x+ N∑
i=1
ui
∣∣∣∣+ N∑
i=1
|ui|,
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c4(x, y1:N , u1:N ) =
(
x+
N∑
i=1
ui
)2
+
N∑
i=1
(ui)2.
The cost c1 is a continuous non-convex differentiable function. The costs c2 and c3 are continuous convex
but non-differentiable functions. Cost c4 is a convex differentiable function. One can readily verify that all
four cost functions are in class IC
(X × Y1:N ,U i) for every i ∈ [N ]. The results of [101] and [102] cannot
be applied to the teams with the cost functions c1, c2, and c3, but the result of [101] can be applied to a
team with cost c4. However, using Theorem 8.10, we readily conclude that all aforementioned teams admit
optimal solutions in the deterministic strategies of the agents1.
Now assume that X and Y i are all jointly Gaussian with zero mean and a positive definite co-variance
matrix. Pick any of the four cost functions above and consider a static team with this cost function in which
Agent i observes Y i. With this distribution of primitive random variables, one can verify that the team
satisfies Assumption 8.4. Theorem 8.8 implies that team-optimal solution exists in this team as well. It
should be noted that this team does not satisfy the assumptions required for applying Theorem 7.15. In
particular, the observations of the agents given the state may not be mutually independent in this setting.
10.1.2 Single-Agent Finite Horizon (Static Output Feedback) LQG problem
Consider a linear system in which all primitive random variables are Gaussian and mutually independent
of each other. The agent has a stagewise additive quadratic cost function. The information available to the
controller at time t is Yt, where Yt = HtXt +Wt for some matrix Ht of appropriate dimensions, that is, we
have a static output feedback problem. The total cost to the controller is
c(x1:T+1,u1:T ) =
T∑
t=1
(
xTt+1Qxt+1 + uTt Rut
)
, Q ≥ 0, R > 0.
Since this is an LQG problem with no sharing of observation, it satisfies both hypotheses of Theorem 8.10.
The cost function for the corresponding reduced static team cS is given by
cS(ω0,y1:T ,u1:T ) = c(x1:T+1,u1:T )
T∏
t=1
Nt(yt −Htxt)
Nt(yt)
,
where Nt is the probability density function of the noise Wt.
Using Theorem 8.10, we then conclude that an optimal static output feedback controller exists. This
solution, however, need not be linear [138].
10.1.3 Teams with Linear State Evolution and Quantized Observations
For simplicity, consider static teams of Subsection 10.1.1, but with the following quantized observation
functions:
Y i = hi(X +W i), i ∈ [N ],
1We can also use Theorem 7.15 here to conclude the existence of team-optimal strategies in all four static teams.
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where hi is a quantization function. This implies that Yi is a countable space, which we endow with discrete
metric, for all i ∈ [N ]. For all four cost functions, we readily conclude the existence of optimal solutions by
Theorem 7.15.
Now, in the above static teams with quantized observations, assume that the agents share their observa-
tions in an arbitrary manner, but the information structure is fixed prior to the beginning of the activity. We
again conclude the existence of team optimal solutions by Theorem 9.6. The expression of the cost function
for the corresponding reduced static team problem depends on the quantization functions hi, i ∈ [N ].
In the same vein, consider the single-agent finite horizon problem considered in the previous subsection,
but with quantized observations, that is,
Yt = ht(HtXt +Wt),
where ht is a quantization function. Fix an information structure of the agent so that the agent, at any time,
recalls complete history, or a subset of past observations. We can again apply the result of Theorem 9.6 to
conclude the existence of optimal solution in this “team” problem. Thus, a large class of single-agent dynamic
decision problems with countable observation spaces and limited memory admits team optimal solutions.
10.1.4 The Gaussian Test Channel
The Gaussian test channel consists of an encoder and a decoder. The source observes a zero mean Gaussian
random variable X1 with variance σ21 , which is encoded by the encoder (Agent 1), and the encoded symbol
U1 is sent across a noisy channel to a decoder. The additive noise W2 on the channel is assumed to be a zero
mean Gaussian random variable with variance σ2w. The decoder (agent 2) observes the corrupted message
Y2, and estimates the realization of the random variable X1 available at the source. The decoder’s estimate
is denoted by U2.
y2
w2
γ1 γ2
x1 u1 u2
Figure 10.1: A figure depicting the unified setup of the Gaussian test channel and Witsenhausen’s
counterexample from [34].
The information structure of the encoder is I11 = {X1} and of the decoder is I22 = {Y2}. Thus, this
is an example of a team with asymmetric information. Note that the observation of Agent 2 satisfies the
observation equation (8.5). Lemma 8.2 implies that this dynamic team problem admits a static reduction.
The cost function of the team of encoder and decoder is2
c(x1, u1, u2) = λu21 + (u2 − x1)2, λ > 0.
One can check that the cost function of the team is of the form in (8.6). The cost function for the corre-
sponding RST problem cS is given by
cS(x1, u1, u2) = c(x1, u1, u2) exp
(−u21 + 2u1y2
2
)
.
2For the Gaussian test channel, this corresponds to “soft-constrained” version; the standard version has a second moment (hard)
constraint on u1. One can show, however, that existence of an optimal solution to one implies existence to the other, and vice versa.
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It is well known that the optimal encoding and decoding strategies are linear in their arguments, despite
the fact that the information structure is non-nested. The only known proof of this result (and therefore of
the existence of a solution to this team problem) is an indirect one, that uses information theoretic concepts;
see, for example [34]. We now have here another proof of the existence of team-optimal strategies to the
Gaussian test channel as a consequence of Theorem 8.10.
Remark 10.1. The existence result also holds for the more general two-agent LQG problem introduced in
[34], which subsumes the Gaussian test channel and Witsenhausen’s counterexample as special cases. For
such extensions, see also [111].
10.1.5 Vector Gaussian Test Channel and Witsenhausen’s Counterexample
Consider the setup depicted in Figure 10.1, with a difference that all random vectors take values in finite
dimensional Euclidean spaces of appropriate dimensions. Furthermore, we assume that W2 has a strictly
positive definite covariance, denoted by Σw2, and the entries in W2 can be correlated. First, we study vector
Gaussian test channel. Consider the cost function of the team as
c(x1,u1,u2) = λ‖u1‖2 + ‖u2 −Hx1‖2, λ > 0,
where H is a matrix of appropriate dimensions. The vector Gaussian test channel admits a static reduction,
and the cost function for the corresponding RST problem cS is given by
cS(x1,y2,u1,u2) = c(x1,u1,u2) exp
(
−12
(
(y2 − u1)TΣ−1w2(y2 − u1)− yT2 Σ−1w2y2
))
= c(x1,u1,u2) exp
(
1
2
(
2uT1 Σ−1w2y2 − uT1 Σ−1w2u1
))
.
It has been shown that under some specific assumptions on the covariance matrix of the noise variable
W2, optimal encoding and decoding schemes exist in the multidimensional Gaussian test channel, again
using information theoretic tools; see [4, Section 11.2.3] and references therein for a review of such results.
In particular, if certain “matching conditions” hold, that is, if the rate distortion achieving transition kernel
is matched with the channel capacity achieving source distribution (see [139] and Remark 11.2.1 in [4] in
the context of Gaussian systems), then optimal encoding-decoding strategies will exist.
As in the scalar case, the multidimensional Gaussian test channel admits static reduction and the cost
function has the same form as in (8.6). Theorem 8.10 implies that optimal encoding-decoding strategies exist
even if X1, U1 and U2 take values in different Euclidean spaces. Thus, a large class of multidimensional
Gaussian test channel problems admits optimal solutions.
A vector version of Witsenhausen’s counterexample has also been studied recently [140]. In this formu-
lation, X1,U1,W1 and U2 are all vectors in Rn with primitive random variables X1 and W1 being mutually
independent Gaussian random vectors. Until now, it was not known if vector versions of Witsenhausen’s
counterexample admit optimal solutions. We now know that the answer is in the affirmative, thanks to
Theorem 8.10.
10.1.6 A Gaussian Relay Channel
Consider now the Gaussian relay channel depicted in Figure 10.2. It comprises an encoder, a certain number
of relays and a decoder. The encoder encodes its observation and transmits it over the communication
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channel. The first relay receives the transmitted signal with an additive noise, re-encodes it and transmits
it to the next relay. Thereafter, each relay observes the signal that is transmitted by the previous relay with
an additive noise, re-encodes it and transmits it to the next relay. The decoder receives an additive noise
corrupted signal transmitted by the last relay, and then decodes it to obtain the best possible estimate of
the encoder’s observation in the mean-square sense. All the primitive random variables are assumed to be
mutually independent and have Gaussian distributions.
This problem was formulated in [141] where the authors have shown that non-linear strategies outper-
form linear strategies when there are two or more relays. Zaidi et al. studied this problem in [142], and
they showed that in fact, even with one relay, quantization based strategies outperform linear strategies of
the agents. Thus, linear strategies of encoder and decoder are optimal only in the case of the Gaussian test
channel discussed earlier, but not in the case of the Gaussian relay channel.
y2 yN
w2 w3 wN
γ1 γ2 γN
u1 u2 uNx1 y1
w1
Figure 10.2: A figure depicting the arrangement of encoder, relays, and decoder in the Gaussian relay
channel. Agent 1 is the encoder, Agent N is the decoder while Agents 2 to N − 1 are relays in the figure.
For a concrete formulation of the problem, assume that there are N − 2 relays and all state, action,
noise and observation spaces are the real line. The encoder observes a noise corrupted version of zero-
mean Gaussian random variable, X1, with variance σ21 . The observation noise of the encoder denoted by
W1 and the observation of the encoder is Y1 := X1 + W1. The encoder’s information is I1 = {Y1} and the
action of the encoder is U1. For i ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1}, the ith relay receives a noise corrupted version of the
transmitted signal, denoted by Yi := Ui−1 +Wi, and Ii = {Yi}. The ith relay outputs Ui. Finally, the decoder
receives YN and outputs UN , which is an estimate of the realization of the random variable X1. The noise
variables Wi, i ∈ [N ] are assumed to be pairwise independent, mean-zero Gaussian random variables with
some specified variances and independent of the random variable X1. Since the observations of the Agents
2, . . . , N − 1 satisfy the observation equation (8.5), we conclude that the dynamic team problem admits a
static reduction using Lemma 8.2. The cost function c of the team is
c(x1, u1:N ) = (uN − x1)2 +
N−1∑
i=1
λiu
2
i , λi > 0.
The cost function for the corresponding RST problem cS is given by
cS(x1, u1:N ) = c(x1, u1:N )
N−1∏
i=1
exp
(−u2i + 2uiyi+1
2
)
.
As we mentioned earlier, it is known for this problem that for any number of relays, non-linear strategies
outperform best linear ones. However, it is not known whether there exist optimal strategies for the agents.
Since the problem admits a static reduction and the cost function of the team is of the form in (8.6),
we conclude that optimal encoding, decoding and relay strategies exist for this problem by the result of
Theorem 8.10. It is not difficult to see that the same line of reasoning (along with Theorem 8.10) applies to
prove that optimal strategies exist for agents in a vector version of this problem as well, where all random
variables take values in appropriate dimensional Euclidean spaces (not necessarily of the same dimensions).
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10.1.7 Existence of a Nash equilibrium in a Static Non-cooperative Game
In this subsection, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria for a class of static games that are strategically
equivalent to static team problems. Consider the N -player static game in which Player i observes Yi and
takes an action Ui as a function of its observation. For simplicity, we assume that Y1, . . . ,YN are mutually
independent random variables, and their distributions are common knowledge among the players. We let
ci : Y1:N × U1:N → R+ denote the cost function of Player i. We refer to this static game as game G.
Assumption 10.1. The set of cost functions {ci}i∈[N ] is such that there exist maps αi : Y−i×U−i → R+ and
βi : Y1:N ×U−i → R which satisfy αi(y−i,u−i) > 0 for all i ∈ [N ] and a function c : Y1:N ×U1:N → R+ such
that
c(y1:N ,u1:N ) = αi(y−i,u−i)ci(y1:N ,u1:N ) + βi(y1:N ,u−i)
for all i ∈ [N ]. 
We now prove that the game described above admits a pure strategy Nash equilibrium under some
sufficient conditions.
Theorem 10.1. Consider an N -agent team problem T in which Agent i observes Yi and takes an action Ui, and
the cost function for the team is c : Y1:N ×U1:N → R+ (see Assumption 10.1 for the definition of c). Then, game
G and team T are strategically equivalent, that is, a Nash equilibrium of game G is person-by-person optimal
solution for team T, and vice-versa.
Furthermore, assume that the map c is continuous and is in class IC
(Y1:N ,U i) for all i ∈ [N ]. If static
game G satisfies Assumption 10.1, and Assumption 7.1 holds for the team problem T, then static game G admits
a Nash equilibrium in pure (deterministic) strategies.
Proof: It is easy to see that game G described in this subsection satisfying Assumption 10.1 is strate-
gically equivalent to the N -agent team problem T. This means, any Nash equilibrium of game G is also
a person-by-person optimal solution of the team T, and vice-versa. By Theorem 7.15, there exist optimal
strategies of the agents in team T that achieves the optimal cost. The optimal strategies of the agents are
also person-by-person optimal for the team T, and therefore, a Nash equilibrium of the game G. This com-
pletes the proof of the theorem.
We have the following lemma which provides a sufficient condition on the maps ci and αi such that the
cost function c of the team T is in the class IC
(Y1:N ,U i) for all i ∈ [N ].
Lemma 10.2. Let ci be in class IC
(Y1:N ,U i) and αi be a strictly positive continuous map on Y−i for all i ∈ [N ].
If the set of cost functions {ci}i∈[N ] satisfies Assumption 10.1 and βi, i ∈ [N ] are non-negative functions, then
the map c is in class IC
(Y1:N ,U i) for all i ∈ [N ].
Proof: From the result of Lemma 8.5, we know that ciαi is in class IC
(Y1:N ,U i) for all i ∈ [N ].
Since βi is a non-negative function, we conclude that ciαi + βi is in class IC
(Y1:N ,U i) for all i ∈ [N ]. This
establishes the statement.
10.2 A Comment on the Cost Functions of the Teams
In the previous two chapters, we assumed that the cost function of the team under consideration is non-
negative and continuous in its arguments. The existence results for static and dynamic teams remain valid
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if we instead assume that the cost function is lower-semicontinuous and lower bounded by an upper-
semicontinuous function. The reason for this result to hold is that the map µ 7→ ∫ f dµ is a lower-
semicontinuous function for µ ∈ ℘(X ) and a lower-semicontinuous function f : X → R+, which is bounded
from below by an upper-semicontinuous function [117, Lemma 4.3]. Thus, non-negativity and continuity of
cost function is not necessary, but was assumed to ease the exposition.
10.3 Continuity of Optimal Strategies in Static Teams
In this section, we present some sufficient conditions on the cost function and measurement channels of a
static team under which the optimal strategies of the agents (assuming they exist) are continuous functions
of their observations. We assume that the state, observation and action spaces of the agents are finite
dimensional Euclidean spaces and the cost function of the team is convex and differentiable. We first need
the following auxiliary lemma to prove the main result.
Lemma 10.3. LetA, Y, and U be finite dimensional Euclidean spaces. Let f : A×Y×U → R+ be a measurable
map that is convex and twice-differentiable in (y,u). Assume that there exists a real number λ > 0 such that
∂2f
∂u2 > λIdim (U)×dim (U) for all a ∈ A, y ∈ Y, u ∈ U ,
where Idim (U)×dim (U) is an identity matrix in Rdim (U)×dim (U). Consider a probability measure µ ∈ ℘(A × Y)
such that µ(da|y) = ρ(a,y)νA(da) for some continuous function ρ : A×Y → R+ that is differentiable in y and
a countably additive non-negative measure νA. Define gµ : Y × U → R+ as
gµ(y,u) :=
∫
A
f(a,y,u)µ(da|y) =
∫
A
f(a,y,u)ρ(a,y)νA(da).
If gµ is continuous and twice-differentiable in (y,u) and the order of integration and differentiation can be
interchanged in the expression of gµ3, then the following statements hold:
1. gµ is strictly convex in u and
∂2gµ
∂u2 > λIdim (U)×dim (U) for all y ∈ Y, u ∈ U .
2. If there exists a γ? : Y → U such that
gµ(y, γ?(y)) = infu∈U gµ(y,u) for every y ∈ Y, (10.1)
then γ? is a unique function satisfying (10.1) and is continuous.
Proof: The proofs of the statements are as follows:
1. The fact that gµ is convex in u follows immediately from the expression for gµ. Since we can inter-
change the order of integration and differentiation, we have for every y ∈ Y, u ∈ U
∂2gµ
∂u2 =
∫
A
∂2f
∂u2 µ(da|y) > λIdim (U)×dim (U). (10.2)
3See [133, Theorem A.5.1, p. 416] for a set of sufficient conditions on f so that the order of differentiation and integration can be
interchanged while differentiating gµ.
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2. First, let us define h : Y × U → U to be
h(y,u) = ∂gµ
∂u
∣∣∣∣
(y,u)
.
Since gµ is strictly convex in u, if a map γ? : Y → U exists satisfying (10.1), then it must be unique.
Now, observe that at every y ∈ Y, the first derivative of gµ satisfies
h(y, γ?(y)) = ∂gµ
∂u
∣∣∣∣
(y,γ?(y))
≡ 0. (10.3)
Note that ∂h∂u is a square matrix taking values in R
dim (U)×dim (U). From (10.2), we know that for every
y ∈ Y,
∂h
∂u
∣∣∣∣
(y,γ?(y))
> λIdim (U)×dim (U) > 0.
Now, we apply implicit function theorem to conclude that for every y0 ∈ Y, there exists a continuous
function γy0 : Y → U and an open neighborhood Ny0 ⊂ Y of y0 such that for all y ∈ Ny0 , we have
h(y, γy0(y)) ≡ 0.
The above fact, together with the fact that γ? : Y → U is the unique function satisfying (10.3), imply
that γ? is continuous, which completes the proof of the second part of the lemma.
We now establish in the next theorem the continuity property of optimal strategies of the agents for a
class of static teams.
Theorem 10.4. Consider a static team ST2 with no-observation sharing information structure (introduced in
Chapter 7) in which (i) the state, observation, and action spaces are finite-dimensional Euclidean spaces of
appropriate dimensions, (ii) Assumptions 7.1, 7.2, and 7.5 are satisfied, (iii) the cost function c is convex and
twice differentiable in the observation and action of Agent i for every realization of the state, the observations
and the actions of the other agents with
∂2c
∂(ui)2 > λIdim (Ui)×dim (Ui) for all (x,y
−i,u−i) ∈ X × Y−i × U−i, yi ∈ Yi, ui ∈ U i,
for some λ > 0, and (iv) P
{
dx|yi} = ρi(yi,x)dx, where ρi(·,x) is twice differentiable in yi for every fixed
x ∈ X . If interchanging the order of integration and differentiation is permissible4, then the optimal control
strategy of Agent i exists and is continuous in its observation.
Proof: Since the team ST2 satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 7.15, we conclude that a team-optimal
solution exists. Let γj? denote the optimal strategy of Agent j ∈ [N ] \ {i}. Then, define f as
f((x,y−i),yi,ui) = c(x,y1:N , γ1?(y1), . . . , γi−1?(yi−1),ui, γi+1?(yi+1), . . . , γN?(yN )).
4See [133, Theorem A.5.1, p. 416] for a set of sufficient conditions on c so that the order of differentiation and integration can
be interchanged while differentiating the conditional expected cost with respect to ui, conditioned on (yi,ui) and uj = γj(yj),
j 6= i, j ∈ [N ]. See the statement of Lemma 10.3 with A, Y and U replaced with X × Y−i, Yi and Ui, respectively.
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Note that f(·,yi,ui) is a measurable function on X × Y−i. We can now apply the result of Lemma 10.3 to
conclude that the optimal strategy of Agent i is continuous function of its argument, yi. This completes the
proof of the theorem.
Remark 10.2. The proof of Theorem 10.4 uses the fact that the observations of the agents given the state are
mutually independent. Since the static team ST2 satisfies Assumption 7.2, we have
P
{
dy−i, dx|yi} :=
 ∏
j∈[N ]\{i}
ηi(x,yj)νYj (dyj)
 ρi(yi,x)dx,
which can be written as P
{
dy−i, dx|yi} := ρ((y−i,x),yi)ν(dy−i, dx), where
ρ((y−i,x),yi) :=
 ∏
j∈[N ]\{i}
ηi(x,yj)
 ρi(yi,x), ν(dy−i, dx) :=
 ∏
j∈[N ]\{i}
νYj (dyj)
 dx.
Note here that ρ defined above is differentiable in yi, since ρi is assumed to be differentiable in yi. 
Example 10.1. We consider a single-agent static team problem here and illustrate the existence of a con-
tinuous optimal strategy. Let X and W be mutually independent mean-zero Gaussian random vectors of
the same dimension. Let Y := X + W be the observation of the agent. Assume that the action space
of the agent, U , is a finite dimensional Euclidean space. Let the cost function of the agent be given by
c(x,u) = ‖u‖2 + ‖u − Hx‖4, where H is a matrix of appropriate dimensions. By Theorem 10.4, we know
that this optimization problem admits an optimal solution and the optimal strategy of the agent is continuous
in the measurement. 
Unfortunately, Theorem 10.4 cannot be applied to several dynamic LQG teams like Witsenhausen’s
counterexample and the Gaussian test channel because the corresponding static reductions are not convex
in the decision variables of the agents. It would be a useful theoretical exercise to identify more relaxed
conditions, perhaps not using implicit function theorem, to establish the existence of continuous optimal
solutions5.
10.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented some applications of the theory we developed in the previous three chapters on
teams with asymmetric information and studied some extensions of the same. In particular, we showed that
the Gaussian relay channel, finite-dimensional extensions of the Gaussian test channel and Witsenhausen’s
counterexample, and the single-agent finite-horizon static output feedback control problem admit team-
optimal solutions under fairly mild conditions. We also provided some discussions on (i) the extensions of
the existing results to teams with lower semicontinuous cost functions and (ii) continuity of team-optimal
strategies of the agents in a static team with no-observation sharing information structures.
This chapter concludes Part II of the thesis. We now proceed to the final chapter of the thesis, where we
provide some concluding discussions and identify some directions for future research.
5Michael’s selection theorem, a celebrated result in functional analysis, can be of some help in establishing continuity of optimal
solutions [143, 144, 145].
156
Chapter 11
Conclusion and Future Work
In the dissertation, we studied various classes of decision problems and established the existence of appro-
priate solutions for them.
In Part I of the dissertation, we presented a novel refinement of Nash equilibrium in dynamic linear-
Gaussian games with asymmetric information, multi-stage incentive design problems and dynamic games
with resource constraints. In each of these games, we devised an algorithm that decomposes the original
dynamic problem into a sequence of static games, which can be solved to obtain a Nash equilibrium of the
original dynamic game of asymmetric information. We also established the existence of a Nash equilibrium,
which we call common information based Markov perfect equilibrium, in a class of dynamic LQG games of
asymmetric information.
In Part II of the dissertation, we first proved the existence of team-optimal solutions in a class of static
and dynamic sequential teams with no-observation sharing information structure. Then, we discussed condi-
tions under which the existence results can be extended to static and dynamic teams with observation sharing
information structures. We applied the existence results to various teams with asymmetric information, and
established, for the first time, the existence of optimal solutions in those teams.
The theories developed in the thesis can be applied to design optimal control strategies in cyber-physical
systems subject to attacks, and establish existence of optimal encoding-relaying-decoding policies in commu-
nication systems. There are several avenues that a future research can take on the subject of the dissertation.
We list them in the sequel.
11.1 Future Directions for Games
11.1.1 Sequential Equilibria in Games with Asymmetric Information
Recall that subgame-perfect equilibrium is defined for dynamic games with perfect information with perfect
recall1. In dynamic games with asymmetric information, however, the state of the game may not be observed
perfectly by all the players. Thus, the idea of subgame-perfect equilibrium cannot be applied to such games.
Due to this reason, Selten developed the solution concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium in [43], which
can only be applied to finite dynamic games of asymmetric information. Kreps and Wilson further proposed
a refinement of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the so-called sequential equilibrium, in dynamic finite games
with asymmetric information [69]. See also some related discussion in [70] and Section 6.4.
1A dynamic game is said to be of perfect information with perfect recall if at each time, all players in the game observe the state of
the game and recall the past realizations of states.
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However, it is not clear how to extend perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium to games
over uncountable state, action and observation spaces. We believe that CIMPE defined in Chapter 2 may
provide some insight on how to extend the two equilibrium concepts to a sufficiently general class of games
of asymmetric information.
11.1.2 Mean-Field Incentive Design Games
The ideas in Chapter 4 can be extended to the case when the number of players is countable. Consider a
static incentive design game with a countable number of players. If one assumes that the cost to each player
depends on the aggregate behavior of the players, the main question that arises is under what conditions, a
mean-field incentive scheme exists in such a game. This class of problems arises in, for example, determining
pricing schemes in a power network with a large number of players.
11.1.3 Infinite Horizon Games with Asymmetric Information
Infinite horizon Markov games (with average cost or discounted cost criterion) of complete information have
been studied in the past, due to their attractive equilibrium properties and applicability in various real world
settings. Since this is a game of complete information, the focus is to compute an equilibrium in Markov
strategies. In such a two-player game, it is also straightforward to show that for a fixed Markov strategy of
one player, there exists a best response strategy of the other player in Markov strategies.
However, proposing an appropriate model for an infinite horizon game with asymmetric information is
somewhat tricky. In particular, it is not clear how the information of the players should evolve in this game –
since the information grows with increasing time, the strategy spaces of the players will also grow. This may
lead to intractable analysis. A simplifying assumption or a restriction on the strategy spaces of the players
needs to be placed, which should also be natural, like the one in infinite horizon Markov games of complete
information, where the strategies of the players were restricted to be Markov. Even if an appropriate model
of such a game is proposed, establishing the existence of equilibrium will be a technical challenge, as the
corresponding virtual game features large action spaces (at the very least a set with the cardinality of the
continuum). It will be interesting to come up with reasonable models and identify novel approaches to
analyze the resulting games. For some work and a recent reference along this direction, the reader is referred
to [146] and the references therein.
11.1.4 Value of Information in Games
One of the long-standing open questions in game theory has been to determine how the behavior of the
players change in a game if extra information is provided to one or more player(s) or some information is
taken away from one or more player(s). A deeper understanding of how information structure of a game
affects the behavior of the players in that game will be crucial to firms, which have to decide on how much
information they should reveal about themselves. The solution approach developed for the dynamic games
with asymmetric information in this thesis can be applied to compute the value of information in certain
special classes of dynamic games with asymmetric information. A similar problem in static setting has been
the subject of study in [39].
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11.1.5 Building Common Information in Games
Consider a static game of incomplete information in which multiple players are allowed to talk face-to-face
before acting. This activity (talking before acting) builds common information in the game. In such a case,
DMs now have an opportunity to share their information with others, and reap a better expected utility.
However, a DM may also misrepresent its private information, if this leads to betterment of its expected
utility. Thus, a natural question that arises now is how to build common information in games, so that it
improves (in some sense) the expected utilities to all players.
11.1.6 Information as an Economic Commodity: Insider Trading and Games
Now that we understand static games with incomplete information in sufficient generality, we can add an
additional feature in such games. Before the game starts, we can now allow the players to trade their
information with other players for a payment. Such scenarios arise in, for example, finance: Insider trading
among executives has been a subject of study for a long time. Treating information as a commodity that can
be bought and sold in the market will bring new insight into the existing understanding of such phenomena.
One way to capture this scenario is to provide a payoff to certain players in a game of asymmetric information
if they agree to share certain part of their information with other players, and consider the resulting game
of asymmetric information.
11.2 Future Directions for Teams
11.2.1 Teams with Observation Sharing Information Structures
In Part II of this dissertation, we established the existence of team-optimal solutions in classes of teams with
certain specific information structures, and placed some restrictions on the observation spaces of the agents
for the same. In Section 9.3, we showed that if there is a unidirectional sharing of observations and if the
observation spaces of the agents are uncountable, then our solution approach fails2. There are many real
world scenarios in which the agents may share their observation. An example of one such scenario is the
classical one-person LQG optimization with perfect recall, where the agent recalls its past observations at
every time step.
Obtaining sufficient conditions on a team with general (observation and control sharing) information
structure under which a team-optimal solution exists is an important problem in the area, which we leave
as a topic for further research. Perhaps, we need to identify a different solution approach for establishing
existence of team-optimal solutions in teams with general information structures (the solution approach
presented in Subsection 9.1.3 provides one such alternative for a subclass of such teams.).
11.2.2 Dynamic Teams with Infinite Agents
We have not studied dynamic teams with an infinite number of agents. One of the reasons is that Wit-
senhausen’s static reduction technique has only been proved for a team with a finite number of agents.
However, no conceptual difficulty seems to appear to extend the result to teams with infinite agents. An
2Note that the solution approach adopted in Subsection 9.1.3 is applicable to this problem. Thus, for this setup, although our
approach fails to establish the existence of optimal solution, there may be other approaches that can be adopted to prove the existence
result.
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additional mathematical tool that may be required to analyze this problem, while using the same framework
as developed in Part II of the thesis, is Kolmogorov consistency theorem [116].
This problem is very interesting from applications viewpoint. Consider a large firm with a huge work-
force. The firm can be viewed as a team, with employees as agents of the team. Some insights on the
behavior of the individuals in a team with an infinite agents can throw light on the behavior of employees in
a large firm. These insights can open up yet another set of questions on communication requirements and
their effect on performance in a large team.
11.2.3 Numerical Methods for Teams with Non-Classical Information Structures
Recall that the team in Witsenhausen’s counterexample admits a team-optimal solution, but the precise
structure of optimal strategies are unknown as of now3. On the other hand, the team in the Gaussian test
channel not only admits a team-optimal solution, but we know that the optimal strategies are linear in the
information of the agents. Besides these two celebrated teams, there are several other multi-agent teams
with no-observation sharing information structure, arising mostly in communication systems, for which we
now know the existence of team-optimal solutions, but we do not yet have any idea about what the opti-
mal strategies of the agents look like. Thus, in-depth study into the structure of these optimal policies is a
welcome avenue. Further, devising a numerical method to determine optimal strategies, or obtain an ap-
proximately optimal solution for such teams is an important and relevant problem for further research. One
can then use this algorithm to obtain optimal encoding-relaying-decoding strategies in a variety of LQG-type
communication systems.
3A structural result on the optimal control strategy of the first controller in scalar Witsenhausen’s counterexample is presented in
[33, Section IV.C]. Specifically, it is piecewise real analytic, monotonically increasing, with a piecewise real analytic left inverse.
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